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Abstract 
 
Studies on the development of the accountancy profession in the ex-colony countries 
have recently adopted theoretical and methodological frameworks that linked such 
development with the socio-historical context of these countries as former colonies or 
dependants of the more developed countries. More specifically, they associate the 
emergence and development of the accountancy profession in these countries with the 
historical and contemporary global expansion of capitalism.  
 
However, there is still a need for further research. First, how global expansion of 
capitalism penetrates is different across different country settings. Hence, this process 
would be best understood by incorporating the socio-political, economic and 
historical specificity of the given country. Second, previous studies emphasize the 
internal dialectic contradictions of capitalism in analysing the changes and dynamics 
of the profession in ex-colony countries. Recent literature, however, has introduced 
methodologies that recognize the need to acknowledge the existence of any rivalling 
structures as possible external sources of the dialectic progress of capitalist 
expansion. In regard to this, the socio-political and historical context of Indonesia 
may offer a case of how the interactions between global expansion of capitalism and 
existing rivalling structures may shape the development of the accountancy 
profession. The need for further research is amplified by the fact that previous studies 
on the Indonesian accountancy profession have generally ignored the influence of 
these wider socio-political factors.  
 
The primary aim of this study is thus to investigate how the accountancy profession 
has emerged and developed in Indonesia over the last five decades. To achieve its 
objectives, this research draws insights from the tradition of the globalization theory 
as a critique to global expansion of capitalism and Robert Cox historical structure 
methodology. The central argument of this thesis is that the development of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession followed the changes in the country‟s system of 
political economy, which in turn has been heavily influenced by the relationship 
between ex-colony countries with their former colonizers within the context of the 
capitalistic world order.  In other words, this study accepts the contention that the 
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spread of the Western-style accountancy profession across the globe, including 
Indonesia, was the consequence of global expansion of capitalism. However, the 
working and the extent of such influence is also shaped by alternative social 
structure(s) existing at the global level and/or emanating from the complexities of the 
Indonesian historical and societal context.  
 
To substantiate this argument, the study uses document analysis to understand the 
development of the Indonesian accountancy profession during the three main periods 
in its history. In the first period (1954 – 1966), the analysis shows that the 
Westernization of the accounting profession was compromised by Indonesian 
nationalism, ideological division amongst the Indonesian leaders and the Cold War. 
In the second period (1967 – 1997), the process was compromised by the oligarchic 
capitalism of the New Order political regime. The Westernization of the profession 
could only reach full speed after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which has 
undermined the politico-business coalitions under the New Order that had prevented 
Indonesia from fully integrating into the global capitalist economic order.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1. 1. Background  
Accountancy, as a practice and a profession, has spread across geographical 
boundaries to become one of the most global professions. Imperialism and 
colonialism have been suggested as vital factors contributing to the spread of 
accountancy, resulting in accountancy structures in most ex-colony countries 
resembling that of their former colonizers. The adoption of a particular model of 
institutional arrangement of the accountancy profession among developing and/or ex-
colony countries needs to be explored to enhance our understanding of the historical 
development of the accountancy profession across various country settings. This 
study is concerned with the historical changes in the institutional arrangement of the 
accountancy profession and not the history of the practice of accountancy in ex-
colony countries. 
 
Three sociological perspectives on the profession, viz. the conventional, 
interactionist, and critical perspectives, have informed the studies examining the 
historical development of the accountancy profession. Conventional perspective 
theorists see the emergence and development of the accountancy profession as a 
natural consequence of the increasing needs of accountancy services to accommodate 
business expansion, economic growth and industrialization. This perspective does not 
problematize accountants‟ claim of professionalism and, as such, has received much 
criticism for neglecting to consider the influence of historical and socio-political 
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aspects of accountancy. The interactionist perspective, on the other hand, views the 
accountancy profession as being just another competing interest group in society set 
to secure and maintain the social and economic interests of its members by 
convincing others of its legitimacy and importance (Perks, 1996 p.15). Professional 
infrastructure is therefore seen as the mechanism for securing and maintaining the 
economic and social interest of accountants. However, this perspective has also been 
criticized as it ignores the influence of the structural conditions of the society in 
relation to the success and failure of a professional claim for legitimacy (Perks, 1996; 
Willmott, 1986). Shortcomings in the previous two perspectives were addressed by 
the critical perspective, which has its roots in the critical social theory, a tradition 
within sociology that emphasizes a historical analysis of social evolution in 
understanding society and its institutions (Caramanis, 1996). This perspective locates 
the emergence and development of the accountancy profession within its social, 
political and economic context and sees the professionalization of accountancy as the 
strategy of collective social mobility in achieving closure and control over the market 
for accountancy services (MacDonald, 1985), involving the interactions between 
accountants with various elements in the society including the state (Willmott, 1986). 
 
Over the last three decades, there has been increasing recognition that accounting and 
auditing is interdisciplinary in nature (see e.g. Roslender and Dillard, 2003, 
Humphrey and Lee, 2005). Therefore, the interpretive and critical perspectives have 
gained more attention as they offer theoretical and methodological frameworks 
capable of capturing the complexity of the social, economic and political factors 
surrounding the operation of accounting and auditing (see e.g. Uche, 2002). As 
methodologies, both traditions assume that power is distributed unequally in society 
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and as such, the interests and power of various social agents influencing the 
development of the profession need to be recognised. In other words, to understand 
the development of the accountancy profession in a country requires the analysis of 
the political economy relationships within that country (Puxty et al., 1987). Such 
analysis will not only help identify the major political and economic forces within the 
country but also of their relationships and interactions with each other. Both traditions 
have also made a considerable contribution in the quest to understand the dynamics of 
the accountancy profession in the context of less developed countries. 
 
The critical perspective in particular has gained increasing attention in exploring and 
understanding the dynamics of the profession in those countries, partly due to the 
limitations of mainstream accounting research, which disregards contextual 
differences, including the socio-political and historical context, between the 
developed and developing societies. Furthermore, the critical perspective recognized 
the fact that many of the ex-colony countries have had certain historical and/or 
contemporary socio-political and economic links to their former colonies in the 
developed countries from which accountancy originated. 
 
The influence of the critical perspective is apparent in the latest surge of studies on 
the emergence and development of the accountancy profession in ex-colony 
countries. Unlike the conventional or mainstream perspective, such studies do not 
attempt to compare the development of the accountancy profession in the developing 
or ex-colony countries with that of the developed countries (Bakre, 2001). Instead, 
the studies offer new explanations linking the history of the accountancy profession in 
ex-colony countries with their socio-historical context as a former colony or 
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dependant of the more developed country. Specifically, they associated the 
emergence and development of the accountancy profession in the ex-colony countries 
not only with the historical but also contemporary expansion of capitalism at the 
global level. Annisette (1999; 2000), for example, used the notion of informal 
imperialism in explaining the early development of the accountancy profession in 
Trinidad and Tobago. In the case of Jamaica, the emergence and subsequent 
development of the accountancy profession was explained using the notion of cultural 
imperialism and globalization (Bakre, 2001, 2005, 2006).  
 
According to the studies, the history of the accountancy profession in the ex-
colonized developing countries does not follow the same trajectory as that of the 
developed countries, as the development of the profession in those countries is shaped 
by the socio-political conditions inherited from the colonial era as well as the power 
configurations between countries during the post-independence/neo-colonial era. 
Because of their position as ex-colony countries, the existence and the models of the 
accountancy profession in such countries were often influenced and/or dictated by the 
need of their colonizer. As a result, it is not surprising to find the models of the 
accountancy profession that exist in the ex-colonies are “quite often traceable to their 
colonial past” (Bakre, 2001 p.8). The influence of the former colonizers on the 
development of the profession in their colonies did not stop with the end of formal 
and direct colonialism but instead continued in more indirect or informal ways 
(Annisette, 1999, Annisette, 2000) through cultural imperialism and globalization 
(e.g. Aba-Alkhail, 2001; Bakre, 2005, 2006). However, the expansion of capitalism 
and its influence on the development of the profession differs from one colony to the 
other. For example, in the Philippines, the indigenous movement to form their 
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accountancy profession was viewed as a form of native resistance against the 
imperialist, stereotyping the Filipinos as incapable of administering public monies 
(Dyball et al., 2007).  In Jamaica, a faction of the elites of the profession aspired to 
maintaining affiliations with the profession of the imperial centre and as such 
hindered the attempts at localizing the profession (Bakre, 2005, 2006).  
 
Despite the evidence presented by previous studies, there is still a need for further 
research in the area for a number of reasons. First, research in understanding the 
operations of accountancy in different time and space contexts needs to continue to 
further our understanding of how global expansion of capitalism works across 
different settings (e.g. Carnegie and Napier, 2002; Carnegie and Rodrigues, 2007; 
Walker, 2008; Walker and Shackleton, 1998). Secondly, most prior studies 
emphasised the internal dialectic contradictions of capitalism as the source of change 
and dynamics in the accountancy profession in ex-colony countries while more recent 
literature recognised the role of rivalling structures in contributing to the dialectic 
progress of global expansion of capitalism (see e.g. Hoogvelt, 2001). Finally, a large 
majority of previous work was conducted in the context of the former colonies of the 
UK or the US and little is known about the colonial legacy of other imperial powers, 
particularly the Dutch, on the development of the accountancy profession in their 
colonies. Given the aforementioned discourse, the following section will elaborate on 
the objective of this study. 
1. 2. Research aims  
Previous studies have established that the development of the accountancy profession 
in ex-colonies did not always follow the same path as that of the colonizers due to 
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various external and internal factors. Hence, there is a need to explore other country 
contexts to enhance our understanding of the phenomenon, especially among ex-
colonies other than that of the UK and the US. Indonesia, a former colony of the 
Dutch, offers an interesting case not only due to its colonial past but also because it 
has not been much explored. 
 
Although previous studies in the context of Indonesia have helped in understanding 
the historical development of the profession, they generally failed to provide a 
comprehensive and contextualized story for several reasons. First, the majority of 
previous works were founded on the functionalist perspective of the profession 
whereby the emergence and development of the accountancy profession was purely 
attributed to the needs of a growing society (e.g. Sapiie, 1980). Secondly, most of 
those studies either partially or completely ignored the wider social, political, and 
economic context surrounding the major events that marked the development of the 
profession. Finally, none of those studies provided a comprehensive account of the 
development of the profession following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
 
Given the limitations of prior studies presented above, this study aims to narrow the 
gap in the literature by examining the historical development of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession within the context of its colonial past and its position within 
the global political and economic order across different periods. In other words, it 
seeks to describe how the accountancy profession has developed to its current state as 
well as identify and explain factors that have shaped its development. Specifically, it 
addresses the following questions:  
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(a) What caused the accountancy profession to emerge in Indonesia and how did 
it develop in its early stages post-independence?  
(b) How did the profession develop during the economic and political stability of 
Soeharto‟s New Order regime (1967 – 1997) and what factors impact on its 
development?; and  
(c) How did the 1997 Asian financial crisis affect the development of the 
accountancy profession? 
The following section describes how the research aims will be achieved.  
1. 3. Methodological and theoretical framework 
It is argued that the history of the accountancy profession in ex-colony countries 
should be interpreted within the specific context of the given country. This study 
therefore needs to identify a theoretical and methodological framework that would 
help make sense of the major events related to the profession within the context of 
Indonesia‟s socio-political and economic constellation for the period in question. In 
this regard, the critical perspective is deemed capable of offering a more 
contextualized explanation of the history of the accountancy profession in Indonesia. 
Unlike the conventional history methodology, the critical perspective suggests that 
the history of the profession needs to be framed within its socio-political context 
(Miller et al., 1991, Fleischman et al., 2003). It should not be seen as consequences of 
a natural and unproblematic social order but rather the result of actions and reactions 
of various social agents as constrained and/or facilitated by the prevailing social 
structures. Such methodology enables multi-interpretations of history, each according 
to the assumptions made about the nature and changes of social order, in 
understanding the social context of the accountancy profession.  
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In the context of ex-colonized countries such as Indonesia, the tradition of the 
globalization theory offers an important tool in explaining the historical development 
of the accountancy profession. It suggests that the development of the profession in 
those countries cannot ignore the influence of the historical and contemporary process 
of the global expansion of capitalism within the framework of the capitalist world 
order. According to the world-system theory of globalization, countries can be 
categorized into core and periphery areas depending on their position in the global 
economic system. Core areas refer to the powerful advanced capitalist countries that 
take centre stage in the global capitalist order. The peripheral areas, on the other 
hand, are the rest of the world from where the core countries accumulate their wealth. 
Global expansion of capitalism determined the relationship between the core and 
periphery countries through different historical stages. As Hoogvelt (2001) 
summarized: 
“Capitalism‟s inherent contradictions (the driving force of the dynamics of 
change) were thought to be worked out in different phases of expansion, 
punctuated by crises, in which state and inter-state relations were time and 
again rearranged as political structures that held in place a continuing 
exploitative economic relationship between „core‟ and „peripheral‟ areas. 
(p.12)”  
 
In other words, globalization can be seen as a progressive evolution of different world 
orders with different core-periphery relationship models. At each and every stage, a 
particular socio-economic relationship between the core countries and the peripheral 
countries prevails. In particular, such global orders have enabled core countries to 
exert influence on the mode of production of the peripheral countries based on their 
need to accumulate wealth. Peripheral countries were “assigned a particular function 
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at the service of the essential needs of accumulation at the centre, or the core, of the 
system” (Hoogvelt, 2001 p.3).  
 
This study adopts Robert Cox‟s1 concept of historical structure in understanding the 
sources of changes in the relationship between core and periphery countries 
throughout the different stages of capitalist expansion. Cox regards capitalism as a 
social structure with its own set of material capabilities, institutions and ideas. The 
three
“production creates 
the material basis for all forms of social existence” (Cox, 1987 p.1).
, i.e. “the production and 
reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are 
prerequisites to the production of physical goods” (Cox, 1989 p.39 cited in Bieler and 
Morton, 2003)
                                                 
1
 Robert Cox (1926 - present) is a Canadian scholar in International Relations and International 
Political Economy (IPE). He is known as one of the pioneer scholars who adopted critical theory 
into the field of International Relations and is regarded as the founder of modern-day IPE 
(Schechter, 2002 p.2). 
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Figure  1-1
Figure ‎1-1: The theoretical and methodological framework of the study 
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 Figure ‎1-2: Timeline showing major changes in political economy infrastructure and the development of the Indonesian accountancy 
profession 
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2
 The term refers to the fact that, although the New Order Indonesia formally carried out democratic measures such as general elections, the ruling regime systematically 
attempted to eliminate political competition such as by limiting and simplifying political parties and forbidding certain ideological and political thinking, as well as 
granting President Soeharto the right to appoint a large fraction of parliament from the military and government-affiliated NGOs (see e.g. Vatikiotis, 1998, Cassing, 
2000). 
1
5
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As can be seen in Figure 1-2, the first period covers the years from 1954 until 1966.  
Having experienced the independence war (1945 – 1949) and gaining status as a 
newly independent country, in this period Indonesia was marked by political and 
economic instability. However, it was also the period that signified the establishment 
and consolidation of the post-independent Indonesian accountancy profession, 
marked by major events such as the enactment of Act number 34 year 1954 and the 
establishment of the Indonesian professional association of accountants. The second 
period spans over 30 years (1967 – 1997), the period when Indonesia was under the 
New Order political regime. During this period, Indonesia experienced significant 
economic growth attributable to political stability brought about by the New Order, a 
political regime founded when Soeharto became Indonesia‟s second president 
following a bloody and controversial transition of power between 1965 and 1966. 
Surprisingly, the accountancy profession did not develop rapidly as expected given 
the remarkable economic growth during the 32 years of the New Order rule. The final 
period was the period after the 1997 Asian financial crisis until 2008, which marks 
another transitional period when the New Order fell as one of the consequences of the 
crisis. A major outcome from the event is the rapid progress in the development of the 
profession, particularly towards meeting international standards. 
 
The next section presents the summary of the findings. It will show that the 
developments in the profession are embedded in the wider changes in Indonesia‟s 
politico-economic conditions and that changes in the latter were the result of the 
interaction of rivalling social structures existing in each of the periods in question. 
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1. 5. Summary of findings 
The world-system theory and historical structure provide evidence that the 
development of the Indonesian accountancy profession is influenced by the wider 
changes in Indonesia‟s political economy. Global expansion of capitalism has 
certainly contributed to the progress towards a Western-style accountancy profession. 
However, the progress was not smooth as it faced various obstacles emanating from 
alternative social structures that shaped Indonesia‟s political economy system across 
the three periods. As a result, the development of the profession in the last 50 years 
has been characterized by an intermittent attempt at Westernization of the profession. 
The narrative of the historical development of the profession in the three periods 
shows that progress towards a Western-like profession is inseparable from the efforts 
to liberalize and integrate Indonesia‟s economy towards global capitalist economy.  
 
The fluctuation of the adoption of the Western-model profession was evident during 
the first two decades of the post-independence Indonesian accountancy profession. As 
a newly independent country, Indonesia was not only a battlefield for ideological, 
material and institutional forces of two rising world powers (the US and the Soviet 
Union), but also domestic rivalry among nationalist aspirants in nation building. 
Thus, in this period, the emergence of the profession was seemingly part of the 
country‟s attempt to open up its economy to foreign investment during the early years 
of its independence. However, such attempts faced fierce obstacles when Indonesia 
leaned towards the Soviet-Chinese model of development under the 
The US influence on the profession only resumed 
when the country turned its economic orientation towards the West following a 
political coup-d’état in 1966 which brought about Soeharto‟s New Order political 
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regime into power. An important point to note during this period was that the key 
success factor of the US in overcoming 
Following the initial establishment of the 
profession, major events in the profession gave signs that the US model would 
overwhelmingly be influential in determining the future of the profession, especially 
as the country entered a period of political stability and economic growth starting 
from 1966.  
A similar display of intermittent Westernization of the profession is apparent in the 
second period. Being a Western-backed regime, the New Order immediately 
submitted itself to the Western-model of economic development during its early years 
in power. Consequently, signs of Americanization of the profession were prevalent. 
For example, the first accounting and auditing standards of 1973 were heavily 
influenced by US GAAP (e.g. Tuanakotta, 2007). Over time, however, the New Order 
evolved into a politico-business regime, turning the country into oligarchic 
capitalism.
3
 As a result, the real progress towards building Western-like professional 
infrastructure only occurred in the first and last decade of the New Order. Despite the 
exciting start in the early years of the New Order, the profession failed to develop as 
might be expected given the context of economic growth and political stability, and 
                                                 
3
 According to Baumol et al. (2007), oligarchic capitalism is a capitalist economic system where  
“… government policies are designed predominantly or exclusively to promote the interest of a very 
narrow (usually very wealthy) portion of the population or, what may be worse, the interests of the 
ruling autocrat and or his (or her) friends and family (in this instance the system is better 
characterized as a “kleptocracy”)” (p.71).”  
Hutchcroft (1998), on the other hand, contrasts capitalism under rational-legal states versus 
capitalism under patrimonial states. He further divides patrimonial-state capitalisms into 
bureaucratic (the state is a consolidated unit and relatively strong against business interests) and 
booty capitalisms (the state is relatively weak against business interests). Chua (2008) argued that 
over the 32-year rule in Indonesia, the New Order transformed from bureaucratic to oligarchic to 
plutocratic/kleptocratic capitalism (p.27-28).   
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the closeness of the New Order to Western powers during its 32 years of rule. By the 
1990s, for example, the profession was considered to be lagging far behind the 
US/UK standards (Briston, 1990) and by the early 2000s, the profession was still 
considered as relatively small compared to other countries of similar economic size 
(The Asian Development Bank, 2003). 
 
The development of the profession reached full speed following the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, which has fundamentally shifted the power configurations in 
Indonesia and significantly undermined the crony capitalism of the New Order. It also 
strengthened the pressure on the economic liberalization agenda, facilitated by IMF‟s 
financial assistance programs to Indonesia during 1997 – 2003. Unsurprisingly, 
reforms and restructuring in the accountancy profession were part of the wider liberal 
agenda. As a result, both the scope and magnitude of progress towards the 
internationalization or Westernization of the profession reached an unprecedented 
level. The professional association actively transformed the professional 
infrastructures (e.g. standards, certification and associations) to meet acceptable 
international standards. On the other hand, the Government was forced to provide the 
legal framework for the profession, which sparked tension between the Government 
and the profession. 
 
Given the trajectory of its history, it is anticipated that the development of the 
profession in the future heavily depends on the extent to which liberal capitalism 
prevails in Indonesia. Recent developments indicate that although the institutional 
framework seemed to be firmly in place in the country, challenges still exist albeit 
sporadically.  
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1. 6. Contributions  
This study contributes to our understanding of the accountancy profession in the ex-
colonized countries in the following ways. First, it contributes to the growing 
literature attempting to understand the operation of the accountancy profession in 
various locales and across different time horizons (see e.g. Walker and Shackleton, 
1998). It provides another piece of empirical evidence of the development of the 
accountancy profession in a context other than that of former British colonies. In 
particular, it provides evidence on how the accountancy profession emerged in a 
former Dutch colony, a topic that has not been addressed before. This will be helpful 
in the long-term effort of constructing general propositions about professionalization 
(Burrage et. al., 1990 cited in Caramanis, 1999 p. 158) and as such, “researchers are 
encouraged to study professions … as individual empirical cases rather than 
specimens of some more general, fixed concept” (Freidson, 1983 cited in Caramanis, 
1999 p.158). Secondly, by utilizing the historical structure methodology, it provides 
an account of how and to what extent the forces of globalization influenced the 
development of the accountancy profession in ex-colony societies over a long period. 
While accepting that the birth and development of the accountancy profession in ex-
colony countries is an inevitable consequence of globalization, it certainly takes the 
view that the process may be more complex and open-ended than previous studies 
suggested. Finally, the study also offers an analysis of the major sources of dynamics 
in the Indonesian accountancy profession over the last five decades from the critical 
perspective by incorporating the issues of power differences both within the 
Indonesian society and between states under the global politico-economic order. No 
previous studies have adopted such a methodological and theoretical framework. As a 
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result, it gives a more contextualized history of the Indonesian accountancy 
profession. 
 
In terms of practical contributions, this study adopts a broader view of the 
implications of accounting research as suggested by some authors (Gendron and 
Bedard, 2001; Roslender, 2006). Accounting research should benefit not just the 
members of the accountancy profession but also the broader stakeholders of the 
accountancy profession (users of their services, governments, and the public). Its 
applicability should be interpreted as more than “the introduction of new knowledge 
to auditors and the identification of emerging practice issues” (Gendron and Bedard, 
2001). Accounting research should not be based only on the belief of the convenience 
of the status quo but also on the belief of the possibility of building something better, 
which incorporate the perspectives of a broader range of stakeholders and thus 
encourages a better fit between accountancy and the interests of all elements of the 
society (Roslender, 2006 p.266). In this respect, the practical applicability of this 
study rests in its value in giving new perspectives to the regulator of the accountancy 
profession (and  the public of the developing and ex-colonized societies in general) 
on the importance of adopting the professional model that best suits the conditions of 
the country. The decision as to the type of professional arrangements and 
infrastructure should be based on democratic principles and not imposed by the needs 
of external forces and interests.  
1. 7. Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. Figure  1-3 presents diagrammatically the 
structure of the whole thesis: 
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Figure ‎1-3: The structure of the thesis 
 
 
Chapter 1 introduces and summarizes the thesis. It explains the background to the 
research and the chosen theoretical and methodological framework, as well as the 
data collection and analysis. It also outlines the findings and the expected 
contribution of the study. 
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to map the existing theories and approaches in examining the development of the 
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accountancy profession in ex-colony countries. The chapter starts by outlining the 
major sociological perspectives explaining the origin and nature of the accountancy 
profession in the context of developed countries. The chapter then continues by 
elaborating the theories and approaches used to explain the historical development of 
the profession in emerging/transitional economies as well as developing and ex-
colonized countries. Finally, the chapter presents a review on prior studies on the 
history of the accountancy profession in Indonesia. Besides providing justifications as 
to why the critical perspective was adopted, the last two sections are important in 
fulfilling the second aim of the chapter, which is to identify the gaps in the literature. 
The chapter ends with a discussion on the necessary attributes of the methodological 
and theoretical framework chosen to provide a contextualized history of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession over the last five decades.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological and theoretical framework adopted in this 
study. It starts with a brief overview of the fundamental differences between 
methodologies that underpin the conventional, interactionist and the critical 
perspectives on the accountancy profession. Following this discussion is a summary 
of how the critical perspective has influenced research on the history of accountancy 
and the accountancy profession. The chapter continues by describing the concept of 
globalization, interpreted as the different stages of global expansion of capitalism. 
The chapter then explains the historical structure concept, which argues that the 
source of changes of the different stages of capitalist expansion was due to the 
interaction between capitalism and competing social structures. It ends by explaining 
how the different stages of global expansion of capitalism have had a profound effect 
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on Indonesia‟s system of political economy, which in turn shaped the development of 
the accountancy profession.  
 
The following three chapters present the empirical part of the thesis. They present the 
narratives of the development of the Indonesian accountancy profession during the 
last five decades. The approach used to present the story is as follows. Each chapter 
starts by describing the socio-political and economic context in the period in question, 
the prevailing system of political economy and finally the narrative of the 
development of the accountancy profession for the corresponding period.  
 
Chapter 4 starts the analysis by unravelling the emergence and the early development 
of the profession, covering the period between 1954 and 1966. It first describes and 
explains the socio-political conditions of Indonesia as a newly independent country 
and their effects on the political economy of the country and describes major events 
in the early development of the Indonesian accountancy profession. It then unravels 
the conditions and factors that enhance our understanding as to why the country 
established an accountancy profession only five years after establishing its own 
government and amidst political and economic instability. Finally, it also explores the 
conditions and factors behind the switch towards the US accounting system. 
 
The development of the profession during the New Order era (1967 – 1997) is the 
topic of Chapter 5. The chapter starts by describing the achievement, central features, 
and major actors during the New Order. It then describes and explains the different 
periodization of economic management under the New Order and the reasons/factors 
why the regime had become a politico-business regime where political and economic 
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power intermingled. The study describes major events in the profession during this 
era and offers an explanation of how and to what extent the New Order had 
influenced such development. More specifically, it explores and explains why the 
profession did not make significant progress despite the political stability and 
economic growth brought by the New Order administration during its 32-year rule. 
 
The topic of Chapter 6 revolves around how and to what extent the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis has shaped the recent development of the profession. As in previous 
chapters, Chapter 6 starts with an analysis of how the crisis had affected Indonesia‟s 
political economy configurations and dragged Indonesia into market-oriented 
capitalism. The chapter then shows how such changes affect the development of the 
profession by narrating the dynamics of the profession during the last decade. It 
describes the significant and unprecedented transformations that took place in almost 
every aspect of the profession in rapid succession, including among others, changes in 
the professional infrastructure and statutory regulations of the profession. 
 
The summary and conclusion chapter provides a review of the main points from the 
narratives as well as the conclusion linking them back to the theoretical framework 
adopted. An exploration of the possible scenarios regarding the future of the 
Indonesian accounting profession is also an important feature of this chapter.  
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2. 1. Introduction 
The rise of the accountancy profession and its spread to other parts of the world has 
attracted the attention of accounting researchers. Over the last few decades, there 
have been numerous studies examining the historical development of the profession 
across different countries. These studies have been characterized by the increasing 
plurality of theoretical perspectives embedding different, sometimes conflicting, 
philosophical and methodological assumptions. The different perspectives determine 
how both accounting and the accountancy profession are defined, as well as how and 
why accountants have successfully achieved and maintained their professional status. 
Understanding the various perspectives, their differences and similarities, is thus a 
crucial step in understanding the plurality of literature in the area. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide a review of the relevant literature on the history of the 
emergence and development of the accountancy profession across different countries. 
This will help in fostering the appropriate framework for interpreting the history of 
the Indonesian accountancy profession.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the major sociological 
perspectives of professions in general, and the accountancy profession in particular. 
Section 2.3 reviews prior studies on the development of the accountancy profession 
across different country settings: developed countries, emerging/transitional 
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economies
4
, and ex-colonized countries. The section ends with a review on prior 
studies on the development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia.  Section 2.4 is 
dedicated to evaluating the appropriateness of the existing frameworks as a possible 
lens in examining the history of the Indonesian accountancy profession. Finally, 
Section 2.5 provides the summary and conclusion for the chapter. Figure 2-1 
illustrates the structure of this chapter. 
                                                 
4
 The term emerging market economy was introduced in 1981 by Antoine W. van Agtmael, an 
economist for World Bank‟s International Finance Corporation (IFC). Originally, it was a narrow 
list of middle income to higher income countries, but the term is now widened to include both low 
and middle-income countries (e.g. Heakal, 2009, and Lazard Investment Research, 2008). For the 
purpose of this chapter, the former definition is used. 
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Figure ‎2-1: The structure of Chapter 2 
 
2. 2. Major perspectives on accountancy and the accountancy profession 
Studies on the historical development of the accountancy profession have been 
informed by various sociological perspectives on the profession. Each perspective 
views the nature of a profession and its position in society differently. Therefore, each 
perspective will have a different view in defining what accounting is and in giving an 
account of the history and meaning of the accountancy profession to the society. A 
good understanding of the various perspectives is a crucial step in deciding the 
methodological and theoretical framework to be adopted for the purpose of this study, 
2.2. Major perspectives on accounting and the accountancy profession 
2.2.1. The functionalist perspective 
2.2.2. The interactionist perspective  
2.2.3. The critical perspective  
2.1. Introduction 
 
2.3. Previous studies on the development of the accountancy profession 
across different countries 
2.3.1. Studies in the context of the developed countries 
2.3.2. Studies in the context of the emerging economies 
2.3.3. Studies in the context of the ex-colonized countries 
2.3.4. Previous studies on the Indonesian accountancy profession 
2.4. Fostering the framework for understanding the development of the 
accountancy profession in Indonesia  
2.5. Summary and Conclusion  
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as each perspective will lead to different methodological consequences. It is not easy 
to classify the various methodologies as they sometimes overlap and conflict with 
each other. Nevertheless, the methodologies are commonly classified as the 
conventional/functionalist, interactionist, and critical perspective (e.g. Chua, 1986, 
Willmott, 1986, Roslender, 1992 and Perks, 1996 p.14). Each of these perspectives 
will be discussed in turn in the following sections. 
2. 2. 1. The conventional/functionalist perspective 
Early works on the accountancy profession were influenced by the functional 
perspective, which is largely based on the work of the socio-anthropologist Talcott 
Parsons (Lindblom and Ruland, 1997). This sociological view of the professions sees 
their emergence as a natural consequence of increasing complexity in both human 
needs and activities. Based on this view, the earliest attempts at defining the meaning 
of professions involved identifying and listing the traits or characteristics that 
constitute a profession (Johnson, 1972). Such attempts identified professions as 
occupational groups having core characteristics such as altruism, esoterism, and self-
discipline. However, according to Johnson (1972), this approach has two problems. 
First, there is no solid agreement amongst commentators on what the true 
characteristics of a profession are. Secondly, as authors identify different and newer 
traits, they are added to the list, making it much more difficult to reach a consensus.  
 
Unlike the earlier functionalist view that emphasised the traits of the profession, the 
second stream of the functionalist view of the profession defines professions based on 
their functions in society. This theory views professions as particular groups of 
individuals offering services that are deemed important to the society (Perks, 1996). 
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In other words, they exist to serve various human needs (Lindblom and Ruland, 
1997). As a result, members of such groups (or “professionals”) are often rewarded 
with high social, economic, and legal status in society (e.g. Hines, 1989). 
Mechanisms such as certification, registration and disciplinary procedures are 
introduced to set exclusive boundaries to such groups in order to protect the public 
from “exploitation by unqualified charlatans and quacks who do not have expertise” 
in the service of a given profession (Perks, 1996 p.14). Under the framework of the 
functional perspective, the rise of accounting as a profession is deemed a natural 
consequence of the increasing complexity of human economic activities. The 
increasingly complex business and economic transactions between various members 
of society necessitate accounting and auditing as a mechanism of accountability. The 
profession, hence, emerged and developed to cater for this demand. The functionalist 
view on professions can therefore be considered as being sympathetic towards the 
professions as it generally does not problematize any claims of professionalism 
against the actual role it plays in society. It treats the professions‟ claim of esoteric 
bodies of knowledge, autonomy, altruism and self-discipline (Hines, 1989; Barber, 
1963 and Ritzer, 1972 as cited in Yapa, 1999) as genuine. It accepts without 
reservation that professions exist to serve „public interests‟ and perceives them "as a 
positive force in social development, standing against the excesses of both laissez-
faire individualism and state collectivism” (Johnson, 1982 p. 12). 
 
However, the functionalist perspective has received much criticism. Some authors 
perceive it as a naive and de-contextualized view of the profession as it ignores the 
dynamic complexity of human interactions and the power relations within society 
(see e.g. Johnson, 1972), and as such, theories of the accountancy profession 
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stemming from this perspective are considered inadequate. Hines (1989) argued that 
accounting knowledge is socially constructed and, over time, it changed and gave 
different meaning to accountants‟ works. In addition, the human dimension of 
accounting and auditing practice has been ignored by the conventional/functional 
view on accounting. This has resulted in the de-contextualization of accounting and 
auditing while in reality they are indeed bound to both place and time (see e.g. 
Carnegie and Napier, 1996). The above criticisms led the interpretive/interactionist 
and the critical perspectives on the professions to gain more attention.  
2. 2. 2. The interactionist perspectives 
While the functionalist tries to explain professions from a normative viewpoint (what 
they should be), the interactionist perspective tries to understand them from a positive 
basis i.e. what professions actually are (see e.g. Uche, 2002). Rather than focusing on 
the attributes and function of a profession in society, interactionist theorists try to 
understand professions as a social process. Proponents of this perspective interpret 
professional aspiration as a social mobility or movement organized by a certain 
section of the society to attain certain objective(s). For interactionists, a profession is 
just another group in society imbued with self-interests, competing for its place in 
society. This view, therefore, puts more emphasis on the processes of 
professionalization rather than on the outcome of such projects (Timperley and 
Osbaldeston, 1975 cited in Uche, 2002 p.473). 
 
The interactionist perspective provides an alternative interpretation of both the history 
and development of accounting and the accountancy profession. Professional 
accountants are seen as a group in society comprised of various individuals, with 
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similar but not homogenous interests, fighting for their existence in society (Uche, 
2002). Through their activities as professionals, these individuals promote their 
interest through their interaction with each other as well as with other groups of 
individuals who are related to their activities. The identity and role of the accounting 
and auditing profession is therefore the product of these social interactions. In other 
words, the meaning of accounting and the accountancy profession is largely 
determined by how successfully accountants build and maintain the symbolic 
meaning and the material value of accounting as well as convince the rest of the 
society to believe in them.  
 
Under this perspective, the functionalist assumption that professionals are of 
importance to the society is put under scrutiny. Interactionists contest the notion of 
competence and community service as the main explanatory variables of the 
emergence of a profession and place greater attention to the complexity of social 
organizations (Uche, 2002). Moreover, as professions need to justify their existence 
in society, they always try to convince others in the society of their legitimacy and 
importance (Perks, 1996 p.15). The existence of a professional body and the 
mechanism of certifying, registering and disciplining its members are deemed by the 
interactionist theorists to be directed to achieve the ultimate goal of maintaining the 
profession‟s respected and valued social identity within society (Becker et al., 1961 
as cited in Yapa 1999 p.330). In other words, the interactionist perspective introduced 
the socio-political aspect of the accountancy profession to the analysis and raised 
questions regarding the accountants‟ claim of professionalism. Accounting is seen as 
not just a neutral technology but also a product of social exchange and interactions. 
The meaning of accounting is built on consensus of meanings which changes over 
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time (see e.g. Hines, 1989). Thus, its meaning and boundaries as well as the work of 
accountants can be different to different people across different times and places (see 
e.g. Napier, 2006).  
 
The interactionist perspective is also not short of criticism. One of the main criticisms 
is its failure to incorporate social structure into the analysis of the profession. 
Although it takes into account human interaction as individuals or groups of 
individuals in the analysis, it pays little attention to power differences between 
members of the society and the effects of such structure on social interactions. In 
other words, it overlooks the existence and influence of social structure in analysing 
the emergence and survival of professions in modern society (Perks, 1996; Willmott, 
1986), which is addressed by the critical perspective of the profession. 
2. 2. 3. The critical perspective 
Proponents of the critical perspective believe that the rise of professions as an 
important element in modern society can significantly be attributed to the unequal 
distribution of power amongst the society. Understanding the structure and operation 
of modern society is vital in answering the question of what professions are and why 
they exist (Perks, 1996), since the meaning and position of professions in society 
depends on the assumptions as to how the modern society works. For example, the 
trait and functionalist perspective of the professions is bounded by the view that 
society resembles an organism in which each of its elements has its own designated 
functions. As described earlier, such a view is deemed outdated because it ignores 
various interests and social forces that may have shaped the emergence and 
development of a profession. Under the critical perspectives‟ assumptions, the 
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concepts of professions are far more varied as it embraces other or alternative theories 
of society that problematize the functional view on society. Over recent years, the 
critical sociological view of the professions has inspired accounting researchers in 
examining and interpreting the rise and dynamics of the accountancy profession. 
Amongst the most notable schools of thoughts are those which stem from the Marxist, 
Weberian and Foucauldian schools of thought (see e.g. Chua and Sinclair, 1994; 
Goddard; Roslender, 1992), which will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.2.3.1. The Weberian approach  
The Weberian perspective on the profession is based on Max Weber‟s concepts of 
class, status groups, and party in explaining communal mobility in modern society. 
Class is defined as a group in society that shares a similar position relative to the 
market (“market situation”), for example, as owner of means of production or as 
labourers with certain level of skills and education (Gerth and Mills, 1948; Weber et 
al., 1978). Status or social status of an individual is the extent to which members of 
society respect or honour the individual (Gerth and Mills, 1948; Weber et al., 1978). 
Status is also a source of power and is unequally distributed within the society. 
Finally, party refers to temporary communal movements in which different classes 
and/or status groups join together to promote their interests (Gerth and Mills, 1948; 
Weber et al., 1978). Class, status, and party are the sources of economic, social, and 
political power in modern society (Levine, 1998). Together with Weber‟s concept of 
closure, which explains the attempts by some members of the society in creating an 
exclusive group to achieve higher status, class-status-party concepts are crucial to the 
study of profession.  
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The main contribution of the Weberian tradition to the study of profession relies on its 
power to explain the process of how professional status is achieved. Unsurprisingly, 
much of the work within the Weberian perspective of the profession attempts to 
examine the development of the accountancy profession in its earliest stage i.e. how 
accountants in a given society achieved their professional status. Weber‟s concept of 
„social closure‟ in particular is used as an analytical tool to examine and explain the 
process or mechanism of „professionalization‟. In Weberian term, profession is a class 
as well as a status group and the process of professionalization is a process of both 
social and market closure. Proponents of this view believe that professionals always 
try to obtain exclusive right over the market for their services for social and economic 
rewards (see e.g. Chua and Poullaos, 1998). This concept of „market closure‟ 
interprets professionalism as:  
“... a strategy for controlling an occupation involving solidarity and 
closure which regulates the supply of professional workers to the market 
and also provides a basis for the domination of institutions, organizations, 
and other occupations associated with it” (Perks, 1996 p.15).  
 
The Weberian concept of „social closure‟ has been used to explain the history of the 
professionalization of accounting, especially in the context of developed countries in 
the West. Unlike the functionalist perspective, the history of the accountancy 
profession is analyzed in relation to the wider organizational and societal as well as 
socio-historical contexts (Colignon and Covaleski, 1991 p.141). The accountancy 
profession fits Weber‟s definition of a class-status group. The professionalization of 
accountancy is thus seen as a social mobility by accountants to close the market for 
accounting labour and skill and to gain both economic and social rewards in the form 
of monopoly of the accounting services and achieve high status in society. Hence, 
professional certification and associational membership are seen as mechanisms 
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enabling the inclusion/exclusion and control over entry to both the accounting market 
and status group as professionals. The concept of market closure and structural 
relationship in society is central to the arguments of the critical view of the 
professions. The effort of market closure is often supported by other powerful groups 
in society, including the state and/or powerful corporations (Perks, 1996 p.15). 
Unsurprisingly, the nature and extent of the relationship between the state and the 
accountancy profession in the professionalization process have received extensive 
attention from critical accounting researchers using the Weberian approach. For these 
researchers, understanding the structure of power relations and interactions amongst 
different sections of society is of central importance in investigating the emergence of 
accounting as a profession.  
 
The Weberian framework has been praised for its ability to provide a richer 
explanation of the dynamic of the accountancy profession. Its most important 
contribution lies mainly on the contextual history of the accountancy profession. 
However, recent studies have shown how the class-status and party concept can also 
be used in analysing the later stage in the development of the accounting history (see 
e.g. Chua and Poullaos, 1998, Caramanis, 2005), as it gives a more nuanced and 
embedded analysis of professional development in the contemporary context. Some 
commentators, however, argue that one of the limitations of the Weberian framework 
is that it emphasizes too much the social process. Such an approach is problematic 
when analyzing the development of the profession in highly structured societies 
(Freidson, 1970 as cited in Bakre, 2001). Another problem with the Weberian view of 
the accountancy profession is that it is developed from theories of the social process 
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in the context of Western advanced capitalistic society. Its applicability in other social 
contexts still needs further examination. 
2.2.3.2. The Marxist approach 
Another sociological thought that has significant influence on the critical perspective 
of the profession is the work of Karl Marx on social structure and evolution. The 
Marxist‟s approach to the profession is largely based on the analysis of the mode of 
production or the political economy of modern society. The analysis involves looking 
at how a particular society produces, accumulates and distributes wealth amongst its 
members. Karl Marx believed that modern society is a capitalistic society where the 
mode of production places owners of the production capital in a position of great 
importance. Wealth or surplus in today‟s society is produced by exploiting the skills 
of the workers or labourers. Labour skill, including accounting and auditing expertise, 
is not viewed as the possession of workers but as a product of social power in play. 
Professionalization, in this sense, is seen as a means of social division and 
organization of work in which a group of labourers were granted a monopolistic right 
over a particular skill. Thus, the professionalization of certain occupational skill 
involves the promotion of the scarcity of a particular skill and the consent to 
monopoly over that skill by the most powerful social agents i.e. state apparatuses and 
market players.  
 
For proponents of this school of thought, the accountancy profession is seen as the 
mechanism of social organization or division of workers with accounting and auditing 
skills. This division is important as accounting and auditing skills are seen as vital for 
both the operation and sustainability of capitalistic mode of production. Accounting is 
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a calculative science that provides the rational decision tool for the owners of capital 
to allocate or withdraw resources while auditing serves as the mechanism for 
checking that calculation. On a more fundamental level, both accounting and auditing 
are seen as an instrument for securing legitimacy, designed to offer assurance and 
reassurance to the public that the capitalistic system is transparent and accountable. 
Through the collegial control of the profession, accounting can then serve more 
effectively the interest of the capitalist. For some other scholars, the specific 
monopoly over the supposedly scarce skill also granted professional accountants a 
higher position compared to ordinary workers, despite being intermediary as they fit 
only the „petty bourgeoisie‟ (Poulantzas, 1975 as cited in Caramanis, 1996). 
 
The Marxist approach has also suffered from criticisms. First, although this approach 
has identified the profession‟s position in the structure of the capitalist society and its 
relation to other structural forces of society, it fails to provide historical explanations 
as to why and how the profession come to its current position in the society (Chua 
and Sinclair, 1994; Goddard, 2002). Secondly, the Marxist analysis on society and 
social dynamics is seen as suffering from economic determinism. Social mobility is 
often reduced as purely economic-motivated and, as such, it cannot explain other 
divisions that may exist within professional life that are attributable to non-economic 
factors such as gender or race inequality. Finally, Marxists claim that professions are 
just another means used by the capitalist class in exploiting labour and appropriating 
surplus value. However, this claim has not been backed by convincing evidence (e.g. 
Saks, 1983 cited in Caramanis 1996). Thus, the existence of such a grand social 
structure as capitalism in explaining unequal power distribution within society has 
been questioned. 
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2.2.3.3. The Foucauldian approach  
Research on accounting and the accountancy profession has also embraced the 
perspective derived from the works of Michel Foucault, a French philosopher 
renowned for his work on the relationship between power and knowledge. He 
attempted to understand modern society without putting too much emphasis on social 
structures at the macro level. Hence, his work has been recognized as post-
structuralist in nature. Unlike Marxist social theory, Foucault did not see the state as a 
purposeful actor. Instead, it is a collection of practice, institutions and discipline. 
Furthermore, Foucault attempts to understand the structure and evolution of human 
knowledge and its role in public administration and policy (Stewart, 1992). He 
emphasizes the importance of power to knowledge and vice versa. They are internal 
to each other: power has a constitutive element in the construction of knowledge 
while knowledge can also be a form of power in play or a „power ritual‟ (Stewart, 
1992 p. 62). 
 
Foucauldian theorists, thus, did not see accounting as a product of grand social 
structure such as capitalism and industrialization. To them, social development is not 
linear in nature as the modern world is a complex phenomenon with many societal 
forces influencing the outcome of history. The modern society developed to its 
current state “accompanied by an epistemic shift from a „classic‟ to a „modern‟ form 
of knowledge, which is organized into „disciplines‟ (Bakre, 2001). Accountancy, 
then, is not solely the product of either capitalism, industrialization, ownership or 
organizational structures (Stewart, 1992), but also power-knowledge relations and 
governmentality. Foucauldian notions of discipline, governmentality and surveillance 
within the dynamics of the modern society are important in interpreting what 
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accounting is. One can start from his emphasis on the centrality of language in 
establishing a power or knowledge synthesis for rendering the individual calculable 
(Fleischman and Radcliffe, 2000). Accounting in this framework is a „language‟ that 
poses a disciplinary power that is capable of increasing control over various domains 
of human activity, increasing the organization of everything, and opening-up of new 
domains to surveillance (Hooper et al., 2005). The professionalization of accounting 
can then be seen as a process through which domination over a body of knowledge 
(i.e. the accounting technology) is achieved in an organized way (Kosmala 
MacLullich, 2003 p.794), and much of this process involves the execution of power 
(Fogarty et al., 1994).  
 
The view is much criticized by the Marxists school of thought who challenged the 
view as being too reductive in seeing the relationship between the materiality bases of 
reality and under-theorizing the material, economic, and political realities 
(Fleischman and Radcliffe, 2005). The Foucauldian theorists‟ interpretation of power 
is also seen as monolithic as if it is “common to all disciplinary regimes, serving 
universally to enhance human capacities” (Armstrong, 1994 as cited in Fleischman 
and Radcliffe, 2005). According to Fleischman (2005), critiques on this view also 
come from traditional historians and economic rationalists. Similar to the Weberian 
approach, the applicability of the Foucauldian approach in analysing the development 
of accounting and the accountancy profession in the context of ex-colonized societies 
is yet to be proven.  
 
In summary, the functionalist, interactionist and critical perspectives offer different 
and conflicting interpretations of what accounting is. They provide different answers 
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to the question of how and why accountancy has become a profession or, more 
fundamentally, whether its claim of professionalism is adequately justified. All three 
perspectives have contributed to our understanding of the nature and history of both 
accounting and the accountancy profession as argued by Willmott (1986): 
“The functionalist perspective usefully highlights the significance of the traits of 
professionalism in relation to the reproduction of complex social systems. The 
interactionist perspective helpfully recalls the socially constructed nature of these 
traits, setting them in the context of a negotiated interaction over the symbolic 
meaning and value of “professional” expertise. Finally, the critical approach 
deepens the insights of the interactionist approach by placing them in the wider 
economic and political context” (Wilmott, 1986 p. 559). 
 
 
Over recent years, research on the development of the accountancy profession has 
shifted from the functionalist to the interactionist and the critical perspectives of the 
professions (see e.g. Uche, 2002 and Cooper and Robson, 2006). To some scholars, 
the functionalist perspective is regarded as „primitive‟ and inadequate (Caramanis, 
1996) in providing a realistic picture of the dynamics of the professional life as it 
generally ignores the influence of complex societal factors on the dynamics of the 
accountancy profession. The latter perspectives, on the other hand, are seen to offer a 
more realistic approach in investigating the history and contemporary dynamics of the 
accountancy profession as they interpret such history and dynamics amidst the 
complex and ever-changing social life.  
2. 3. Studies on the development of the accountancy profession across 
different countries 
As stated in Chapter 1, the objective of this study is to examine the birth and the 
development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia over the last 60 years. For 
this reason, the following sections review prior studies on the emergence and 
development of the accountancy profession across various countries using the critical 
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perspective as it provides a more contextualized approach in explaining the rise and 
dynamics of the accountancy profession in structured society such as in the former 
ex-colonized countries. Scholars have argued that due to the differences in historical 
and socio-political context, the theories used to explain the birth and development in 
the developed countries may not be applicable in the context of ex-colonized 
countries (e.g. Annisette, 1999, 2000; Bakre, 2001). The following sections will 
review prior studies in the context of the developed countries followed by similar 
studies in the context of the ex-colony countries.  
2. 3. 1. Studies on the development of the accountancy profession in developed 
countries
5
 
There have been numerous studies on the birth and development of the accountancy 
profession in developed countries covering various aspects of professional 
development within various settings across the developed world (for reviews see e.g. 
Cooper and Robson, 2006; Napier, 2006). Most of those works concentrated on 
investigating the historical development of the accountancy profession in the context 
of the Anglo-American countries (the UK, the US, and Australia), although other 
studies have also attempted to shed light on similar processes in the context of other 
developed countries such as Belgium and France (De Beelde, 2002; Ramirez, 2001).  
 
Much of the works on the early development of the accountancy profession in the 
developed countries is concerned with the professionalization of accountancy. The 
term accounting professionalization refers to the process by which accountants 
achieve or try to achieve their professional status (e.g. West, 1996, 2003; Willmott, 
                                                 
5
 Without ignoring the possibility of the existence of other studies conducted in other languages, the 
review is limited to studies reported in the English language. 
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1986). The earliest movement of professionalization of accountants can perhaps be 
traced back to the United Kingdom (hereafter the UK) in the middle of the 19
th
 
century. This was marked by the formation of the first ever organization of 
accountants i.e. the Society of Accountants in Edinburgh (Scotland) in 1854. This was 
soon followed by the Glasgow Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in the following 
year (1855), and by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in 
1880 (Walker, 1995). The movement of accountants to organize themselves was first 
interpreted as being purely the consequence of the rise of financial and economic 
complexity due to the industrial revolution at the time (Lee, 1995 p.49). A closer look 
at the process, however, shows that the organization of accountants into coordinated 
associations was part of their collective mobility in achieving social and market 
closure (see also MacDonald, 1985; Lee, 1995 p.49; Birkett and Evans, 2005). In this 
context, a more nuanced explanation of the process as well as the success and failure 
of the professionalization attempts were needed. Competition from other market 
forces, for example, was an important reason for accountants to organize themselves 
(Lee, 1995). Walker (1995) shows that accountants in Glasgow and Edinburgh formed 
professional organizations to defend their exclusive right over the market for their 
services which was under threat because of a campaign by a London-based merchant 
group who were proposing reforms to base Scottish insolvency practice on English 
legal provisions. The reform threatened accountant‟s existence as under English laws, 
unlike Scottish law, lawyers rather than accountants act as administrators of 
bankruptcy and insolvency. 
 
A recurring theme of professionalization was the involvement of the state in shaping 
the trajectory of the professionalization process, either directly or indirectly. In the 
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Anglo-American countries (most notably the UK, US, and Australia), the state has 
been an important player in the professionalization of accountants despite the fact that 
accountants were responsible for initiating the movements in obtaining professional 
status. Chua and Poullaos (1993) went further and argued that „professions‟ are 
outcomes of dynamic interactions and transformation of state and profession (p.691, 
p.724), especially in the context where there are different levels of states (imperial 
state versus colonial/commonwealth) and professions (imperial professional bodies 
versus local/colonial professionals). As a result, the professionalization process is 
neither a uniform attempt at market and social closure nor a deterministic coupling of 
action, interest, and outcome (p.691). In other words, the role of the state in the 
emergence and subsequent dynamics of the accountancy profession differs with 
different contexts of time and places (see e.g. Dyball et. al. 2006 p.418). The role of 
the state in the professionalization of the US accountants, for example, was different 
from the UK. The American state granted monopoly through accreditation in the name 
of protecting public interest (Lee, 1995 p.55). In Canada, Richardson, (1989) shows 
that the state, market, and community upheld the profession‟s hegemonic structure 
based on intellectual and moral leadership. State policies, in particular, helped in the 
continuation and reproduction of the hegemonic structure of the profession and/or 
upheld the profession‟s claim to certain types of work (also Richardson, 1987 cited in 
Dyball et. Al. 2006 p.418). 
 
The state played an even more critical role in determining the success or failure of the 
professionalization of accounting in continental European countries (Ramirez, 2001; 
De Beelde, 2002). In the Belgian context, De Beelde (2002) argued that the 
professionalization of auditing was the outcome of the struggle between competing 
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models of the audit profession that stemmed from different interpretations of the 
function of audit: verifying financial data for work councils or verifying annual 
financial statements for shareholders. In this context, statutory audit legislation 
became the battlefield in which politicians, different accountant groups, labour unions 
and employers pursued their preferred professional model. Ramirez (2001) explains 
the vital role played by the state in determining the failure of French accountants to 
institutionalize and obtain public legitimacy over their professional status before 
World War II and after:  
“It was because of the state that they (the accountants) could not be 
recognised before the war. It was now because the state wanted to give birth 
to an economy and a society in which accountants could play a role, that 
they were now institutionalised” (p.414). 
 
Other studies confirm that the political nature of the accountancy profession goes 
beyond the initial professionalization process. The contemporary position and the 
functioning of the accountancy profession in the context of developed countries are 
embedded in the capitalistic order as a combination of the organizing principles of the 
state, market and community (Willmott, 1986 and Puxty et al., 1987). Professional 
bodies are political groups whose power originated from collegial solidarity of the 
accounting community (Willmott, 1986). The primary responsibility of these bodies is 
establishing and maintaining the economic and social value of the skills of their 
members i.e. “the right to control and regulate the supply of, and influence the 
demand for, accounting labour” (Willmott, 1986 p. 574). In the context of the power 
relationship of a capitalistic country, professionals need to influence and convince the 
most powerful social forces i.e. the consumers of their services (the market) and state 
official/agencies of “the strategic importance and effectiveness” of their professional 
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services and status by maintaining any social arrangement that granted them the 
privilege (Willmott, 1986 p.561).  
 
Puxty et al. (1987), thus, view the regulation of accountancy and its dynamic as: 
“… an outcome of interactions between parties (e.g. diverse state managers, 
agents of fractions of capital and representatives of interest groups) who are 
positioned within a structure of politico economic relations that is 
simultaneously united and divided by internal contradictions, tensions and 
struggles….. the reproduction/reform of the prevailing structure of politico-
economic relations is seen as an (often unintended) consequence of these 
parties‟ efforts to mobilise material and ideological resource (including 
institutions) to negotiate policies and practices of regulations that are 
perceived, within the terms of their own reference, to safeguard or advance 
their own individualistic career interests as well as the class interests on 
whose behalf they act” (p.282). 
 
Puxty et al. (1987) further argued that the market and the state are superior organizing 
principles compared to community in terms of regulatory power over accounting 
institutions and practice (p. 283). Based on this theoretical proposition, the authors 
outline a matrix of the accounting regulatory regimes, viz. liberalism, legalism, 
associationism, and corporatism, in the context of advanced capitalistic societies.  In 
the liberal mode, accounting regulation comes from the market principles, while in the 
legalism regime they mainly serve the working of state principles. Corporatism and 
associationism modes of regulation lie in the middle of this spectrum (see Figure  2-2). 
In the corporatism model, the role of the professional community in influencing 
accounting regulation was less than that of the state. Finally, the market and 
community axis play a greater role than the state in the associationistic model. Based 
on this classification, Puxty et al. (1987) distinguish the regulation regimes of four 
advanced capitalist countries: Germany (legalism); the UK (associationism); Sweden 
(corporatism) and finally the USA (legalism – associationism). Although the study 
may no longer reflect the current conditions within these countries, it has provided a 
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conceptualization and evidence of how the accountancy profession is a function of 
particular politico-economic system.  
Figure ‎2-2: Strategies of regulation situated in relation to social order 
Adapted from Puxty et al., 1987. 
Note *: The guiding principle of coordination and allocation 
 
In more pragmatic terms, the state, through its actions, often serves the interests of the 
accountancy profession or some of its members and plays an important part in 
resolving conflicts, be it intra- or inter-professional. In the US, for example, Mills and 
Young (1999) argued that the audit licensing agency, the licensing legislation and the 
courts interacted with each other and, over time, shaped the changing significance of 
the US CPA (Certified Public Accountant). Fogarty et. al. (1997) provide evidence in 
the case of the US where the state board of accountancy provides support to the 
profession‟s legitimacy claim and its own existence to the public despite the fact that 
this conduct conflicted with the board‟s initial mandate of assuring professional 
competence. Rollins and Bremser (1997) conclude that the Security and Exchange 
Market 
(dispersed competition)* 
State 
(hierarchal control)* 
Community 
(spontaneous solidarity)* 
Liberalism Legalism 
Associationism 
Corporatism 
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Commission‟s disciplinary actions against particular members of the profession 
(largest audit firms) are different (less frequent and lighter) from the rest. Such 
symbiotic relationship is also suggested in the case of the UK. Sikka and Willmott 
(1995) stated that the UK accountancy profession has used the state as part of their 
attempt to defend jurisdiction and the right of self-regulation over the auditing service, 
often by exploiting the notion of serving the public interests (Sikka et al., 1989). Time 
and again, the state often acts or chooses not to act in certain ways (e.g. choosing a 
case to be forwarded to the court) to protect the interest of some, if not all, members 
of the profession (see e.g. Sikka, 2001; Mitchell et al., 1998; Mitchell and Sikka, 
2004).  
 
Over recent years, globalization has become a central theme in research on the 
development of the accountancy profession of the developed countries within their 
context as settler colonies
6
 (particularly Canada and Australia). Cross-border transfer 
of accounting knowledge and professional structures had been thought of as a 
manifestation of imperialism at work, at least in the case of Anglo-American 
accountancy (Johnson, 1973 quoted in Chua and Poullaos, 1993; Lee, 1995; Dyball et 
al., 2007). The fact that these developed countries were major imperialist powers had 
contributed to the spread of accounting all over the globe, creating “an imperial 
accountancy arena” across different colonies (Chua and Poullaos, 2002). For the 
imperialist countries, the end of colonialism was just another demand for restructuring 
the global order of wealth accumulation systems for some of their public (the 
                                                 
6
 The terms settler and non-settler colonies refer to two different types of European colonies. In settler 
colonies, a large number of Europeans (the „settlers‟ or ‟colons‟) migrated and resided permanently 
in the colonies (e.g. Argentina, the US, Canada and Australia). In non-settler colonies, on the other 
hand, the indigenous or other colonized people brought by the colonizers (e.g. as slaves) were still 
the majority residents but they were still subject of foreign rule (see e.g. Ashcroft et al., 2000 
p.211). As evident today, many (if not all) settlers colonies are now rich/developed countries. 
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capitalist class). In this sense, globalization is just another recent restructuring phase 
of capitalism in which accounting played a central role (Catchpowle et al., 2004; 
Cooper et al., 1998). Since the state, capital and accounting are socially related to 
each other (Catchpowle et al., 2004), globalization has been useful in promoting 
Western accounting to become a global profession with enormous commercial 
significance (see e.g. Sikka, 2001; Hanlon, 1994; Dezalay, 1995; Dezalay, 1997; 
Hanlon, 1997; Willmott and Sikka, 1997). In earlier periods, accountancy spread 
through imperial links and connections. On the other hand, the more contemporary 
spread of accountancy takes the form of global convergence of accounting 
infrastructure through various intergovernmental institutions such as the IFAC, the 
WTO, the IMF, the World Bank (e.g. Arnold, 2005; Arnold and Sikka, 2001; Loft et 
al., 2006; Loft and Jeppesen, 2003; Neu et al., 2002; Willmott et al., 1992). 
 
In summary, studies on the development of the accountancy profession in the context 
of the developed countries have shown that the birth and development of the 
accountancy profession in these countries was a socio-political phenomenon involving 
various forces in the society. Accountants were able to achieve, maintain and expand 
economic and social rewards as professionals due to the perceived value of their 
expertise to both the market and the state. In a more contemporary context, the above 
studies also reveal that the functioning of the accountancy profession is inseparable 
from the capitalist economic system, framed within the corporatist political regimes. 
„Professional bodies‟ are political vehicles that will always represent accountants‟ 
interests (Willmott, 1986).  
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2. 3. 2. Studies on the development of the accountancy profession in the context 
of emerging/transitional economies 
This section aims to review the development of the accountancy profession in the 
context of countries with emerging and/or transitional economies. Arguably, these 
countries are not developed countries but they are also not ex-colonized countries 
because of their closeness (geographical, historical, or cultural) to the more advanced 
countries, their economic status, or relative power in global politics. These countries 
include, for example, China, Russia, Greece, and the Czech Republic. 
 
Among these countries, Greece was perhaps the country that has received 
considerable attention in the literature on the accountancy profession. In Greece, the 
government contributed significantly to the success of the consolidation of the Greek 
auditing profession as it perceived the profession as a political and economic 
instrument of social management and not as professionals serving market purposes 
(Ballas, 1998; Dedoulis and Caramanis, 2007). Ballas (1998) used the critical 
sociology of the professions while Dedoulis and Caramanis (2007) used the 
imperialism of influence and the state-profession axis in analyzing the emergence of 
the Greek auditing profession. According to both studies, the state established the 
profession to pursue its policy agenda. Thus, the Greek profession followed the 
corporatist rather than the Anglo-American associationist model, despite strong 
British and US influence at the time (Dedoulis and Caramanis, 2007). Other studies 
investigated the conflict between professional groups within Greek auditing using 
various theoretical lenses. Using the state-profession axis framework, Caramanis 
(1999) examines the liberalization of the Greek auditing market between 1990 and 
1993. He concludes that the liberalization of the market was far beyond a technical, 
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rational and neutral phenomenon but was “the outcome of a political struggle between 
interested groups, against the background of contemporary socio-political conditions 
of the country, and specifically the advancement of neoliberal political and economic 
discourses” (p.190). In another study, Caramanis (2002) investigated the attempt of 
Greek local accounting firms to overturn the aforementioned liberalization of the 
Greek auditing market using the framework of globalization theory. However, such 
an attempt was deemed to have failed due to the advancing power of globalization (as 
represented by major nation-states (in this case the US) and major political-economic 
blocs (in this case the EU) that marginalized the role and importance of the Greek 
nation-state in advancing the interest of the local accountants. He concluded that: 
“…the politics of international accounting professionalism in the 
„globalization‟ era are becoming more polycentric with (lesser) nation-states 
as merely one level (of diminishing importance) in a complex system of 
superimposed, overlapping and often competing national and international 
agencies of governance” (Caramanis, 2002 p.379). 
 
Caramanis (2005) also re-tells the liberalization episode of the Greek auditing 
profession in the 1990s using Weberian concepts of class-status-party, charisma, and 
rationalization. He argued that the liberalization agenda was seen as an inevitable 
rationalization and a consequence of Greece‟s integration into the global free-market 
economy. However, the presence of a charismatic individual with an important party 
status position had made the efforts to overturn the liberalization of the Greek 
auditing market possible. As a result, the dynamics of the Greek accountancy 
profession during that period are seen as a fluid and open-ended historical process. A 
similar case of the role of powerful individuals in mediating the globalization of the 
accountancy profession was found in the Czech Republic. Examining the dynamics of 
the accountancy profession in the post-1989 Czech Republic, Seal et al. (1996) 
   
52  
 
reported that state legislations and transitions in Czech socio-politics and economics 
had accommodated the collective mobility of local accountants in creating the market 
for their services and securing statutory rights over it. However, such legitimacy was 
concurrently undermined by powerful political figures with libertarian ideology. As a 
result, reputable foreign/international accounting firms were given enormous 
opportunity to gain a stronghold in the country‟s accountancy market.  
 
The globalization of Western accounting practices and institutional framework is also 
found in China and Russia. In these countries, however, the country‟s specific socio-
political, institutional, and cultural context has to some extent compromised the 
advancing forces of the globalization of accounting and auditing. Hao (1999) studied 
the impact of transitions towards market economy on the development of the 
accountancy profession in post-1978 China and argued that steps towards establishing 
a Western-like profession did exist in post-1978 China. Unlike Western countries, 
however, the state initiated those steps (such as forming the professional association) 
and as a result, it still has firm control over the profession. Using a different 
theoretical framework, Yee (2009) confirmed Hao‟s result and reported the 
hegemonic relation between the state and the accountancy profession. She shows that 
the state‟s political and ideological leadership had profoundly determined the 
professionalization of accounting in China. Within this hegemonic environment, she 
argued that professional accountants have willingly aligned to the state‟s ideology 
and agenda. Due to this „father-son relationship‟, she predicted that future 
development of the profession in China will continue “under the authoritative guiding 
hand of the state” (p. 89).  
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In the case of Russia, the state was only one of the important sources of moderation in 
the process of adopting an internationalized audit legislative framework. According to 
Samsonova (2009), other factors include the lag in accounting legislative framework 
and the revision or detection culture in local auditors‟ mindset. Most importantly, she 
argued that the Russian business environment (inter alia limited outsider ownership 
and prevalence of institutional shareholdings, an immature state of the capital market, 
limited number of professional investors, and strong tax-orientation of financial 
reporting practices) has made the internationalization of audit legislation only 
relevant to certain sectors of the economy, i.e. the internationally oriented businesses 
(p. 550).  
 
Clearly, different social and politico-economic configurations between the developed 
and developing countries (ex-colony societies in particular) have profound effects on 
the dynamics of the accountancy profession in the respective countries. The next 
section will provide a review on the previous studies on the development of the 
accountancy profession in the context of ex-colonized societies.  
2. 3. 3. Studies on the development of the accountancy profession in ex-colony 
countries  
Studies investigating the development of the accountancy profession in the context of 
ex-colony countries have also increased in recent years. Some of those studies applied 
the theoretical frameworks used to analyze the history of the accountancy profession 
in the context of developed world. On the other hand, other studies argue the need to 
adopt different theoretical frameworks from those used to explain the development of 
the profession in the developed countries.  
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A number of studies have applied Weberian concepts of closure in understanding the 
birth and subsequent dynamics of the accountancy profession in the ex-colonies of 
Great Britain (Sian, 2006; Yapa, 2006). Sian (2006) examined the professionalization 
of accounting in Kenya and concluded that the process was nuanced by “the 
aspirations of the state to implement its Africanization policy in the profession” 
(p.371). As a result, the professionalization project did not merely involve exclusion 
of accountant groups but also indicated attempts by the state to include all indigenous 
accountants as a strategy to achieve its Africanization goals, amidst intra-professional 
struggle among different professional groups. A complex closure project was also 
found in Sri Lanka. Yapa (2006) argued that the professionalization of Sri Lankan 
accounting was characterized by competition between the various imperial (British) 
professional bodies to exert power in the country. He also contended that further 
development of the profession was also hampered by attempts of local accountants to 
close the accounting/auditing market by controlling the supply of public-practising 
accountants.  
 
The political economy of accounting and auditing has also featured in research in the 
context of the ex-colony countries. Susela (1999) reported the existence of conflicting 
international and national interest in the process of setting accounting standards for 
goodwill in Malaysia. Amidst international pressures and intra-professional division, 
she argued that the state‟s policy and ideology determined the outcome of the 
struggle. Ali et al. (2006) examined a longer history of the Malaysian auditing saga 
using the political economy analysis of Malaysian society and concluded that the 
function of auditing in Malaysia has been determined by the dominant political 
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economy relationship in the country in a particular period. They observed that over 
different periods between 1957 and 1997, the development of auditing has generally 
responded to various pressures of politico-economic interest groups, both internal 
(accommodating ethnic relationship within the society) and external (the interests of 
Western investors), or both (strengthening the bonds between global and local elites). 
Yapa (1999), on the other hand, reported the influence of the specificity of Brunei 
Darussalam‟s politico-economic configurations on the development of the 
accountancy profession and contended that the prevalence of the Sultanate 
government in controlling the economy makes it difficult for the profession in 
fulfilling its responsibility of safeguarding public interests. Using the concept of the 
state–profession axis, Uche (2002) explored factors that significantly influence the 
development of the accountancy profession in Nigeria. He showed evidence of 
conflict between the professional bodies (the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria (ICAN) and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN)) 
over the professional domain within the accountancy profession and that the conflict 
was partially sparked, and later resolved, by government actions. Therefore, he 
concluded that the development of the accountancy profession in Nigeria was not 
solely a function of “public expectations and professional competence” (p. 493) but 
also influenced by the nature of government in place (i.e. military or civilian) and the 
lobby of interest groups and personal relationships. 
 
Over recent years, there have been studies that regard the fact that many of such 
countries are former colonies of the Western world as an important variable in 
understanding the development of the accountancy profession in these countries. This 
view has led to the rise of theories of global expansion of capitalism to become one of 
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the most compelling frameworks in understanding the history of the accountancy 
profession in the ex-colonized world. One of the strengths of this theory is its 
suitability for looking into the historical and socio-political context of those countries 
as ex-colonies of Western imperial powers. Studies on the development of the 
accountancy profession in countries such as Jamaica (Bakre, 2005, 2006), Trinidad 
and Tobago (Annisette, 1999, 2000), and the Philippines (Dyball, et al., 2006, 2007) 
reveal that any analysis of accounting development cannot ignore the history of 
colonization and the socio-political impacts it has inflicted on the colonized societies.  
 
In these countries, the interactions between the colonial states and the newly 
independent states may influence the process and outcome of the professionalization 
(Annisette, 1999, 2000). Taking the early development of the accountancy profession 
in Trinidad and Tobago as a case study, Annisette (1999, 2000) used „imperialism of 
influence‟ or „informal imperialism‟ in explaining the early development of the 
accountancy profession in the context of ex-colony societies. De-colonization only 
ended imperialism as the means of capitalist expansion in its formal form and it had 
now moved to another stage of imperialism – „true imperialism‟ that lies in trade and 
influence (Annisette, 2000). Informal imperialism influenced the professionalization 
of accounting in ex-colonized societies in two ways. First, the expanding economy of 
the imperial states require the integration of the weaker states in such a way that the 
strategic decisions governing both the direction and rate of growth of the latter are 
made and governed for the interests of the former (Girvan and Win cited in Annisette, 
2000). Second, to spread the „logic of capitalism‟ requires the support of an 
international or global state capable of exercising “its authority formally and 
informally across national boundaries in the service of the internationalization of 
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capital” (Petras and Morley, 1980, p. 44; Polychroniou and Targ, 1992, pp. 62-63 
cited in Annisette, 2000).   
 
The process of informal imperialism therefore suggests that the accountancy 
profession in less developed countries, especially in ex-colony states, was heavily 
influenced by the more developed countries, more specifically the colonizer. In the 
case of the new post-Second-World-War global order, the professionalization of 
accounting was influenced by two conditions: the newly formed states and the rise of 
the US as the new imperial power (Annisette, 2000). The former, due to both 
economic and political reasons, increased the need for accountants while the latter 
influenced important contours of the accountancy bodies that emerged in the new 
states. In other words, even in the absence of formal colonial relationships, informal 
imperialism theory is still deemed useful in explaining the emergence of the 
accountancy profession as it considers the centrality of the local collaborators in the 
process. It enables investigations of local indigenous accountants and institutions as 
“part of the wider network of collaborative systems that connect the internal/local 
with the external/metropolitan in the operation and maintenance of an informal 
Empire” (Annisette, 2000, p. 637). According to Annisette (1999), professionalization 
of accountants in Trinidad and Tobago was embedded in the context of internal 
disjuncture of a nation struggling for independence, whereby the state actively 
supported the profession because it saw the possibility of the profession acting as the 
social transformer to gain independence from the colonizers. The professionalization 
effort in Trinidad and Tobago was also initiated by state-employed, non-practitioner 
accountants and not by the public-practising accountant elites whereas the motivation 
was also not to achieve closure but instead to open up the profession to others (the 
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local accountants) who had previously been denied entrance to the profession. 
Annisette (2000) provided an account of how imperialism of influence became a 
major force in shaping the success and failure of local aspirations. She reported that 
despite the aforementioned aspirations, attempts at nationalizing the profession in 
Trinidad and Tobago were heavily subverted by the British-based professional bodies 
and its local collaborator elites, resulting in the continuation of the imperialist order. 
 
Imperialism is indeed an important factor in the professionalization process as 
colonization had made it impossible for any colonized society to develop on its own 
any form of cultural and socio-technological advancement such as accounting. Dyball 
et al. (2007) argue that the accountancy profession in the ex-colonized world would 
not emerge and develop in a similar fashion to that of the developed world because 
there are leading conditions or circumstances („precursors‟) to the emergence of the 
accountancy profession that were only evident in the developed countries. These 
conditions include the level of economic development, the self-organizing 
accountants and the presence of a modernist state (Dyball et al., 2007). Hence, Dyball 
et al. (2007) linked the birth of the accountancy profession in the Philippines with the 
US imperial administration propaganda to undermine the capability of the indigenous 
Filipinos to manage public monies. Using cultural imperialism as the framework in 
understanding the consolidation of the Filipino accountancy profession, the authors 
viewed the emergence of the profession as a „native-resistance‟ movement that was 
largely motivated by anti-imperialistic sentiment. The Filipinos felt the need to 
organize their own accountancy profession to deny imperialist accusations of 
backwardness and primitiveness (see also Dyball et al. 2006). 
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Conflict and resistance are inevitable themes in the early development of the 
accountancy profession in ex-colony countries.  One such conflict in the context of 
the early development of the profession was reported by Bakre (2005, 2006) in his 
account of the early development of the Jamaican accountancy profession. He argued 
that there are always two elite groups in post-colonial societies: the global capitalist 
elites and the local collaborators (Bakre, 2005). These classes represent two 
conflicting interests: the former represent the global imperialist interest while the 
latter represent local interests. The local aspiration of the independent Jamaican 
accountancy profession culminated in the passing of the Public Accountancy Law in 
1968. The law was originally designed to enable the localization of the profession 
through the setting-up of the Institute of Certified Accountants in Jamaica (ICAJ). 
However, the attempt failed because of resilient opposition from the „global 
capitalist‟ elites within the Jamaican accounting society. 
2. 3. 4. Previous studies on the development of the Indonesian accountancy 
profession  
The previous section has highlighted the increasing interest in the development of the 
accountancy profession in many ex-colony societies. This section aims to review 
previous studies on the development of the Indonesian accountancy profession, both 
in the English language and in Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language).  
 
Prior studies have examined the development of the accountancy profession in 
Indonesia across different periods in the country‟s history. 
 to investigate if accountancy existed before the colonial period and 
he found the existence of some form of accountancy during the pre-colonial era due 
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to the existence of trade activities by
Islamic kingdoms in Indonesia since the 14
th
 
century. As with any other colonized societies, Western accountancy was introduced 
by the colonial powers during the colonial era that succeeded the Islamic kingdoms 
era (Sapiie, 1980; Sukoharsono, 1995; Sukoharsono and Gaffikin, 1993a). However, 
as we will see later in Chapter 4, accountancy was largely carried out by and for the 
Dutch as part of the internal function of the colonial administration. As a result, there 
was no accountancy profession in the sense that there were no private accounting 
firms operating in Indonesia until the liberalization of colonial Indonesia‟s economy 
in the late 19th Century. Even then, there was only one Dutch accounting firm that 
had significant representation in Indonesia despite the close economic connections 
between the two countries (see Sluyterman, 1998 p.5).  
 
One of the earliest studies on the development of the profession in post-independent 
Indonesia was conducted by Sapiie (1980). The study traced the development of the 
profession after Indonesia‟s independence until the late 1970s, besides also describing 
accounting practices during the colonial time. The study described chronologically 
the events that marked the advance of the profession from the enactment of Act 
34/1954, the establishment of the professional association, and the influence of the 
US accountancy. Another study by Foo (1988) investigates the development of 
accounting and the accountancy profession in Indonesia and Singapore. The author 
attributed the underdevelopment (compared to that of the USA/UK) of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession to the outdated commercial code, undeveloped capital 
market, and lack of professional infrastructure, qualified accountants and accounting 
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education. He also reported the existence of dualism in the Indonesian accountancy 
system. The American system was prevalent in the bigger corporations while the 
Dutch accounting system was practised by smaller local companies. Similar to Sapiie 
(1980), the study did not take into account the issues of power relations and interests 
between states. Although both studies acknowledge the influence of the government 
in the development of the profession, they studies generally viewed such involvement 
as externalities to the development of the profession.  
 
While Sapiie (1980) and Foo (1988) provide important documentations for the first 
three decades of the history of the profession, their studies are not without limitations. 
Apart from the obvious fact that both studies were conducted some time ago, one of 
their major limitations was that they did not problematize the history and role of the 
profession. They viewed the emergence and development of the profession as 
unproblematic for the development of Indonesian society as well as not taking into 
account the issues of power and interests as possible sources for historical changes of 
the profession. Sapiie (1980), for example, considered the influence of the USA as 
Indonesia‟s inevitable necessity:  
“The history of accounting development in Indonesia will always show that 
professors Dinman and Divine
7
 have planted the seed and contribute greatly to 
the growth and development of the [accountancy] knowledge when Indonesia 
needs it most.  
... the graduates of economics sciences [of the Indonesian universities] will 
bear the mission to spread the American system of accountancy for the 
purpose of developing the knowledge, which in turn will then be applied to 
organizations, from small entities to government affairs. ... These are the 
driving factors towards the application of the American (accountancy) model” 
(p.184 and 193, footnote is added). 
 
                                                 
7
 Carl L. Devine and R. Dinman are two American lecturers sent to teach accountancy in Indonesia in 
the late 1950s under the Ford Foundation‟s educational cooperation programme. 
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More recent studies on the development of the Indonesian accountancy profession 
include Bachtiar (2001), Tuannakotta (2007) and Kartikahadi (2007). Bachtiar (2001) 
provided an account of the history of the profession from early independence until the 
early years after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. He explains professionalization of 
accountants as motivated by nationalistic ideology but contends that recent 
development had revealed the true self-interested nature of the accountants. He 
further concluded that there had been no „internal rivalry‟ between Indonesian 
accountants (p.15) since the profession emerged as part of nationalistic ideology, but 
there was increasing concern by local accountants at the threat of foreign accountants 
operating in Indonesia. Although the author has attempted to question the altruistic 
claim of the profession, he did not consider how the dynamics of the profession are 
embedded in the socio-political changes in Indonesia. Furthermore, the analysis was 
confined to one particular issue i.e. local versus foreign accountants.  
 
Tuanakotta (2007) described the long history of the profession from the pre-colonial 
period until the post-1997 Asian financial crisis. The approach in this study is similar 
to Sapiie (1980) in that it traced chronologically the major events in the development 
of the profession. It considers the latest development of the profession until 2007 
where there had been major changes to the statutory regulations following the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, which include, among others, the introduction of mandatory 
audit rotation and penal code for audit negligence. He strongly argued against the 
government‟s initiative to change the regulation seeing it as a raw application of 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (p.403-404) and believed that the profession should be given the 
right of „self-policing‟. Similar to Sapiie (1980) and Foo (1988), the study adopted 
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the functionalist view of the profession and did not problematize the history of the 
profession. 
 
Kartikahadi (2007) also conducted a study on the historical development of the 
profession. Specifically, the author described the regulation of the profession from 
1954 until 2006 by dividing it into three periods: the blooming period (1954-1972), 
the growth period (1973–1996), and the challenging period (1997–2007). He believes 
that “in order to grow steadily and efficiently, a market economy needs to be 
supported by a reliable financial information system” (p.54) and that “an advanced 
economy needs big accounting firms” because they are the only ones capable of 
“serving big clients” (p. 56). Based on this view, the view is very critical of the new 
proposed public accountant law which introduced tougher regulations to the 
profession, viewing it as an unnecessary intervention to the profession. Although both 
Kartikahadi (2007) and Tuannakotta (2007) looked at the development of the 
accountancy profession, their studies present the normative views of the regulations 
in the profession from the practitioners‟ perspective8. Kartikahadi (2007); for 
example, they criticize the post-1997 regulations (which introduced, among others, 
audit rotation and penal codes for auditor negligence) but they praise the older law of 
the previous periods (which of course had not introduced the newer and tougher 
regulations) as being “prudent, compiled after considering the view of all 
stakeholders („to listen, not just to hear‟), and without any hidden agenda of any party 
whosoever” (p.62) and did not see them as the Government‟s intervention.  
                                                 
8
 Theodorus M. Tunanakotta and Hans Kartikahadi are not only accounting academics at the 
University of Indonesia (Departemen Akuntansi FE UI, 2009) but also amongst the earliest 
practicing accountants in Indonesia. Tuannakotta was the first chair of the practising accountant 
chapters of the Indonesian Institute of Accountants when it was set up in 1977. Both were also 
founders of the Indonesian affiliate firm of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
2009) and Hans Kartikahadi is still listed as an active partner (IAPI, 2009a).  
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2. 4. Fostering the framework for understanding the development of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession  
Previous studies on the emergence and development of the accountancy profession 
across different countries have contributed considerably to our understanding of the 
research area. There is, however, room for further research. First, prior studies have 
shown that there is no general explanation of the historical development of the 
profession across different country settings as such history is heavily influenced by 
the historical and socio-political context of each country. It is interesting to see how 
the case of Indonesia is similar or different to the previous studies, especially 
considering the fact that Indonesia is a former colony of the Dutch and very little is 
known about how Dutch colonialism affected the development of the accountancy 
profession in her colonies. Secondly, previous studies on the history of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession offer inadequate accounts of the history of the profession as 
they are dominated by the functionalist paradigm, which is deemed to provide a 
decontextualized history of the profession. This section therefore aims to evaluate the 
applicability of the methodological and theoretical frameworks used in previous 
research in the context of Indonesia. From the review of the previous studies, it can 
be seen that various theories have been utilized in explaining the emergence and 
dynamics of the accountancy profession across different country settings. As those 
studies may inform the theoretical and methodological framework suitable for this 
study, Table  2-1 presents a summary of the theoretical framework used and the results 
of those studies.  
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Table ‎2-1: Previous research on the emergence and development of the 
accountancy profession in different country settings 
Country 
 
Author(s) 
(Period) 
Theoretical 
framework 
Summary of results 
Developed Countries (selection) 
UK Willmott 
(1986) 
State-market-
community axis 
The formation & advancement of the 
profession was a medium as well as outcome 
of the forces of the market and the power of 
the state. Professional bodies are thus seen as 
political vehicles for accountants to control 
both the supply and demand to their labour. 
 Walker 
(1995) 
Critical-conflict 
paradigm 
Early professional formation in Glasgow 
and Edinburgh was a collective and 
organized movement against efforts of 
certain non-accountant groups to reform the 
(Scottish) law that threatened the 
accountants‟ interests. 
USA Lee (1995) Political 
economy of 
accounting 
Accountant professionalization in the US was 
a movement to pursue economic self-interest 
disguised in “public interest” discourse. 
USA, UK, 
Germany, 
Sweden 
Puxty et al., 
(1987) 
State-market-
community axis 
Regulation of accounting is a medium and 
outcome of contradictions within the 
organising principles of the advanced 
capitalism social order. 
France Ramirez 
(2001) 
Bourdieu‟s 
concept of field 
The state determined the success and failure 
of accounting professionalization. The 
newly created profession is only a field in 
which relationship between the state and 
profession was redefined. 
Belgium De Beelde 
(2002) 
State-market-
community axis 
Different models of profession emerged 
simultaneously as various parties (the state, 
professional groups, unions and employers) 
defined the function of audit differently 
according to their interests. 
Australia Chua and 
Poullaos 
(1993) 
State-profession 
axis 
Professionalization (and subsequent 
dynamics of the accountancy profession) 
involved interactions and transformations of 
both state and profession.  
Canada Richardson 
(1989) 
State-market-
community axis 
The state played a decisive role in 
reproducing the hegemonic structure of the 
profession when such structure was 
challenged.  
Japan Sakagami et 
al. (1999) 
Political 
economy of 
accountancy 
Due to differences in politics and business 
environment, the accountancy profession 
has not developed as in the UK, especially 
in the public and management accounting 
sector. 
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Country 
 
Author(s) 
(Period) 
Theoretical 
framework 
Summary of results 
Emerging/transitional economies 
Greece Ballas 
(1998) 
State-profession 
axis 
The audit profession was created during 
1940-1950 by the state to assist in fulfilling 
its socio-economic agenda.  
 Caramanis 
(1999) 
Critical 
sociology of 
profession 
The liberalization of the auditing market 
(early 1990s) was the result of lobby by 
foreign affiliated accountants. The process 
itself involved a struggle between two 
groups in the profession and the interaction 
of various social forces and interests. 
 Caramanis 
(2002) 
Globalization 
theory 
Forces of globalization (major state, 
politico-economic blocs) had undermined 
efforts of local auditors to overturn the 
liberalization of the auditing market during 
1993 – 1997. 
 Caramanis, 
2005) 
Weber‟s 
concepts of 
class-status-
party, charisma, 
and 
rationalization 
Liberalization was seen as rationalization 
towards free-market economic regime. A 
charismatic individual played an important 
role in the local auditors‟ attempt to regain 
monopoly over audit market (1993 – 2001).  
 Dedoulis 
and 
Caramanis 
(2007) 
Imperialism of 
influence and 
state-profession 
axis 
The socio-economic agenda of the state 
played an important role in shaping the 
formation of Greek audit profession; hence, 
its arrangement did not fully follow the 
US/UK model (1940s – 1950s). 
Czech 
Republic  
Seal et al. 
(1996) 
State-market-
community axis 
Collective mobility of accountants was 
supported by the state but undermined by 
the ambivalent position of key political 
figures.  
China Hao (1999) State-market-
community axis 
The professionalization of accounting has 
been largely determined by the state (1978-
1980s). 
 Yee (2009) Gramsci‟s 
theory of 
hegemony 
Strong political and ideological leadership 
of the state determined the history of the 
profession as well as its future development 
(1978 – 1980s). 
Russia Samsonova 
(2009) 
The concepts of 
transnational 
communication 
The internationalization of the auditing 
legislative framework in Russia was a result 
of various cross-border activities of national 
and international actors. However, such 
process had also been shaped by the legacies 
of previous system of economy and business 
environment. 
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Country 
 
Author(s) 
(Period) 
Theoretical 
framework 
Summary of results 
Ex-colonized countries 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Annisette 
(1999) 
Imperialism of 
influence/ 
informal 
imperialism 
 
The state actively supported the profession 
as it saw the possibility of the profession to 
act as the social transformer to gain 
independence from the colonizers. Local 
accountant movement was motivated to 
open up the profession for indigenous 
accountants. 
 Anisette 
(2000) 
Imperialism of 
influence/ 
informal 
imperialism 
Attempts at nationalizing professional 
education were heavily subverted by the 
British-based professional bodies and its 
local collaborator elites, resulting in the 
continuation of the imperialist order. 
Jamaica Bakre 
(2005) 
Cultural 
imperialism & 
globalization 
Attempts to localize Jamaican accountancy 
profession (1950s – 1970s) involved a 
struggle between local-oriented elites and 
global-oriented elites and the interference of 
British professional bodies. As a result, the 
aspiration to localize the profession was 
seriously constrained. 
 Bakre 
(2006) 
Cultural 
imperialism & 
globalization 
The failure of the second attempt of 
localization of the profession (1975–1986) 
was due to the existence of global-oriented 
capitalist elites, the colonial relationship 
with and interest of the imperial 
accountancy body (ACCA). 
Sri Lanka Yapa 
(2006) 
Weberian 
concept of 
closure 
The profession failed to grow because of 
cross border competition between ex-
colonizers (British) professional bodies and 
attempts at market closure by local 
accountants.  
Philippines  Dyball and 
Valcarcel 
(1999) 
Weber‟s concept 
of modern/ 
traditional 
society 
Familial/traditional values served as a 
mediating factor to the rational/corporatist 
regulatory framework. This has questioned 
the “professional” status of the Filipino 
accountants. 
 Dyball et al. 
(2007) 
Cultural 
imperialism 
 
Accounting professionalization (1898–1929) 
was a form of native resistance of the 
Filipinos to the imperial/colonial power of 
the USA. 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
Yapa 
(1999) 
Insights from 
functionalist, 
interpretive and 
critical 
(Willmott, 1986) 
The dominant role of the Sultanate in the 
Bruneian economy has cast doubts over the 
profession‟s ability in serving public 
interests. 
Kenya Sian (2006) Weberian 
concept of 
The professionalization of accounting in 
Kenya involved inclusion by the state 
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Country 
 
Author(s) 
(Period) 
Theoretical 
framework 
Summary of results 
closure amidst intra-professional struggle over 
closure.  
Malaysia Susela 
(1999) 
Political 
economy of 
accounting 
Global and local interests created struggle 
over accounting standard setting and can 
only be resolved by the state. 
 Ali et al. 
(2006) 
Political 
economy of 
accounting 
Function of auditing has been shaped by 
politico-economic pressures existing in 
Malaysian society.  
Nigeria Uche 
(2002) 
Critical view on 
state-profession 
axis 
The dynamics of the profession in Nigeria 
were heavily influenced by the type of 
government in place (military or civilian). 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Aba Al-
Khail 
(2001) 
Cultural 
imperialism and 
globalization 
Forces of globalization, facilitated by the 
state and local intellectuals, have 
prominently influenced the formulation of 
the Saudis‟ auditing standards.  
Indonesia 
Indonesia  Sapiie 
(1980) 
Functionalist 
perspective 
The study described and traced the major 
events in the history of accounting and the 
accountancy profession from 1870 to 1980. 
However, it did not problematize the 
emergence and development of the 
profession and/or take into account the 
issues of power and interests in the 
development of the profession. 
Indonesia 
and 
Singapore 
Foo (1988) Functionalist The study described and traced major events 
in the history of accounting and the 
accountancy profession (1954 to 1988). 
Like Sapiie (1980), it also did not 
incorporate the wider issues of power 
relations and interests between states. The 
study concluded that accounting and the 
accountancy profession in Indonesia is 
underdeveloped due to the obsolete 
commercial code and capital market. 
Indonesia Bachtiar 
(2001) 
Critical 
sociology of 
profession 
The analysis of the dynamics of the 
profession (1945 to 1999) has shown that 
the profession had revealed its true motives 
over time. The study argues that nationalism 
was the main motive for the birth of the 
profession, whereas in later stages the 
profession seemed more active in protecting 
and pursuing its economic interests.  
Indonesia Tuannakotta 
(2007) 
Functionalist 
view on 
profession 
The study described the major events in the 
development of the profession since colonial 
time (1870) until 2007. The author focuses 
on the new changes in regulations on 
Indonesian accountants, sees them as a raw 
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Country 
 
Author(s) 
(Period) 
Theoretical 
framework 
Summary of results 
application of the Sarbanes Oxley and calls 
for the profession to be given the full right 
of responsible self-regulation. 
Indonesia Kartikahadi 
(2007) 
Functionalist 
view on 
profession 
The study traced and described changes in 
relationship between the government and the 
profession between 1954 and 2007. The 
author views statutory regulations of the 
profession as a form of intervention.  
 
Previous studies have revealed that the development of the accountancy profession in 
ex-colonized countries should be viewed differently from that in the developed 
countries. In the context of developed countries, the rise of the profession has been 
linked to accountants‟ social mobility to gain monopoly over the market for 
accounting services. On the other hand, studies on the professionalization and 
development of accounting in ex-colonized countries have incorporated the historical 
and socio-political context of these countries within the discourse of global expansion 
of capitalism. These studies have shown that the accountancy profession in these 
societies did not emerge from within. Instead, it was introduced as part of economic 
expansion by the imperialist power and, as such, the theoretical tradition of the global 
capitalist expansion provides a more powerful explanation of the contemporary 
dynamics of the accountancy profession across both the colonizer and colonized 
countries. However, the working and impacts of global expansion of capitalism on the 
profession in the context of ex-colonized/weaker countries would be different from 
that in the context of the developed/strong countries. 
 
While prior studies have provided considerable evidence on the development of the 
accountancy profession in different countries, they also provided encouragement for 
further research. First, there is a call for continuous research in understanding the 
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operations of accounting in different time and space contexts (e.g. Walker and 
Shackleton, 1998) by exploring and investigating the development of the profession 
in different country settings across various periods. While previous studies have 
provided good evidence that global expansion of capitalism has been the main force 
in driving the dynamic of the accountancy profession in the ex-colonized world, how 
the global forces work in different societies would be best understood by taking into 
account the socio-political, economic and historical specificity of given societies 
(Bakre, 2001). Such a call is still relevant today given the fact that much of the 
previous work was conducted in the context of ex-colonized countries with direct 
links with the UK or the USA. On the other hand, works in the context of former 
colonies of other colonial or imperialistic powers such as the Netherlands, France and 
Spain have been rather limited. Secondly, previous studies put greater emphasis on 
the internal dialectic contradictions of capitalism as the source of change in the 
accountancy profession in ex-colonized countries. On the other hand, recent literature 
on the relationship between globalization and the ex-colonized countries has 
introduced methodologies that appreciate the role of rivalling structures as the 
possible external sources of the dialectic progress of global expansion of capitalism 
(see e.g. Hoogvelt, 2001). Indonesia may offer a different historical and 
contemporary socio-political context that potentially provides the basis for alternative 
social structures to Western capitalism, which in turn shaped the development of the 
profession. There have been limited studies that offer a theoretical and 
methodological framework that recognizes such specificities and how they might 
have shaped the trajectory of the development of the accountancy profession in the 
ex-colonized countries, especially Indonesia. Thirdly, previous research has generally 
focused on a particular episode or story in the history of the accountancy profession. 
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It would be intriguing to explore how the global forces of capitalism have worked in 
shaping and influencing the profession to suit the need of the capitalist global order 
throughout the different and changing modes of relationship between strong and weak 
nation-states across different periods. The work of Ali et al. (2006) was one such 
study, exploring the macro-development of auditing in Malaysia over a period of 60 
years. However, the study did not explore the issue and effects of globalization and 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the profession (Haniffa, 2006 p. 678).  
 
In the context of Indonesia, further research is needed to help tell a more 
comprehensive story of development of the Indonesian accountancy profession for 
the following reasons. First, the majority of the previous works on the history of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession (Foo, 1988; Kartikahadi, 2007; Sapiie, 1980; 
Tuanakotta, 2007) were founded on the functionalist perspective of the profession and 
regarded the emergence and development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia 
as being purely due to the needs of a growing society (e.g. Sapiie, 1980). They failed 
to consider the historical and socio-political specificities of Indonesia. Bachtiar 
(2001) attempted to adopt an alternative perspective by attributing the historical 
development of the profession, especially the formation of IAI, as motivated by the 
accountants‟ nationalist ideology. The proposition, however, failed to explain why the 
country resorted to altering its accounting orientation from the Dutch to the US (see 
e.g. Hadibroto, 1990). In effect, most of the above studies partially or completely 
ignored the wider social, political, and economic context surrounding the major 
events that marked the development of the profession. Furthermore, most of those 
studies do not provide a comprehensive account of the development of the profession 
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis except for Tuanakotta (2007) and 
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Kartikahadi (2007). However, both studies took the practitioners‟ perspective in 
viewing the dynamics of the profession and generally viewed the government‟s 
initiatives as an intervention to the development of an independent profession (see 
e.g. Tuanakotta, 2007 p.399-401).  
 
This study aims to address the various gaps in the literature, using Indonesia as a case 
study. The objective of this study is to examine the historical development of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession during its 50-year history from 1954 to 2008. In 
particular, the study seeks to: 
(a) understand how the accountancy profession emerged in Indonesia as well as 
how and why it has achieved its current state; and  
(b) investigate how and to what extent the 1997 Asian financial crisis affected the 
profession.  
To facilitate analysis, the long history of the profession is divided into three periods. 
The first period is between the early 1950s and 1966; the second period is between 
1967 and 1996; and the final period is between 1997 until the present time. In order to 
achieve its objective, there is a need to develop a theoretical and methodological 
framework that could help make sense of the dynamics of the profession within the 
changes in Indonesia‟s socio-political and economic constellation for the period in 
question. First, such a framework should consider Indonesia‟s position within the 
international political economic relations. As indicated in previous studies, the end of 
formal colonialism did not mean total freedom for ex-colonies countries, including 
Indonesia. The power structure that exists between states in the international arena 
exerts considerable pressures on newly independent states (such as Indonesia) in 
terms of political and economic choices, even decades after their formal 
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independence. The pressure of how to manage the country‟s economy is of particular 
importance to this study as such choices will in turn have considerable effects on the 
development of the accountancy profession. Secondly, the framework should also 
recognize and appreciate the possibility of the existence of social structure in 
Indonesia that may compromise or otherwise catalyse the working of the 
aforementioned global pressure. In short, this study attempts to provide support for 
the previous studies which assert that the emergence and development of the 
accountancy profession in Indonesia is a consequence of the pressures from and 
changes of the global capitalist relation between states. However, how and to what 
extent such pressures operate in shaping the history of the profession may also be 
influenced by other alternative structures existing at the global level and/or emanating 
from the specificities of the Indonesian society.  
2. 5. Summary and conclusion  
This chapter has provided a review of the prior literature on the emergence and 
development of the accountancy profession across different countries. This branch of 
accounting research attempts to understand the history and functioning of the 
accountancy profession within modern society. Over recent decades, it is evident that 
this field of study has witnessed the rise of a more critical approach in understanding 
the history of the accountancy profession. Under this approach, the rise, development 
and position of the accountancy profession is understood in the context of wider 
economic and socio-political factors. The professionalization process (i.e. the process 
by which accountants attempted to gain professional status) has been seen as an 
outcome of the accountants‟ strategy to gain exclusive control over the market for 
accounting services. This approach also stresses the importance of structural 
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relationships between the profession and other members of the society, particularly 
the state, in understanding the function and position of the accountancy profession 
within modern society. 
 
It has been argued that the reasons for and trajectories of the development of the 
accountancy profession in the ex-colonized world are different from those in the 
countries from which they originated. Nevertheless, the critical approach has 
influenced similar studies that attempted to examine the professionalization and 
dynamics of the accountancy profession across different countries within the ex-
colonized world. Insights from the Marxist tradition as a critique of the global 
expansion of capitalism have become one of the strongest theoretical frameworks in 
understanding the historical development of the accountancy profession in those 
countries. The theory links the rise of the accountancy profession in these countries to 
the expansion of Western accountancy, embedded in the imperialism and 
globalization as the process of global expansion of capitalism. In these countries, the 
emergence of the accountancy profession has largely been related to the transition of 
global economic domination modes from formal imperialism to informal imperialism 
(Annisette, 1999, 2000). Most of these studies have therefore reported the closeness 
or „continuation‟ of the model and pattern of professional arrangement between the 
colonized and the colonizer (Annisette, 1999). Recent studies have also revealed that 
the birth and subsequent development of the profession in these countries are far 
more complex involving various internal socio-political factors within the ex-
colonized societies. These factors may serve as either mediating or accommodating 
factors in response to the pressures of the globalization of the accountancy profession.  
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Given the rather limited studies in the context of former colonies of non-
British/American colonies, the history of the Indonesian accountancy profession may 
be an interesting case as there are questions that need answers. For example, how and 
why has the US accounting model had pervasive influence on the country‟s 
accountancy profession despite the fact that Indonesia is a former Dutch colony? This 
condition amplifies the call from recent studies that highlighted the need to pay 
attention to the internal conditions as factors that may accelerate, compromise, or 
even hinder the force of globalization to fully shape the development of the 
accountancy profession in a given ex-colony society. Indeed, the methodological 
framework proposed in this study, which will be elaborated in the next chapter, takes 
into account both external and internal factors in understanding the history of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession over its 50 years of existence.   
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Chapter 3 : Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
Chapter 3 
Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
 
3. 1. Introduction 
The literature review presented in the last chapter shows accounting research to be 
influenced by “theoretical, methodological, and even philosophical choices” (Ryan et 
al., 2002 p.7). The division of  “researchers into the political and philosophical camps 
brings world views into sharp conflict and is tied to the paradoxes of our uncertain 
social and value systems” (Ryan et al., 2002 p.1). The literature review further 
suggests that the theoretical explanations of the emergence and development of 
accounting as a profession vary across different national settings. It also shows an 
increasing attention to the global expansion of capitalism as a possible explanation of 
the emergence and development of the accountancy profession in developing and ex-
colony countries. This chapter is dedicated to describing the research methodology 
used in addressing the research question in this thesis and will justify the choice of 
methodological positions adopted in this study.  
 
The chapter is arranged as follows. The next section reviews the alternative 
methodologies in accounting research that are particularly relevant to examining the 
history of the accountancy profession. It is argued that the functionalist, interactionist 
and critical perspectives on the accountancy profession are products of different 
epistemological and methodological assumptions
9
, and the section concludes with an 
                                                 
9
 Differences in viewing the nature of the accountancy profession are shown as the result of 
fundamental differences in assumptions about what is considered as knowledge and how to achieve 
such knowledge. 
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observation that the literature on the accountancy profession in recent years has paid 
significant attention to both critical and interpretive approaches. Section 3.3 further 
argues how the various approaches influenced the methodology in researching the 
history of the accountancy profession and concludes that there is a need to frame 
history with a particular theoretical lens. Section 3.4 elaborates on globalization 
theory as the process of global expansion of capitalism, and the concept of historical 
structure, to map the history of the accountancy profession in Indonesia in the last 
five decades. Section 3.4.1 starts by presenting the competing conceptions of 
globalization, followed by an explanation as to how globalization is perceived as a 
process of the expansion of capitalism in the world economic order.  Section 3.4.3 
describes how the concept of historical structure, which views each stage in the 
history of capitalist expansion as having its own set of material, institutional and 
ideological structures, may be applied in viewing the different stages in the history of 
the expansion of capitalism. Section 3.4.4 elaborates the periodization in the history 
of the capitalist world order in which different economic relationships between 
developed and less-developed countries thrived using Robert Cox‟s10 concept of 
“historical structure”. Section 3.5 links the stages of capitalist expansion as a possible 
way to understand the different developmental processes of the accountancy 
profession in Indonesia. The chapter ends with a summary and conclusion. The 
following diagram summarizes the structure of this chapter.  
                                                 
10
 Robert Cox (1926 - present) is a Canadian scholar in International Relations and International 
Political Economy (IPE). He is known as one of the pioneer scholars who adopted critical theory 
into the field of International Relations. He is also regarded as the founder of modern-day IPE 
(quoted in Schechter, 2002 p.2). 
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Figure ‎3-1: The structure of Chapter 3 
 
3. 2. Alternative methodologies in research on the accountancy profession  
Accounting is an interdisciplinary discipline in the sense that it “draws its theory and 
methodology from other disciplines” (Roslender and Dillard, 2003). As such, it 
includes positivism as well as post-positivist approaches that include, among others, 
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social constructionism, interactionism, political economy, radical humanism, 
interpretivism and critical theory (Chua, 1986; Roslender and Dillard, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the term “interdisciplinary” usually refers to the work of accounting 
researchers that adopt their theoretical lens from disciplines other than economics, 
such as history, philosophy and political sciences (Roslender and Dillard, 2003 
p.327). There is a close link between theory and methodological choices in 
accounting research (Laughlin, 1995). The extant accounting literature over the last 
few decades has shown different and often conflicting choices of theories, 
methodologies, and research traditions. Each research tradition has its own 
assumptions about the nature of truth and knowledge, reality or the empirical world, 
and the relationship between theory and practice (Chua, 1986; Ryan et al., 2002). 
Research on the development of the accountancy profession is no exception. Different 
epistemological and methodological assumptions gave birth to different explanations 
of the nature and position of the accountancy profession offered by the functionalist, 
interactionist and critical perspectives. The next section will describe differences in 
each perspective.  
3. 2. 1. Mainstream accounting research 
As described in Chapter 2, the earliest attempt at understanding the development of 
the accountancy profession includes the functional and trait theories of profession. 
The functionalists view accounting as an inevitable necessity for society. Public 
legitimacy is therefore essential for the accountancy profession (e.g. Lee, 1994). One 
way of creating this is through intellectual work that produces accounting and 
auditing knowledge (Gendron and Bedard, 2001), as they are the very foundation of 
the professional claims of accounting and auditing (Hines, 1989). Research based on 
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the functionalist perspective may offer such legitimacy. This is done by either 
presenting the work that may induce the perception of the scientifically logical 
character of auditing work, or not presenting the weaknesses of the auditing process 
(Gendron and Bedard, 2001 p.345). Accounting or auditing failure is not necessarily 
viewed as the failure of the profession (see e.g. DeFond and Francis, 2005). In other 
words, research based on the functionalist perspectives would arguably be aimed at 
finding ways of enhancing accounting and auditing practices and, thus, enhancing the 
legitimacy of the accountancy profession in society.  
 
These early works on the profession were thus part of the larger agenda in accounting 
research which built upon various theories and concepts from the field of economics, 
especially those of neoclassical economics (Roslender and Dillard, 2003). This 
„economics wing‟ of accounting research is often regarded as the mainstream 
paradigm in accounting research (Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995; Roslender and Dillard, 
2003). Its „scientific‟ methodology is perhaps the most celebrated characteristic of 
mainstream accounting research as it is based on the ontological belief that there is “a 
world of objective reality” that “exists independently of human beings” and has a 
knowable determinate nature or essence (Chua, 1986 p. 606). In other words, it 
separates accounting researchers from their „object‟ of research. Individuals are often 
analyzed as entities that may be “passively described in objective ways” (Chua, 1986 
p.606; Henderson et al., 1992 p.363). In capital-market-based accounting research, 
for example, the human (investor) is often described as an information processor who 
has a certain attitude towards risk (risk adverse, bearer, or neutral). Secondly, 
mainstream accounting research adopts hypothetical deductivism as the means for 
achieving knowledge (Chua, 1986 p.607). Consequently, quantitative statistical 
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techniques have been the primary research methods used to test or provide „scientific 
explanation‟. Thirdly, mainstream accounting researchers believe that human 
behaviour (individually or collectively) is purposive and, thus, social order is 
(implicitly) assumed to be controllable (Chua, 1986 p.608-609). Conflict is always 
seen as a dysfunctional, yet manageable, disturbance to the social order at any level. 
Accounting research then aims to find the procedures or solutions to correct the 
dysfunctions. Table  3-1 summarizes the underlying assumptions of mainstream 
accounting research. 
Table ‎3-1: Philosophical assumptions of mainstream accounting research 
Beliefs about knowledge: 
Theory and observation are independent of each other. Quantitative methods of data 
collection are favoured to provide a basis for generalizations. 
 
Beliefs about physical & social reality: 
▪ Empirical reality is objective and external to the subject (and the researcher).  
▪ Human actors are essentially passive objects who rationally pursue their assumed 
goals.  
▪ Society and organizations are basically stable and dysfunctional behaviour can be 
managed through the design of control systems. 
 
Relationship between accounting theory & practice: 
Accounting is concerned with means, not ends – it is value neutral and existing 
institutional structures are taken for granted. 
 
Adapted from Chua (1986) and Ryan et al. (2002) 
The most profound advantage of this approach is that it provides clear and structured 
procedures. It also emphasizes rigorous research processes. These characteristics 
offer a high level of objectivity and are open to public scrutiny regarding validity. 
However, there are also major limitations attached to this tradition. First, it does not 
encourage researchers to question the role of accounting in the wider socio-political 
context. It tends to see accounting merely in its technical sense by assuming that the 
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environment in which accounting operates is in its best order and, thus, does not 
necessitate evaluation and change (Chua, 1986 p.610). Secondly, translating social 
phenomena such as human purpose, attitude, and behaviour into reality and sets of 
models has never been simple. They also require many qualifying assumptions before 
they can be derived as theoretical constructs. Finally, the explanations and models 
offered by this stream of research are also fallible propositions that are theory-
dependent and thus cannot be used to test competing theories (Chua, 1986 p.612; 
Ryan et. al. 2002, p.23).  
 
Useful and generalizable knowledge that can explain, control, and predict empirical 
phenomena is perhaps an ideal goal of any research. Mainstream accounting research, 
as Chua (1986) argued, has contributed to this effort by insisting on certain standards 
of validity and objectivity in conducting such research. Accountancy, nonetheless, is 
not a mere technical phenomenon. Its implementation may shape and be shaped by 
humans, autonomous agents capable of changing their purpose, attitude, and 
behaviour. Mainstream accounting research, unfortunately, tends to ignore the basic 
question of whether accounting is actually implemented as it is intended: as a value-
free technology. This is where alternative research philosophies, most notably the 
interpretive and the critical approach, make their way into the accounting literature. 
3. 2. 2. Interpretive accounting research 
Interpretive accounting research is built upon the notion that social structure is 
produced (and reproduced) from the interchange of meanings between individuals. 
Social reality is then the product of continuous social interactions. It is constructed 
rather than discovered (Ryan et al., 2002, p.15). Therefore, interpretive researchers 
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emphasize the importance of understanding an individual‟s behaviour and how others 
interpret her/his behaviour, as well as how he/she interprets others‟. Observation is 
encouraged as the main research technique to obtain the objects‟ opinions, beliefs or 
behaviours. Interpretive researchers also believe that it is necessary to confirm the 
researcher‟s analysis or interpretation of the data with the object in order to get the 
consensus explanation of the event being studied. Finally, interpretive research 
usually does not aim at generalization; hence, it has no practical or technical 
implications. Instead, it attempts to “enrich people‟s understanding of the meanings 
of their actions, thus increasing the possibility of mutual communication and 
influence” (Chua, 1986 p.615). Table  3-2 summarizes the underlying philosophical 
assumptions of interpretive accounting research. 
Table ‎3-2: Philosophical assumptions of interpretive accounting research 
Beliefs about knowledge: 
Theory is used to provide explanations of human actions. Its adequacy is evaluated 
via logical consistency, subjective interpretation and agreement with the actor‟s 
common-sense interpretation.  
Beliefs about physical & social reality: 
▪ Reality is socially constructed and objectified through human interactions. 
▪ Human action is intentional and has meaning grounded in the social and 
historical context.  
▪ Social order is assumed and conflict is mediated through social meanings. 
Relationship between accounting theory & practice: 
Accounting theory seeks to explain action and to understand how social order is 
produced and reproduced. 
Adapted from Chua (1986) and Ryan et al. (2002) 
While mainstream accounting research takes for granted what accounting should do, 
interpretive accounting research has enriched the understanding of what function 
accounting actually performs in its contextual environment. This research tradition is 
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however not without limitations. First, as analysis and interpretation have to be in 
consensus between the researcher and the actors, there are difficulties in settling 
major differences and choosing competing theories for explanation purposes (Chua 
1986). In addition, from the perspectives of those who believe that knowledge must 
promote social change, interpretive accounting research lacks the evaluation 
dimension. It also tends to emphasize more investigation of the micro level of social 
life and neglect the conflict at higher levels of social interaction, such as clashes 
between different members of society. Recent development in the field has witnessed 
the emergence of critical accounting research.  
3. 2. 3. Critical accounting research 
Over the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in accounting research 
and its relation to the societal environment. Such works often offer a critique of the 
function of accounting in society and are based on the spirit of critical social theory 
which forms the tradition of critical accounting research. While mainstream 
accounting research claims to be value neutral, and interpretive research admits the 
value bias of both researchers and the researched, critical accounting research admits 
its ideological nature. This tradition is based on the belief that both individuals and 
societies have historical potentialities that are not fulfilled and are restricted by 
external dominating systems (Chua, 1986 p.619). There is also an underlying belief 
about the totality of the relationship between a society and its elements (individuals, 
groups, and organizations). According to this belief, accountants and auditors exist in 
society within the context of their occupational groups. Accountants and auditors are 
also subject to external societal powers such as the users of their services, their fellow 
accountants, the regulators of their services and so on. As such, critical accounting 
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research emphasizes the importance of historical examinations as part of its core 
methodology. Quantitative methods are usually used at the minimum level since 
generalization is not the primary objective. Table 3-3 summarizes the underlying 
philosophical assumptions of the critical tradition. 
Table ‎3-3: Philosophical assumptions of critical accounting research 
Beliefs about knowledge: 
Criteria for judging theories are always temporal and context bound. Social objects 
can only be understood through a study of their historical development and change 
within the totality of relations. 
Beliefs about physical & social reality: 
▪ Empirical reality is characterized by objective, real relations, but is transformed 
and reproduced through subjective interpretation.  
▪ Human intention and rationality are accepted but have to be critically analyzed 
because human potential is alienated through false consciousness and ideology. 
▪ Fundamental conflict is endemic in society because of social injustice.  
Relationship between accounting theory & practice: 
Theory has a critical imperative; in particular, the identification and removal of 
domination and ideological practice. 
Adapted from Chua (1986) and Ryan et al. (2002) 
The merits of critical accounting research are then obvious, given the history of its 
development. First and foremost, it treats accounting beyond its technical aspects. It 
opens a new and rich interpretation of accounting works in the real world and within 
different social and political settings. It also accommodates various perspectives that 
received scarce attention from mainstream accounting research.  
 
Having discussed the more fundamental differences in the methodology of accounting 
research, the following section discusses specifically the influence of the critical 
perspective of accounting methodologies on research related to the history of the 
accountancy profession. While the functionalist and the interpretive methodologies 
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have their own merits, critical accounting research may perhaps be the most suitable 
approach to examine the history of the accountancy profession in Indonesia over the 
past 50 years. As explained above, and in Chapter 2, the approach has the potential to 
give a more realistic account of such history as it does not isolate the development of 
the accountancy profession from the wider economic and socio-political factors. 
3. 3. The new accounting history  
The rise of critical and interpretive approaches is important to this study, which is 
concerned with the historical development of the accountancy profession in 
Indonesia. Together with the interpretive approach, critical accounting research has 
contributed significantly to the way we understand accounting by introducing the 
importance of embedding the influence of social and environmental factors into the 
analysis. They enlivened the field by opening so many possibilities for new ways of 
seeing accounting as both a technology and human activity. Both approaches have 
enabled:  
“.. a proliferation  of methodologies, a questioning of received notions such 
as progress and evolution, a widening of scope, a new attentiveness to the 
language and rationales that give significance to accounting practices, and 
a shift of focus away from invariant characters such as the book keeper and 
the decision maker towards a concern with broad transformations in 
accounting knowledge. New ways of posing questions about the past of 
accounting have become possible as a result. Taken together, these 
interrelated shifts are of such an order as to entitle us to speak of “the new 
accounting history” (Miller et al., 1991, p.395).     
 
What is implicit in the above quote is that the term „new accounting history‟ is an 
open research paradigm that embraces various alternatives to the conventional 
accounting history. It does not signify a certain research agenda with a “definitive 
theoretical framework”, instead it is “a loose assemblage of often quite disparate 
research questions and issues” (Miller et al., 1991 p. 396). In addition, this research 
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paradigm attempts to provide an alternative history to the mainstream-functionalist 
view on the history of accounting. Such a conclusion is apparent in how it hosts 
various theories and methodologies that view accounting history as anything but 
linear. These theories and methodologies problematize the history of accounting by 
bringing back its human and social aspects. As Miller et al. (1991) continues to argue:  
“Rather than viewing the history of accounting as a natural evolution of 
administrative technologies, it is coming increasingly to be viewed as the 
formation of one complex of rationalities and modes of intervention among 
many, a complex that has itself been formed out of diverse material and in 
relation to a heterogeneous range of issues and events. Attention has been 
directed to a variety of agents and agencies, ranging from the accounting 
profession through the diverse bodies of experts claiming a legitimate 
knowledge of this and that area of economic or social life” (p. 396).   
 
In relation to the history of the development of the accountancy profession, „new 
accounting history‟ has brought a wave of reinterpretation both in the context of ex-
colony countries and developed countries. Unlike conventional historical research, 
one of the significant features of historical research under the critical perspective 
tradition is that it uses theory as the framework for interpreting and understanding 
historical events. As a result, theories from the fields of social science such as 
political science, international political economy, sociology and so forth were 
introduced to tell the history of the accountancy profession across countries. These 
theories were utilized to capture the influence of various social forces that may have 
shaped the development of the profession. The ultimate expectation is that they can 
help provide a richer and more realistic picture of how accounting has come to be 
what it is today. 
 
Chapter 2 has shown that a particular set of theoretical traditions has gained 
increasing popularity as the lens used in framing and interpreting the historical events 
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surrounding the emergence and development of the accountancy profession in the 
context of the ex-colonized world. These studies attributed the development of the 
accountancy profession in these countries to the processes of social, political and 
economic interconnectedness of the world during the colonial and postcolonial era. 
Hence, they fall into the tradition of globalization theory, despite different labels such 
as „imperialism of influence‟ (Annisette, 1999, 2000; Annisette and Neu, 2004) or 
„cultural imperialism‟ (Bakre, 2001, 2005, 2006; Dyball et al., 2006; Dyball et al., 
2007) being used. These studies have provided more nuanced stories of the dynamics 
of the accountancy profession. Those theoretical frameworks have enabled the 
incorporation of the social and political complexity of developing and ex-colony 
societies, which is not present in the developed world. Hence, the tradition of 
globalization theory, interpreted as the process of the global expansion of capitalism, 
may provide substantial insights into the development of the Indonesian accountancy 
profession during its 50-year history. As reviewed in Chapter 2, previous research on 
the topic in the Indonesian context has neither considered such an approach nor 
covered the entire period considered in this study. The next section discusses the 
theoretical framework that may capture not only the influence of global expansion of 
capitalism but also the existing social structures that have shaped the process.  
3. 4. Historical structure and the history of globalization  
Globalization is a term encompassing various meanings of great diversity. Since the 
terminology has been the focal point of various disciplines, its meaning is thus 
dependent upon the viewpoint of the discipline in question. It is therefore necessary to 
start the discussion by establishing which conception of globalization the study 
adopts.  
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3. 4. 1. Defining globalization 
The term globalization refers to the phenomenon of the increasing global 
interconnectedness of people and places in which exchanges of materials and ideas 
are no longer restricted by time and distance. As a social process, it has been regarded 
as denoting a social, cultural and political, as well as an economic, phenomenon. 
Hence, defining globalization is not a straightforward task as it can be interpreted in 
numerous ways. Scholte (2000) sums up the complication:  
“Regarding definition, for example, some people equate „global‟ relations 
with „international‟ relations, while others emphasize the difference between 
the two notions. In respect of scale, some analysts see globalization as 
pervasive and overriding fact of contemporary society, while others dismiss 
globalization as a fantasy. Concerning chronology, some say that 
globalization is a recent development, while others date its beginning far back 
in history. On the questions of social change, some assessments affirm that 
globalization is transforming our lives, while others assert that old social 
structures persist intact. In normative terms, some evaluations champion 
globalization, while others denounce its consequence. With regards to policy, 
people have promoted competing neoliberal, reformist and radical courses of 
actions” (p.2).    
 
In other words, the definition of globalization depends on the discipline and the 
approaches used by the person studying the phenomenon. There are, however, four 
main approaches to globalization (e.g. Sklair, 1999): the world-system, global culture, 
global society and global capitalism perspectives.  
 
The world-system approach to globalization is largely attributed to the work of 
Immanuel Wallerstein
11
. This theoretical tradition looks at globalization as a system 
in which nation-states across the globe are connected to each other. Under this model, 
states are categorized as core, semi-periphery and periphery based on the roles that 
                                                 
11
 Immanuel Wallerstein is an American sociologist at Yale University whose book, titled “The 
Modern World-system” (first published in 1974), is considered as having founded the world-system 
theoretical tradition as a critique of global capitalism. 
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each of those countries performs in the context of the capitalist world system. Core 
countries are the focal point of the world capitalist system in that they receive most of 
the world‟s wealth. These countries are usually the fully industrialized countries that 
have strong nation-state institutions, and great military and political forces. Most 
commentators would include countries like the US, the UK, Germany, and Japan as 
core countries. Semi-periphery countries are countries that have achieved some 
degree of industrialization but still lack power and economic dominance, as well as 
still suffering from inequality and poverty (e.g. China and Russia). Finally, periphery 
countries refer to those that are not only the least wealthy and developed but also 
institutionally weak and, hence, are dependent on or perhaps exploited by the core 
and the semi-periphery nations. In other words, the world system model regards 
globalization as inter-nation connectedness under the capitalistic mode of production 
operating on a global scale. 
 
The second conceptualization of globalization springs from the tradition of cultural 
studies. Its basic view is that globalization is a worldwide process of the emergence 
of a global culture. From this perspective, globalization is seen as the process of 
homogenization of identities of people across culture and nations. In this process, 
mass media play a very important role as they are vehicles in which images of 
identities are transferred between people. With the invention of recent technologies 
(such as television, internet and mobile phone), the process accelerated as, through 
such mediums, cultural identities can reach across vast distances and across 
boundaries in virtually no time. In other words, the extensive reach of mass media has 
enabled people across the globe to be contemporaneously exposed to the same images 
of identity. Based on this perspective, discussions revolve around issues such as 
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whether there will be a single global culture or what will happen when different 
people and their cultural identities meet and interact with each other.  
 
In a similar tone, the third theoretical model of globalization argues that globalization 
is the creation of a global society. The model was based on the belief that the 
combined processes of integration in economics, technology, socio-cultural issues 
and politics on a global scale is leading to the increasing awareness or consciousness 
of „world oneness‟. In this process, the difficulty in communicating and exchanging 
ideas and systems of belief caused by time and distance is reduced. The space-time 
compression has been an enormous catalyst in shaping social interactions amongst 
people across different territories. The advancement of communication technology, in 
particular, has accelerated the process and virtually influenced every aspect of human 
life, be it politics, economics or culture. The result is an unprecedented world order 
based on the supra-territorial relationship between people (Scholte, 2000). 
 
The final conception of globalization regards it as the process of establishing global 
capitalism. However, unlike the world system approach, this approach does not 
emphasize the relation between states but instead views globalization as a process of 
consolidation of capitalistic class structure on a global scale that transcends borders. 
For instance, Sklair (1995) argues that the global capitalism expansion takes place in 
three major spheres: economic, political and cultural-ideological (Sklair, 1995). Each 
of these spheres has its own key institutions: transnational corporations for the 
economic, the transnational capitalistic class for the political, and the cultural-
ideology of consumerism for the cultural-ideological sphere. The three spheres are 
complementing elements that support the working of the capitalistic mode of 
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production on a global scale. Table  3-4 summarizes the three spheres of global 
capitalism.  
Table ‎3-4: The process of global capitalism  
TRANSNATIONAL 
PRACTICES 
LEADING 
INSTITUTIONS 
INTEGRATING 
AGENTS 
Economic sphere 
Transnational capital 
 
International capital 
 
State capital 
Economic forces 
Global TNCs 
 
World  Bank, IMF,  BIS 
State TNCs 
 
 
Global Business Elite 
 
Political sphere 
TNC executives 
 
Globalizing 
bureaucrats, politicians 
and professionals 
 
Regional blocs 
 
Emerging transnational 
states 
 
Political forces 
Global business 
organization 
 
Open-door agencies, 
WTO, Parties  and lobbies 
 
EU, NAFTA,  ASEAN 
 
UN, NGOs 
 
 
Global Political Elite 
 
Cultural-ideology sphere 
Consumerism 
 
Transnational neo-
liberalism 
 
Cultural-ideology forces 
Shops, media 
 
Think tanks, elite social 
movements 
 
 
Global Cultural Elite 
 
Source: Sklair (1995) 
 
The above descriptions shows that globalization is a process of transformation that 
transcends space and time borders (Scholte, 1997) and affects every aspect of human 
life, be it economic, political, or socio-cultural. The concepts of globalization as the 
process of integration of the world economy under the capitalistic mode of production 
(whether interpreted as the inter-states order under the world system theory or as the 
process of formation of global capitalist class under the global capitalism theory) is 
of particular importance to this study. Since previous studies have shown that modern 
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accountancy is an ideological product of capitalism, the spread of accountancy as 
both a practice and a profession has been an integral part and consequence of 
globalization. Consequently, the analysis of the relationship between countries within 
the capitalist world order is an important step in understanding the historical 
development of the accountancy profession in ex-colony countries. Such analysis is 
important in understanding how globalization affects the politico-economic 
conditions of those countries, which in turn served as the structural framework within 
which the accountancy profession developed. The next section further elaborates on 
the concept of globalization as global expansion of capitalism. 
3. 4. 2. Globalization as global expansion of capitalism  
As the previous section indicates, consideration of globalization in its economic sense 
requires discussion of the expansion of capitalism as the prevailing global system of 
political economy (Hoogvelt, 2001). A political economy or a mode of production is 
a system by which a particular society produces, accumulates and distributes wealth. 
In this regard, capitalism is a system of political economy in which society comprises 
two major groups: owners of productive capital (money and land) and owners of 
productive skill (labourers). In a capitalistic system, owners of capital are central to 
the production and distribution of wealth and they are the primary decision makers 
regarding the type, amount and timing of production of commodities. The labourers, 
on the other hand, have to sell their productive skill to the capitalist. The profit from 
the sale of the commodities generates wealth, all of which goes to the owners of 
capital. The wealth accumulation cycle takes place when the owner of capital 
reinvests the profit to produce even more profit.  
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The endless pursuit of profit maximization is an important explanation of why 
capitalism is not a system of nation-states but a world system (Wallerstein, 1989) 
with a globalizing attribute (Amin, 2001). Capitalism “involves outward expansion, 
gradually encompassing ever-larger areas of the globe in a network of material 
exchanges” (Hoogvelt, 2001 p. 14). The source of this ever-expanding nature of 
capitalism is the contradiction inherent in capitalists‟ pursue of ever-bigger profits. 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1989) summarizes two fundamental contradictions of 
capitalism as a world system. First, there is contradiction between short-term and 
long-term profit maximization: 
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In other words, the inherent contradiction of capitalism constitutes the expanding 
nature of capitalism. This nature is traceable to its early birth in 16
th
-century western 
Europe (Hoogvelt, 2001). The world system theory explains how capitalism works at 
the global level and, more specifically, it analyses global capitalism at work through 
power relations between states. The theory starts by explaining the power structure 
amongst different states as encapsulated in two different groups of countries: core and 
periphery countries. The core countries are at the centre of the capitalist world system 
and they have undergone social evolution that enabled them to successfully 
implement a capitalistic mode of production. The principle of free competition, 
inherent within the capitalist system, means that a producer would have to find better 
ways of production. This is necessary, not only to win the competition but, more 
importantly, to get the maximum profit possible. This characteristic of capitalism is 
inherently expansive in nature. When core countries could no longer sustain 
expansion within their heartland, the core countries‟ capitalist class turned their 
attention to other territories. Such expansion initially took the form of the exploration 
of new production input, which resulted in the subjugation of other territories by the 
core countries, i.e. creating the periphery and semi-periphery countries. Over five 
centuries of historical development, capitalism has taken various modes of expansion 
encapsulating intricate relationships between rich and poor countries. In the next 
section, the nature and causes of such modes or stages of capitalist expansion are 
described in more detail using the concept of historical structure introduced by Robert 
Cox. 
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3. 4. 3. Historical structure and the different stages of capitalist world order  
Figure ‎3-2: Three underlying forces in a social structure 
 
Ideas 
Institutions Material 
capabilities 
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applicable at three levels of human activities: social forces, forms of 
state and world order (Cox, 1996 p. 100). In his analysis, Cox explained the concept 
of social forces as engendered by any particular organization of production. 
Production is indeed of central importance to Cox as he believes that “production 
creates material basis for all forms of social existence and the way in which human 
efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of social life, 
including the polity” (Cox, 1987 p.1). However, Cox‟s idea of production was not 
limited to the process of producing physical goods but also covers the creation and re-
creation of “knowledge, social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites 
to the production of physical goods” (Cox, 1989 p.39 cited in Bieler and Morton, 
2003). Forms of the state are representations of the complexity of states/societies 
while world order denotes the configurations of power in the world which, in turn, 
define the problematic of war and peace between states (Cox 1996, p. 101). The three 
levels of human activities are interrelated but not in a linear fashion. According to 
Cox (1996, p.100), they are interrelated to each other in that transformations in the 
prevailing mode of production generates and/or requires new social forces. Changes 
in the configurations of social forces in turn cause changes in the structure of states. 
Finally, the generalization of the structure of states alters the problematic of world 
order. The process, however, also goes the other way around. Global forces influence 
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individual states through a particular world power configuration whereas the type and 
power of state in place shape the development of social forces (p.101).  
 
The Coxian approach to international political economy (IPE) has received both 
praise and criticism (for a review and dialogue between Cox and his commentators 
see e.g. Berry, 2007; Cox and Schechter, 2002; Schechter, 2002). Criticism towards 
Cox‟s works ranges from epistemological weaknesses of his approach to his political 
stand of changes. The epistemological criticism rests heavily on the argument that 
Cox emphasizes too much on the structural analysis and undermining the role of 
social agents in fostering social changes (see e.g. Rosamond, 2003). Another criticism 
is that his work focused on the global and not the local (Phillips, 2005). Finally, his 
approach has also been accused as being too descriptive and lacking details of the 
agenda for social change (Schechter, 2002). Despite the criticisms, there is little doubt 
that Robert Cox‟s thinking offers significant merits. His theorization on the relations 
between states has earned him the recognition as the founder of the Critical IPE (see 
e.g. Berry, 2007). The historical structure concept offers an alternative explanation to 
the story of global expansion of capitalism as it enables the capture of external 
sources of capitalism‟s dialectical progress. Not only does it fit well in explaining 
social changes that span a long period, but it also offers insights to alternative forms 
of historical, contemporary and future development of the social order. In the context 
of this study, it offers the analytical tool in recognizing the existence and role of 
alternative sets of material, ideological and institutional forces in the “structural level 
of capitalist historical development” (Ross and Trachte, 1990 as cited in Sklair, 1999) 
i.e. the formation and the demise of each stage in the capitalist expansion. 
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3.4.3.1. The mercantilist era  
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3.4.3.2. The colonization era  
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3.4.3.3. The neo-colonialism era  
   
108  
 
   
109  
 
   
110  
 
                                                 
12
 The Bretton Woods system established the US Dollar as the world currency reserve by requiring 
countries to peg their currencies against either gold or US Dollar, which at the time was the only 
currency directly convertible to gold due to the US‟s enormous gold reserve. During the first half 
period of the system (until ca 1958), the US would literally print dollars and run her economy on a 
deficit balance of payment. However, as the deficits became significantly greater, countries started 
to demand direct conversion to gold, putting heavy pressure on the Dollar. Eventually, the Bretton 
Woods system collapsed when the US unilaterally abandoned its pegged rate to gold at 
US$35/ounce. 
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3.4.3.4. The global financial era (debt peonage era) 
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3. 5. Theoretical and methodological frameworks  
Having described the different mode of relationship between the rich-strong and 
poor-weak countries throughout the different stages of global capitalist expansion, 
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this section explains the theoretical and methodological frameworks of this study. 
First, the how the different stages of globalization may influence the development of 
the Indonesian accountancy profession is explained. This is followed by a description 
of the data collection and analysis.   
3. 5. 1. Linking globalization and the accountancy profession in Indonesia 
The research questions of this study are addressed using several theoretical and 
methodological pillars. In essence, this study argues that the development of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession throughout its history is profoundly influenced by 
Indonesia‟s wider socio-political conditions, which in turn are shaped by the 
interaction between the forces of global expansion of capitalism and any rivalling 
social structure existing in the period in question. Figure 3-3 presents the theoretical 
and methodological framework of this study.  
Figure ‎3-3: The methodological framework of the current study 
 
 
The development of the 
Indonesian accountancy 
profession 
Globalization as 
capitalist 
expansion 
 
Rivalling social 
structures  
(global or local) 
Indonesia‟s prevailing 
system of political 
economy  
   
114  
 
As can be seen from the figure, the first methodological pillar of this study rests on 
the contention that the model of the accountancy profession depends on the wider and 
more fundamental capitalist system of political economy (among others Willmott, 
1986, Puxty et al., 1987; Robson et al., 1994). This means that an associationist 
model of the accountancy profession requires a higher degree of liberal capitalistic 
institutions and ideals (such as private ownership, separation of agents and principals) 
than that required by the corporatist mode of regulation.  
 
Secondly, the study adopts the view that the emergence and development of the 
accountancy profession in the context of ex-colony countries is both the outcome and 
medium of the global expansion of capitalism (Annisette, 1999, 2000; Bakre, 2005, 
2006; Dyball et al., 2006; Dyball et al., 2007). This means that the emergence and the 
development of the Indonesian accountancy profession cannot be attributed solely to 
the internal social dynamics of the Indonesian society. As in any other colonized 
societies, the oppressive nature during the colonial era, which lasted for more than 
300 years, had destroyed the possibility of any technological advancement or 
development of institutions such as the accountancy profession. the 
influence of globalization does not occur in a direct and deterministic way but is 
channelled through Indonesia‟s prevailing political-economic regime, which was in a 
relatively weak state within the world‟s geopolitical and economic constellation. In 
other words, 
 fully globalized, Western-like Indonesian accountancy profession could 
only occur if the capitalist economic system arrangement prevails in Indonesia 
.  
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Third, the study also argues the needs to recognize the existence of alternative 
structures that served as rivalling forces to globalization as theorized by Cox‟s 
historical structure concept. The political economy of ex-colony countries such as 
Indonesia is an outcome of the interaction between the structural forces of global 
capitalism with any rivalling structures. Given the position of Indonesia in the 
world‟s geopolitics and economic order, globalization is a pervasive factor in shaping 
Indonesia‟s choices of socio-economic arrangement. However, this study believes 
that this influence had constantly faced alternative ideological, institutional, and 
material forces emanating either from rivalling global forces (e.g. the Soviet bloc) or 
local conditions (i.e. Indonesia‟s historical and socio-political background).  
 
The theoretical and methodological frameworks of the study therefore require that the 
first step in understanding the development of the accountancy profession is the 
analysis of the political economic system that prevailed in any given period of 
Indonesian history. In this regard, 
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3. 5. 2. Data collection and analysis 
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1-2
 
 Figure ‎3-4: The periodization in the development of the Indonesian accountancy profession 
 
Early independence and the Old Order era 
(1949 – mid-1960s) 
 
 
The New Order (1967 – 1997) 
 
Post 1997 Asian Financial crisis 
External/global: The rise of the US as a new 
world superpower, end of colonialism 
 
Internal/local: Early independence, the period of 
social, political and economic instability 
Global: The cold war, start of global financial 
era  
 
Local: Soeharto came into power, the beginning 
of the New Order Political stability and 
economic growth under the New Order‟s 
crony/oligarchic capitalism 
  
Global: The intensifying of global 
financial era  
 
Local: The Asian financial crisis, 
acceleration toward integration of 
global economy following the fall 
of the New Order regime  
 
1949                                                                      1966                                                                    1997/1998                                                                2008 
Independence                         The New Order came 
into power 
 
 
The Asian financial 
crisis/ the fall of the 
New Order 
 
 
 
Western-like accounting and its professional 
infrastructure are necessary and imperative. 
Partial Westernization of the profession exists 
but was later heavily hindered by the New 
Order‟s politico-economic coalitions. 
 
Pressure to have trans-border 
convergence of accounting rules and 
regulations. 
1
2
0
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Figure 3-4 only exhibits the details for post-independence Indonesia as the 
development of the profession in the previous periods is not within the scope of this 
study. As can be seen from the timeline, the first period is the period of the 
emergence and early development of the profession, covering the years between the 
early 1950s and the mid-1960s. According to Hoogvelt‟s (2001) periodization, as 
explained earlier in this chapter, this was the neo-colonial period, marked by the 
ending of direct control over the colonies and the rise of the US and the Soviet Union 
as the world superpowers. In this period, indirect control over overseas resources and 
investment required the presence of the accountancy profession to provide 
mechanisms of accountability similar to that of the home country. This influence was 
curtailed by economic instability and political turbulence and ideological division 
amongst political elites in the newly independent state of Indonesia. The second 
period, covering the years between the mid-1960s and 1998, is the period of the 
development under the New Order political regime. From the perspective of 
Hoogvelt‟s periodization, it was the beginning of the globalization stage of capitalist 
expansion in which the US‟s power started to decline and was replaced by the 
consolidation of political and economic power in both Western and Eastern blocs. In 
this period, pressures to modernize the accountancy profession came from inter-
governmental institutions in line with the agenda of constructing a free-flow financial 
market across borders. Such pressures, however, have to be understood in the context 
of the New Order‟s choice of system of political economy. The New Order was a 
political regime under President Soeharto who came into power in 1966/7, allegedly 
with the backing of Western powers. Finally, the last period of analysis is from the 
1997 Asian financial crisis till the present time. In this period, the globalization of 
financial systems requires coordinated governance, including the convergence of 
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accounting rules and regulations. In this period, global coordination of production, 
market, and financial systems has intensified. As a result, further integration and 
convergence of rules and regulations has been the central theme as part of the wider 
attempt to provide a global regulatory regime to accommodate the intensifying trans-
border capital traffic. As in the first two periods, analysing the impacts of those global 
transformations must take into consideration the impacts of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis on Indonesia‟s socio-political and economic power configuration. 
3. 6. Summary and conclusion  
This chapter elaborates upon the methodological framework of this study. The 
discussion starts by reviewing the alternative methodologies associated with the 
functional, interpretive and critical perspectives on the accountancy profession. In 
line with the previous chapter, this chapter also acknowledged the merit of the critical 
and interpretive methodologies in accounting research and continued the discussion 
of the influence of such methodologies on research into the history of the 
accountancy profession. This discussion was in line with the nature of this study, 
which is primarily an historical research. One primary difference between 
conventional research on accounting history and the „new accounting history‟ is the 
use of theory as a framework for interpreting and understanding historical events.  
 
This study therefore supports the contention that the development of the accountancy 
profession cannot be separated from the process of globalization as an exercise of 
global expansion of capitalism. This chapter supports the argument that historical 
structure and the theories of the stages of global expansion of capitalism can provide 
fruitful insights in renewing our understanding of the development of the accountancy 
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profession in ex-colony countries, particularly Indonesia. It proposes that the 
development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia moved in tandem with the 
changes in the country‟s political economic system, which was influenced by 
Indonesia‟s historical and contemporary position in the world geopolitics and 
economic order. As Indonesia is a weak country, the capitalist relationship between 
the advanced countries (the core) and the less developed countries (the peripheries) 
has a telling influence on Indonesia‟s socio-political and economic life, including its 
choice of political economic system. Since accountancy is an inherent part of 
capitalism, this study therefore argues that the various phases in the development of 
accounting in ex-colony countries follow the stages of capitalist expansion. However, 
based on the notion of „historical structure‟ proposed by Robert Cox, such a process 
is not linear because in each of the historical periods, the force of capitalist expansion 
has always been met by competing social structures. In other words, while the study 
accepts that the Indonesian accountancy profession developed in accordance with the 
changes in the structural level of capitalism as the world‟s prevailing socio-economic 
order, this influence should also be understood in the context of any contending social 
structures existing at domestic as well as global level in any given period. 
 
As a result, it is argued that the history of the accountancy profession in Indonesia 
does not tell a linear story and any attempts at answering questions of how the 
Indonesian accountancy profession has developed during the three major periods in 
its history should be made with reference to the country‟s prevailing political 
economy system of the given period. In the next chapter, the study starts the analysis 
by focusing on the early development of the Indonesian accountancy profession, 
covering the period between the early 1950s and the mid-1960s.  
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Chapter 4 : Globalization and the Early Development of the Indonesian Accountancy Profession  
Chapter 4 
Globalization and the Early Development of the Indonesian 
Accountancy Profession 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the study covers three main periods in the development of 
the profession. The objective of this chapter is to provide the historical narrative as 
well as contextual analysis of the birth and early development of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession between the early 1950s and mid-1960s. Specifically, it seeks 
to illustrate how the Indonesian accountancy profession emerged as well as 
explaining how and why the profession is inclined more towards the US model than 
the Dutch model.  
 
The remainder of Chapter 4 is structured as follows. Based on the methodological 
framework presented in the last chapter, the story of the emergence and early 
development of the Indonesian accountancy profession is presented in two parts. To 
provide the context for making sense of how and why the profession had emerged in 
Indonesia, it is necessary to first understand the socio-political and economic systems 
prevailing at the time, and these are presented in Section 4.2. The second part traces 
the major events in the early development of the profession.  Section 4.3 describes the 
status quo of the accountancy profession in Indonesia during colonial times. Section 
4.4 presents the analysis of the developments in the early years post-independence by 
identifying three major themes for the period considered: the birth and consolidation 
period; the stagnation period; and the change in orientation period. Section 4.5 
presents the summary. Figure 4-1 illustrates the structure of Chapter 4. 
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Figure ‎4-1: The structure of Chapter 4 
 
4. 2. The socio-political and economic conditions of the newly independent 
Indonesia 
The Indonesian accountancy profession was established in the early 1950s.
13
 In order 
to fully make sense of the process, it is imperative to consider the socio-political and 
economic context leading up to, as well as during, the early years of the state‟s 
                                                 
13 In the context of this study, the accountancy profession refers to its institutional and structural sense 
and not its broadest sense which includes all accounting activities (see Section 1.1. in Chapter 1). 
In addition, accounting practices prior to independence were solely conducted by the Dutch with 
very little or no involvement of the indigenous population. Hence, unlike British colonies, there 
was virtually little or no inheritance and continuance of professional infrastructure from the Dutch. 
In this context, the professional infrastructure of accountancy is said to have only emerged in 
1950s since the country had to start from the scratch.  
4.1.Introduction 
4.3. Status quo of the accountancy profession in colonial Indonesia 
4.4. The early development of the accountancy profession in post-
independent Indonesia 
4.4.1. The consolidation period (1950-1957)  
4.4.1.1. Act number 34/1954: The birth of the profession 
4.4.1.2. The Formation of Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (IAI) 
4.4.2. The stagnation period during the era of guided democracy 
(1957 – 1966) 
4.4.3. Regime change and switch to the American system (1967-1973) 
 
4.5. Summary and Conclusion 
4.2. The socio-political and economic conditions of the newly 
independent Indonesia 
 
4.2.1. The legacy of Dutch colonialism 
4.2.2. Indonesian nationalism 
4.2.3. Indonesia and the world‟s global power 
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independence. In this section, three conditions that contributed to the 
professionalization of accounting in Indonesia will be elaborated. It starts by 
describing the impact of the Dutch colonial administration on the development of the 
accountancy profession in Indonesia. Next, the nature and origin of Indonesian 
nationalism, which is an important factor in the story of professionalization, will be 
presented. Finally, world geopolitics during the 1950s, which played a major role in 
determining the political and economic policy of Third World countries including 
Indonesia, will be discussed.  
4. 2. 1. The legacy of Dutch colonialism  
The presence of foreign powers in Indonesia‟s history may be attributed to its 
strategic location and fertile soil for crops and spices, which were vital factors during 
the ancient trade and mercantile eras. Indonesia, an archipelago located in the south 
part of the Silk Trade Route, strategically links Asia and Australia as well as the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The country covered an area of almost 2,000,000 
km. square, spanning 5000 km. west to east and almost 2000 km. from north to south. 
Although more than 60% of its area is ocean, the tropical Indonesian islands 
contained some of the richest soil on earth producing crops and spices that were vital 
commodities during the era. Hence, it is not surprising that the country had been 
under the grip of foreign powers through traders from India, China, Middle East and 
finally Europe. Table 4-1 summarizes the history of foreign powers in Indonesia. 
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Table ‎4-1: History of foreign influence during pre-independence Indonesia 
Periods Major foreign power in control  
Pre- 700 AD Chinese and Hindu traders 
Ca. 700 - 1300 Shri Vidjaja (Local Kingdom with Hindu Mahayanist influence)  
1300 - 1400  Madjapahit (Local Kingdom with Hindu-Brahmanism influence.  
1400 – 1522 Moslem kingdoms 
1522 – 1600 Portuguese rule 
1600 – 1795  First phase of Dutch rule through Verenegigde Oost-Indieche 
Compagnie (VOC; the United East Indies Companies). VOC held 
monopolistic right on trade and business in Indonesia. 
1795 – 1811  French rule; no significant difference from the Dutch. VOC was 
dissolved.  
1811 – 1830  British rule; the intention was to create textile market and land 
reform in Indonesia. 
1830 – 1942  Second Dutch rule, direct administration by Dutch government. 
1942 - 1945  Japanese occupation. 
1945 - 1949  Independence declaration followed by war of independence.  
1949 Dutch recognition of independence 
Adapted from Furnival, 1944; Grant, 1967; Legge, 1964; Palmier, 1965 and Ricklefs, 2007  
 
As can be seen in the table, Indonesia was under various European imperialists and 
colonialists for over 350 years. The Portuguese were the first European power that 
came to the country in the early 16
th
 century. After conquering the Sultanate of 
Malacca in 1511, the Portuguese arrived at the port of Banten at the western tip of 
Java Island in 1522 in their attempt to extend their trade networks southward. With 
the help of their navy armada, they were successful in extending their power as far as 
Amboina, Ternate and Tidore in Maluku, which are important producers of spices in 
the eastern part of Indonesia. The Dutch arrived in the port of Banten in 1596 under 
the leadership of Cornelius de Houtman, which triggered competition between the 
Portuguese and the Dutch for control in Indonesia during the early years of colonial 
power. The Portuguese ruled in the eastern part of the country (Amboina) while the 
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Dutch controlled the west part of the country (Jakarta). However, Portuguese rule in 
Indonesia was very short due to local resistance throughout its occupancy and the 
Dutch had effectively become the dominant colonial power in the archipelago by 
1665 (see Figure 4-2). 
Figure ‎4-2: Dutch and Portuguese power in Asia ca. 1665 
 
Source: Boxer, 1969, p.24 
The Dutch became the colonial power having the longest and firmest grip on the 
country. They ruled for more than three centuries with only short stints by the French, 
the British and the Japanese. The periods of rule of the French and British were 
merely a consequence of the political turbulence in Europe during the late 18
th
 
century. When France conquered the Netherlands in 1795, they also indirectly took 
control over all Dutch colonies. For example, they appointed a Dutch governor, 
Herman Daendells, to rule Indonesia during the French rule in 1795-1811. Although 
the French tried to exert direct control over the colony in 1811, they had to surrender 
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to the British whose administration lasted for less than 15 years (circa 1815–1830). 
The Dutch gained control of the archipelago again in 1830 and ruled for another more 
than a century until Indonesia‟s declaration of independence in 1945, only being 
interrupted by the Japanese for three and a half years during World War II (1942-
1945).  
 
In terms of administrating the colony‟s economy, the Dutch colonial era can be 
divided into two major periods. The first period covered the VOC administration 
(1596-1796) and the second period was after the British administration until the 
independence of Indonesia (1830–1942). The first period was an era of monopolistic 
economy under Verenegigde Oost-Indieche Compagnie (VOC: the United East Indies 
Companies). Established in the early 17
th
 Century, VOC was a trading company that 
acted as the ruler of the colony. The company was a state-backed unification of 
colonial traders that landed in port of Banten in 1596 (e.g. Neill, 1973). In a sense, 
VOC was both a multinational corporation and a quasi-government. It adopted a 
„forced delivery system‟ for spices and agricultural products to extract the colony‟s 
wealth and it had power similar to a state to enforce this system. One observer 
explained:  
“... although its directors, the Heeren Zeventien (Seventeen Gentlemen), 
were motivated solely by profit, the VOC was not simply a trading 
company in the modern sense of the word.  It had authority to build 
fortresses, wage war, conclude treaties with indigenous rulers, and 
administer justice to subject populations” (Frederick and Worden, 1993, 
online).  
 
The second era started at the turn of the 19
th
 Century. Following the liquidation of 
VOC in 1796, the French and the British took control of the administration (see e.g. 
Furnival, 1944; Legge, 1964). Different policies of land reform and the abolition of 
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land tax were introduced. However, the effects of such policies were short-lived as 
the Dutch government took control of the colony in 1830. During the last century of 
Dutch administration, Indonesia experienced repeated radical changes in its political 
and economic system, something unprecedented in previous periods of its 
colonization. When the Dutch government took over control from the British, it 
reinstated the „forced delivery system‟ but renamed it „the culture system‟ (Legge, 
1964). Indonesians were forced to produce export commodities, such as indigo, sugar, 
coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, cinnamon, etc. for the benefit of the Dutch government 
who imposed either 20 per cent of the land or of compulsory labour for the landless, 
to be dedicated to those export commodities (Geertz, 1963).  
 
The „culture system‟ did not last very long and was abandoned in 1850 for a number 
of reasons (Higgins and Higgins, 1963). Firstly, it was proving unsustainable to 
provide support to the colony‟s population growth. Secondly, there had been ethical 
protest in the Netherlands against its inhumane nature. Thirdly, there was mounting 
pressure from Dutch private capitalists who saw the opportunity in the colony but 
could not do anything due to government monopoly. Shortly after the capital class 
took control over the Dutch state, the „culture system‟ was phased out and replaced 
by the „liberal system‟ (Geertz, 1963, Higgins and Higgins, 1963).  Under the new 
system, private businesses were allowed to invest in the profitable areas of industrial 
agriculture such as sugar cane and tobacco. After several decades of the so-called 
„liberal economic system‟, problems of falling living standards afflicted the colony 
because the system was just as exploitative as the „culture system.‟ Criticism of the 
„liberal economic system‟ mounted in the Netherlands, leading to the introduction of 
a policy of compensation known as the „ethical system‟. Sympathetic officials 
   
131  
 
introduced programmes aimed at improving living standards in the country and 
Indonesians were given more educational opportunities, albeit ones limited in 
numbers. The reforms being introduced were too late. With a long history of 
exploitation, Indonesia was left by the Dutch upon independence with a very small 
economy in disarray:  
“After 350 years of Dutch colonialism, Indonesians had been drawn 
into the modern sector of the economy to an astonishingly small 
degree.  In 1940, less than 10% of labour force was employed in that 
sector. Only about 5% of the Indonesian labour force was engaged in 
trade of any kind, and still a smaller percentage were smallholders 
producing export products. At least 80% of the population still gained 
its livelihood in the traditional sector. Soemitro has estimated that 
0.5% of the population (the Europeans) received 60% of the taxable 
national income, while the Chinese, constituting a mere 2% of the 
population, received 20% of taxable national income.  If these figures 
are correct, it would mean that pribumi, constituting 97% of the 
population, received only 20% of the taxable income (Higgins and 
Higgins, 1963 p.65). 
 
The impact of the Dutch style of administration did not just stop at economic matters. 
A longer-lasting legacy was the division of Indonesian society in almost every 
respect. The Dutch adopted a divisive style of governance known as divide at impera 
– divide and conquer (e.g. Gouda, 1995). Citizens were classified based on their 
ethnicity. The European descendants were first class citizens and eastern foreigners 
such as the Chinese, Arabs, and Indians were second class citizens. Various 
indigenous ethnic groups, more popularly called pribumi or irlander, were only 
considered third class citizens. The segregation was not only in terms of social status 
but also in terms of economic activities. Pribumis were forced to be farmers and 
during the period of the „culture system‟; they were forced to cultivate export crops 
and spices. During the period of the „liberal system‟, private colonial companies 
leased land from the pribumis through their village feudal leaders. These owners were 
given no option as their rights to cultivate were only safe if they continue to rent their 
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lands to these companies (Legge, 1964). On the other hand, Asian foreigners – most 
notably the Chinese who were just a minority group in society – were granted the 
right to be involved in trading activities (Legge, 1964).  
 
Such discrimination had caused bitter consequences for the pribumis and had 
certainly created and preserved economic classes in society.  This division was so 
embedded in the economy that J. H. Boeke, a well-known Dutch economist, referred 
to Indonesia as having a „dual‟ economy since  the „modern‟ economic activities of 
trading and industrial manufacturing by the European and Chinese never mixed with 
the more traditional activities of the pribumis (see e.g. Boeke, 1953). The indirect 
implication of this economic duality was the lack of entrepreneurship skills among 
indigenous Indonesians (Higgins & Higgins, 1963) and administrative skills among 
Indonesian leaders (Legge, 1964) in the post-independence period. Another 
immediate implication of the colonial policy, especially with regards to the „ethical 
system‟, was the introduction of higher education for some Indonesians (Legge, 
1964). The policy had originally been aimed at preparing a group of educated local 
citizens to become local collaborators. Despite the success of the policy in creating a 
group of educated Indonesians, they later became the elite group that steered the 
sentiment of nationalism to its highest point.  
4. 2. 2. Indonesian nationalism 
The sense of economic injustice unsurprisingly aroused nationalist sentiment in 
Indonesia, but it was not the sole contributor. The seeds of the nationalist movement 
could be traced back to the wars of resistance to the early European infiltration during 
the 16
th
 century when they arrived initially as traders (Palmier, 1965). The fight for 
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resistance continued until the 19
th
 century for reasons that were not simply economic. 
Some resistance movements were religious in nature, led by the „ulama’ (Islamic 
scholars). Islamic teachings, adopted by 90% of Indonesians, had always been a 
strong motivation for resisting colonialism (Palmier, 1965). Another group was the 
aristocrats who were concerned about the increase in foreign power. The fact that 
these resistances had been mobilized by local figures did not alter the nationalistic 
nature of the resistance movement and Indonesians still regard these figures as 
national heroes until the present time.
14
  
 
The impact of the „ethical policy‟, introduced in the second part of the 19th century, 
on the Indonesian national uprising cannot be ignored. Firstly, there had been some 
delegation of power as a reaction to demand for democracy and representation. 
Partially motivated by the need to accommodate private business expansion (Palmier, 
1965, p 91), the Dutch passed the Decentralization Law in 1903 that opened the 
political sphere to Indonesians for the first time. During 1903–1908, local Volksraad 
(People‟s Councils) were set up and press regulations were relaxed (Palmier, 1965). 
In 1916, national Volksraad were established. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the 
„ethical policy‟ had given Indonesians the opportunity to receive Western education. 
Although this opportunity was very limited, it raised the nationalist consciousness 
amongst intellectuals who were „fortunate‟ enough to have Western education. Many 
of these intellectuals later became political elites of Indonesia. 
 
                                                 
14
 In fact, many of these local aristocrats were also influenced by both their Islamic beliefs and the 
local ulama (Islamic scholars). They are, among others, Pangeran (Prince) Diponegoro, Tjoet Nyak 
Dien, Teuku Umar, Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa, Sultan Agung, Tuanku Imam Bonjol, and Sultan 
Hasanuddin (e.g. Sudarmanto, 2007). 
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When „modern‟ Indonesian nationalism emerged in the early 20th century, it took a 
more colourful form. The combination of Western education introduced by the Dutch 
through its „ethical policy‟, and the long-existing legacy of traditional aristocracy and 
Islamic teachings, created two shades of Indonesian nationalism: „religious 
nationalism‟ and „secular-traditional nationalism‟. This was evident from the early 
modern national movement organizations as described by Palmier (1965). Boedi 
Oetomo (High Endeavour), formed by Dutch-educated intellectuals, was a secular 
nationalist group. Nationalist organizations with Islamic influence followed shortly 
with the establishment of the Muhammadiyah in 1909 and the more business- and 
economic-oriented Sarekat Islam in 1912. Another non-political nationalist 
movement was influenced by European socialist thinking. The earliest movement was 
the Marxist-oriented Social Democratic Association of the Indies (ISDV), which was 
formed in 1913. Some of those early non-political nationalist organizations were later 
transformed to political organizations: Sarekat Islam transformed into a political party 
in 1917; and, ISDV changed its name to Perserikatan Komunis di India (PKI or the 
Communist Association of the Indies) in 1920, and later became known as Partai 
Komunis Indonesia (the Communist Party of Indonesia). A new political party, the 
secular Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI; National Indies Party), was founded in 1913. 
 
The nationalist movements were suppressed during the 1930s but regained 
momentum during the Japanese occupation (since they were too occupied with their 
Second World War campaign). The Japanese‟s gradual defeat gave Indonesia the 
opportunity to proclaim its independence on 17 August 1945, despite some hesitation 
from the national leaders. However, the Dutch did not easily accept the independence 
claim and attempted to reinstate its power by diplomatically denying Indonesian a 
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temporary government. It took another four long and bitter years of independence 
struggle, both at war and on the diplomatic table, before the country was finally able 
to set up its own administration. This was symbolized by Dutch recognition in 1949 
with the signing of The Hague Treaty (see e.g. Osmańczyk, 2003).  
newly
  
“… 
Indonesian politics was marked by a new drama in 1957. The failure by the elected 
parliamentary members to draft a new constitution as mandated in the 1955 general 
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election plunged the country into further political turbulence. Soekarno, the 
incumbent president then, declared the re-enactment of the 1945 constitution that 
gave greater political power to the presidential institution. With the support of the 
traditional Islamic faction, the military (most notably the air force) and the 
communist party, he pursued his ideological vision of Indonesia. He led the country 
into what he called „true Indonesian democracy‟, one that is capable of 
accommodating the three most powerful ideological forces in Indonesian society at 
the time: Islam, Nationalism, and Communism. Soekarno‟s inclination towards 
socialist thinking
15
 led him to take a series of drastic actions in the following years. 
He abandoned The Hague Treaty, nationalised all Dutch companies operating in 
Indonesia, and expelled all Dutch citizens from the country by 1958 (e.g. Bresnan, 
2006).  
4. 2. 3. Indonesia and the world’s global power (1950 – 1970)  
                                                 
15
  Despite admitting that his political aspirations were similar to that of the then popular PKI 
(Indonesian Communist Party), he insisted that his political aspirations were “... not the result of any 
communist principles”.  Instead, they were born out of the necessity of the Indonesian community 
who were mostly kromo and marhaen (roughly meaning peasant or worker) “just as European 
society makes it necessary for European socialists to adhere to proletarianism” (Soekarno as cited in 
Mintz, 1965 p. 57).  This is why he called his political thinking „Marhaenism’. 
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Table ‎4-2: Foreign aid to Indonesia 1950 – 1961/1962 (in US$ million) 
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“... The President regarded Indonesia, this country of a hundred 
million people, so rich in oil, tin and rubber, as one of the potentially 
significant nations of Asia.  He was anxious to slow up its drift 
toward the communist bloc; he knew that Soekarno was already 
turning to Moscow to get the military equipment necessary for 
invasion.  And he was also anxious to strengthen the anti-communist 
forces, especially in the army” (Schlesinger, 1967 p.533). 
 
In summary, during the first two decades after independence, Indonesia was a country 
facing disorder, instability and uncertainty. The Dutch, like most colonizers, left the 
legacy of a socially and economically divided country. Economically, the Dutch left 
Indonesia with a dual economy in which economic activities were divided along 
racial lines. Indonesia remained as a paternalistic society with a small and politically 
divided elite group (Legge, 1964). As a result, the newly independent country was in 
a state of chaos as the leaders lacked both leadership and administrative skills. In 
addition, the nature of Indonesian nationalism and the geopolitical conditions also 
enormously contributed to the chaotic situation. Indonesian nationalism was initiated 
and orchestrated by various elite groups who held different ideologies. This caused a 
rift amongst the country‟s leaders which in turn led to political instability. This was 
exacerbated by the geopolitical situation, which at the time witnessed a power 
struggle between two superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) competing to be the 
world‟s hegemon. The combination of those factors made Indonesia one of the most 
intense political and ideological battlefields for the world‟s superpowers during the 
Cold War (Mintz, 1965). Amidst these circumstances, the Indonesian accountancy 
profession was developed.  
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4. 3. Status quo of the accountancy profession in colonial Indonesia (1870–
1949) 
As in any colonized society, the Dutch brought Western accounting and auditing into 
Indonesia. Accounting was practiced during the VOC era, as the company held 
monopolistic rights on trade in business in the colony and acted as its quasi-
government (Sukoharsono, 1995; Sukoharsono and Gaffikin, 1993a). However, VOC 
only practiced simple accounting and there was no evidence of the existence of a 
sophisticated accountancy profession until VOC was dissolved in the late 18
th
 century 
(see e.g. Sukoharsono and Gaffikin, 1993a). The brief transfer of control from the 
Dutch to the French (1795), and later to the British (1811), did not create significant 
influence on the country‟s accounting development. The French conquest of the 
Netherlands did not have significant impact on Indonesia, other than the liquidation 
of the VOC. British rule (1811-1830) was too short to leave any significant impact 
despite its colonial style being significantly different from the Dutch.
16
 According to 
prior studies, it was only after the British period that accounting and auditing in 
Indonesia entered a stage of development that mimicked its Western origin. However, 
such development did not happen immediately after the Dutch took power from the 
British in 1830. This was because the Dutch decided to directly control and 
monopolize the colony‟s production of agricultural commodities between 1830 and 
1870 (see e.g. Higgins and Higgins, 1963 and Furnival, 1944). As in the VOC‟s era, 
there was no need for accounting and the accountancy profession since the colonial 
ruler controlled production centrally.  
                                                 
16
 “The British style is different from the Dutch in that it tried to make Indonesia not only a producer 
base of crops but also a market for British manufacturing products.  Under the administration of Sir 
Stamford Raffles, the British tried to change the Dutch system of „forced deliveries‟ with a system 
of „land taxes‟ and „feudal aristocracy‟ with more modern colonial rule to help liberalize the 
administration and monetize the economy” (Higgins & Higgins, 1963 p.53, also Ali, 2009).  
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The introduction of accounting as a professional service to Indonesia corresponded 
with changes in the colony‟s mode of production. As described earlier in this chapter, 
the Dutch government‟s decision to adopt the liberal economic system in 1870 ended 
its monopolistic power on the colony. Direct investments by Dutch companies in 
Indonesia at that time created a demand for such infrastructure. In the early 19
th
 
century, the Dutch established two big financial institutions: Netherlandsche Handel-
maatschappij (NHM) on 7 February 1825 and the Javasche Bank on 24 January 1828. 
These financial institutions financed most of the trading and agricultural activities 
until 1850. The availability of financing sources stimulated commercial and business 
activities which eventually created greater demand for accounting knowledge 
(Sukoharsono and Gaffikin, 1993b).  
 
Accounting development under Dutch direct administration intensified during the 
first half of the 20
th
 century. It developed in an institutionalized manner during 1900-
1940, parallel with the increase in governmental, industrial, commercial and financial 
activities. During this period, a colonial state accounting agency was established to 
maintain proper records of the Dutch government‟s financial flow into the colony 
(Sukoharsono and Gaffikin, 1993; Bachtiar, 2001)
17
. The First World War also played 
a part in accounting development during this era as it pushed the Dutch to maximize 
their tax revenue, thus creating more demand for accounting services (Bachtiar, 
2001). As the colonial government opened its economy to private investment, private 
                                                 
17
 Different authors give different accounts of this. Bachtiar (2001) reports the agency‟s name as 
Belasting Accountantdienst, translated as the State Accountant Bureau. Sukoharsono and Gaffikin 
(1993), on the other hand, report the establishment as the State Audit Agency.  It is possible that the 
difference was only due to the difference in the translation of the agency‟s name in the Dutch 
language.  
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accounting firms also flourished in Indonesia. The first firm was co-founded by Frese 
and Hogeweg in the second part of the 1910s (Sapiie, 1980). No fewer than six firms 
offered their services in several cities in Indonesia in the period between 1915 and 
1941. All of these firms were Dutch accounting firms. Table 4-3 presents the names 
of the accounting firms operating in Indonesia during that period.  
Table ‎4-3: List of accounting firms operating in Indonesia during 1915-1941 
Firm 
Years of 
operation 
Cities in which offices and branches 
operated 
1. Frese & Hogeweg 1918–1941 Jakarta, Bandung, Medan, Semarang, 
Surabaya, Palembang 
2. H.J Voorns 1920–1921 Surabaya 
3. E.F Jahn 1935–1940 Jakarta 
4. H. Grevers 1938–1941 Malang 
5. J.P van Marle 1941 Surabaya 
6. Mej. G. Segall 1941 Surabaya 
Source: Adopted from Sapiie (1980) 
 
The development of the profession took a twist during the Second World War when 
the Japanese occupied Indonesia. They embarked on a mission to destroy Western 
influence amongst Indonesians and introduced „Japanised‟ policies. This brought the 
development of accounting in Indonesia to a new stage.  The use of Western language 
was banned and replaced with Japanese. The Japanese took over all Western 
businesses, took hostage of all non-allied Europeans as well as allowing for the first 
time the pribumis (Indonesian term for indigenous Indonesians) to take on 
governmental positions such as in the Ministry of Finance (Ricklefs, 2007). Courses 
in bookkeeping and accounting were offered to train these new officers. The training 
was Japanese-based, and four different levels of accounting were introduced (Foo, 
1988). Thus, one of the important legacies of 
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The narrative in this section shows that during the period of formal control and 
occupation, the introduction and development of the profession in Indonesia can be 
divided into two phases. In the first phase of VOC administration, accounting was 
only practised to meet the VOC‟s internal needs and as such, there was no demand for 
the services of the accountancy profession. The accountancy profession started to 
flourish when the VOC‟s monopolistic right was abolished and the Dutch government 
adopted the liberal economic system in Indonesia (ca. 1870). The liberal system 
opened up the colony‟s economy to Dutch private companies whose operations were 
separated from their owners back in the Netherlands, which created demand for 
accounting services in Indonesia. In short, the link between free-market capitalist 
economic systems with the development of the accountancy profession was evident in 
colonial Indonesia.  
 
Despite the above development, the accountancy profession in colonial Indonesia was 
run by, and for, the Dutch. In fact, the level of integration of accounting with the 
indigenous people had been very low, even when compared with the standard of 
involvement of local indigenous people in other colonies. This was due to the Dutch 
style of colonial administration, among which was the distinct segregation of 
economic activities amongst Indonesian society. The impact of this on the emergence 
and early development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia following her 
independence is explored in the next section. 
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4. 4. The early development of the accountancy profession in post-
independence Indonesia  
took place in 1966–1967. Table 4-4 illustrates the significant events in the process of
Table ‎4-4: Significant milestones in the early development of accounting and the 
accountancy profession in Indonesia 
Periods Milestone 
Accounting in colonial Indonesia 
1602–1795  The formation of Verenegigde Oost-Indieche Compagnie (VOC; the 
United East Indies Companies). VOC held a monopolistic right on 
trade and business in Indonesia. 
1795–1811  French rule; no significant difference from the Dutch. VOC 
surrendered its monopolistic right.  
1811–1830  British rule; the intention was to create textile market and land reform 
in Indonesia. 
1830–1942  Second Dutch Rule:  
 1824: The establishment of financial institutions in Indonesia: 
Netherlandsche Handel- maatschappij (NHM) and the Javasche 
Bank  
 1848: The first commercial law was enacted. This law was based on 
the Dutch commercial law of 1838 which was influenced heavily by 
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Periods Milestone 
the French law.  
 1907: The establishment of the State Audit Agency. 
1942–1945  Japanese occupation. 
Dutch and European accountants were expelled from Indonesia.  
Indonesians were given the opportunity to receive clerical bookkeeping 
training.  
1945 - 1949  War of independence;  
 17 August 1945: Proclamation of independence.  
 2 November 1949: The Hague treaty, Indonesia was not to 
nationalize Dutch businesses.  
 27 December 1949: Transfer of sovereignty.  
Sub-period 1:  the consolidation period (1949–1957) 
1959–1957 An era of liberal democracy politics 
 1949 With liaison by the US and Australia, the Dutch recognized Indonesia‟s 
independence. 
 1952 The passing of Foreign Investment Act 
 1954 The passing of Act 34/54 concerning the Use of Accountant 
Designation.  
 1957 The establishment of the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IIA). 
Sub-period 2: the stagnation period (1957–1966) 
1957–1964  The guided democracy period  
 1957 Unilateral breach of The Hague Treaty; all foreign companies were 
nationalized.  
 1962 A PhD dissertation by S. Hadibroto proposed Indonesia adopt the 
American accounting system 
 1963 the first IIA Congress 
Sub-period 3: Regime change and full switch to the US system  
 1966/67 The fall of Soekarno‟s Old Order and the instalment of the New Order 
 1967 Act number 1 concerning Foreign Investment passed. The Finance 
Minister allowed Arthur Young (US) to form joint partnership with an 
Indonesian local accounting firm (KAP Santoso Harsokumo). 
1969–1977 
 1971 
The transition to the US accounting system: 
Revocation of local – foreign accounting firms joint partnership rulings 
 1972b Preparation for Indonesian capital market. The IIA published Prinsip 
Akuntansi Indonesia and Norma Pemeriksaan Akuntan (the Indonesian 
Accounting and Auditing standards) 
Adapted from Foo (1988) and The Asian Development Bank, 2003 
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4. 4. 1. The consolidation period (1949–1957) 
The Dutch colonial style and policy of preventing from participating in 
modern economic activities, coupled with the restriction of access to education, 
resulted in only one Indonesian, Abutari, 
Foo (1988) reported the state of accountants in 
Indonesia at that time:
p. 109). 
The exclusion of the  from accounting practice was extreme compared to 
other former colonies, especially British colonies. Table  4-5 illustrates the difference 
in the number of accountants relative to the level of population at the time of the 
establishment of the profession in three different ex-colony countries. 
Table ‎4-5: Comparison in the number of indigenous accountants during the 
establishment of the accountancy profession
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Two major events that occurred during this period established and 
consolidated the accountancy profession of the new independent Indonesia. The first 
is the enactment of Act Number 34 year 1954, titled “The Use of the Accountant 
Designation”, and the second event was the formation of the first association of 
accountants in 1957. The following sections explain both events in turn.  
4.4.1.1. Act number 34/1954: The birth of the profession  
In 1954, the government issued Undang-undang nomor 34 tahun 1954 tentang 
Pemakaian Gelar Akuntan (Act of Republik Indonesia number 34 year 1954 
concerning the use of „accountant‟ designation). This Act is a vital milestone in the 
history of the Indonesian accountancy profession as it is considered as the legal 
foundation of the Indonesian accountancy profession. seven sections, the 
most crucial sections were the ones relating to Articles 1, 2, and 4. Article 1 
established the credential mechanism in determining who has the right to claim 
professional status. It stated that:  
“…… the right to use the „akuntan’ („accountant‟) designation – with or 
without further explanation or extension – is only to be granted to those 
who hold „ijazah akuntan’ (accountant diploma) in accordance to the 
rules based on this Act” (Act number 34 year 1954, Article 4). 
 
   
147  
 
“ using 
 (Act number 34 year 1954, 
footnote is added). 
 
The setting up of the boundaries of the accountancy profession through this Act was 
considered timely and reasonable because prior to 1954, no one really knew the type 
of expertise the accountants offered and the type of training that was needed to be an 
accountant.  As a result: 
“... all sorts of people can call themselves accountant without getting 
any legal consequences despite their  of accounting knowledge.  
Often we see these people are offering services that are unacceptable 
to accountants‟ ethic such as brokerage, commission-based job, and 
property agency” (Sapiie, 1980 p. 137). 
 
Some authors argued that the closure of the accountancy profession by Act number 
34/1954 was in the government‟s interest. Bachtiar (2001, citing Sukoharsono and 
Gaffikin, 1993b) stated that the Act was intended to accommodate Indonesians‟ 
aspiration to attain professionalism without having to obtain qualifications abroad 
                                                 
18
 This is the Dutch term for “accounting office”. 
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while Sapiie (1980) believed that it was due to the government‟s need for accountants 
to protect its tax revenues. In the Act‟s official explanatory document, it was implied 
that the motive of the government was to fulfil market demand. In the memorandum 
of explanation of the Act, it was stated that:  
“During the last decade, the importance of the work of accountants has 
increased.  This was due to increasing economic difficulty, increasing 
competition, and the increase in taxes for trading and industry.  Hence, 
there has been an increase in the need of opinion and advice of experts 
to achieve improvement in the administration of companies, more 
accurate „kostprijsberekening’ (cost calculation), and the 
implementation of principles of business economics. Certainly, the 
business community will use the service of one who studied these 
matters based on knowledge and had practical experience in it, that is 
the accountant. …However, this increasing need for accountants‟ 
services will probably become the motivation for the general public to 
claim themselves as accountants, without the required knowledge and 
experience” (Memori Penjelasan Mengenai Usul Undang-undang 
number 34 tahun 1954 (Memorandum of Explanation Concerning the 
Proposal of Act number 34 year 1954)). 
 
government‟s statement of market rationale in justifying the stipulation of 
the Act, there was scepticism about the urgent need for accountants and accounting 
services for a five-year-old economy that was still gasping for political stability. 
Soemardjo Tjitrosidojo, one of the first few Indonesian accountants, provided an 
account of the limited accounting market at that time:  
“Companies that belong to pribumi or non-pribumi but without Dutch 
ownership rarely used the service of public accountants... and before 1954, 
there were only a few accounting firms operating in Indonesia” (cited in 
Sapiie, 1980). 
 
Given the state of affairs then, it can thus be speculated that foreign interests may 
have influenced the government‟s decision
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1975) provided an account of the elites favouring the west: 
“Distressed by the spectre of Soekarno and the strong left wing of 
the Indonesian independence forces, the American establishment 
found the bland nationalism offered by Soedjatmoko and Sumitro a 
most comfortable alternative. The Marshall Plan strategy for Europe 
depended on the „availability of the resources of Asia‟, Soedjatmoko 
told a New York audience, and he offered them an Indonesia open to 
„fruitful cooperation with the West.‟ At the Ford Foundation-funded 
School of Advanced International Studies in Washington in early 
1949, Sumitro explained that his kind of socialism included „free 
access‟ to Indonesian resources and „sufficient incentives‟ for 
foreign corporate investment” (p. 93).  
                                                 
19
 During his tenure in the cabinet, he was in fact involved in a rebellion movement against the then 
ruling socialist Old Order Regime. The rebellion was supported by the modern wing of Indonesian 
Muslims. Some believed that this movement was backed by the US, after all he was indeed the 
leading partner of Ford Foundation projects in Indonesia (e.g. Ransom, 1975).  
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The promulgation of Act 34/1954 was clearly intended to prepare the foundation for 
the establishment of the Indonesian accountancy profession. The country seemed to 
have been prepared to embark on the Western-style accounting infrastructure. An 
event immediately following the stipulation of the Act provided a stronger indication 
of this conclusion. In 1957, Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia was formed. 
4.4.1.2. The formation of Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (IAI)  
As described in the previous section, the Dutch style of colonial administration left 
Indonesia in an impotent state. Not only was the country without sound 
administrative infrastructure in place, but it also lacked both qualified personnel and 
administrative skills. Consequently, it was forced to send its citizens abroad to gain 
much needed skills and experience especially in economic-related disciplines. The 
country turned to the US and Australia for academic and technical assistance as they 
were the ones helping Indonesia in its diplomatic struggle to gain international 
recognition. During the 1950s, the government (including education institutions) sent 
many students abroad to study economics, public finance and accounting in the US, 
the UK and the Netherlands. Most of these students were officers and lecturers from 
different governmental agencies and universities. One of these students was 
Soemardjo Tjitrosidojo, who later became the first Indonesian professor of 
accounting (Gade, 2002 p.41).  
 
One of the most important educational cooperation programmes was through the Ford 
Foundation. This cooperation was introduced in 1952, enabling Indonesia to send 
students abroad, mostly to the US. The cooperation covered research and educational 
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projects in economics (through the MIT and later the University of California in 
Berkeley, UC Berkeley) as well as social politics through the Cornell Modern 
Indonesia Project (see e.g. Ransom, 1975 and Kahin, 1989).  The immediate impact 
of the cooperation between UC Berkeley and the University of Indonesia was the 
establishment of the country‟s first higher education accounting programme in 1953 
(Foo, 1988).  UC Berkeley sent some of their accounting and economic lecturers to 
teach in Indonesia and some Indonesian students were sent to study accountancy in 
various US universities.  The first person to graduate from such a programme was 
Suhadji Hadibroto, the second accounting PhD holder in Indonesia who was sent to 
the University of Michigan and completed his doctoral thesis at the University of 
Indonesia (PDAT, 2009a; Gade, 2002).  
 
The opportunity given to Indonesians to study abroad created a small network of 
Western-educated elites who were supportive of the US‟s accounting system. 
Although few in numbers, this did not stop them in shaping the early foundation of 
the Indonesian accountancy profession. There were seven Indonesians who had 
accounting qualifications at the beginning of 1957: Abutari, Soemardjo, Tan Eng 
Oen, Teng Sioe Tjhan, Tio Poo Tjiang, Liem Koei Liang, The Tik Hie (Akuntansi 
dan Administrasi, 1966; IAI, 2007a).  They were all Dutch-educated accountants 
under the VAGA (Vereniging Academisch Gevormde Accountants) scheme except for 
Abutari who was educated via NIVA (Nederlands Institute Van Accountants) short 
courses (Institut Akuntan Publik Indonesia (The Indonesian Institute of Public 
Accountants, herefater IAPI), 2009b; Bachtiar, 2001).  At the time, there were two 
groups of accountants based on their accounting education paths. NIVA was the 
association for accountants who graduated from a university-based accounting 
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education. VAGA, on the other hand, is the association for accountants who had 
previous practitioner experience and were educated under the professional accounting 
short courses. By the end of 1957, the number of accountants grew to 11 when the 
University of Indonesia‟s accounting programme produced its first batch of locally 
educated accountants: B. Siddharta, H. Darmawan, Tan Tong Yoe, and Go Tie Sien 
(IAI, 2007a; Tuanakotta, 2007).  
 
The key actors in the early organization of the Indonesian accountancy profession, 
who were responsible for the establishment of IAI, were Soemardjo and the four 
newly graduated local accountants. They were determined to establish an 
organization for Indonesian accountants and one of the primary reasons was because 
these accountants were not accepted into the two Dutch accounting organizations: the 
NIVA and VAGA (IAPI, 2009b).
20
  On 17 October 1957, they held the first gathering 
of accountants with the motive of establishing an organization of Indonesian 
accountants. The objectives of the organization were: (1) to help in the enactment of 
Act number 54/1954; (2) to help in monitoring (public) adherence to Act number 
54/1954; (3) to help in maintaining the quality of accounting education; and (4) to 
facilitate the gathering of accountants for sharing of theoretical and/or practical 
knowledge (IAI, 2007b). Those at the meeting also agreed to form a steering 
committee for the establishment of what was temporarily called the „Perkumpulan 
Akuntan Indonesia (the Union of Indonesian Accountants)‟ (IAI, 2007a; IAI, 2007b).  
 
                                                 
20 
There is no clear account as to why these accountants were not accepted as members of NIVA and 
VAGA. However, one of the strongest reasons was the fact that these new accountants were not 
educated under the Dutch system, hence their qualification was not recognized by the Dutch 
accountant community. The second reason was that political hostility towards the Dutch has started 
to escalate by the time these accountants graduated from the University of Indonesia (see the last 
paragraph of Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.4.2). 
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The first task of the steering committee was to contact the other six accountants who 
were not present at the meeting and on 20 October 1957, letters were sent asking their 
opinion on the establishment of PAI, to which they responded positively. The second 
gathering was on 5 December 1957, and the main agenda was related to the setting up 
of the organization including deciding and agreeing on basic terms such as the 
objectives, charters, membership and fees. There were also discussions about the 
possibility of foreign accountants becoming members of the newly formed 
organization in an effort to eradicate „bogus accountants‟. In the third meeting on 23 
December 1957, the organization was formally established, the executive committee 
elected and the organizational charter discussed. In May 1958, the organizational 
charter was agreed and finalized. On 19 October 1958, IAI applied for state 
recognition and on 11 February 1959, it was formally acknowledged by the Ministry 
of Justice (IAI, 2007b). 
 
US started pursuing a hegemonic 
world order which linked political dominance with an open world economy 
(Ikenberry, 2007). A hegemonic world order is a pattern of inter-state relationship in 
which the hegemon or the leading state, “opens its domestic market, constructs 
institutions and uphold rules, and seeks to manage crises and imbalances in the 
system as well as provides security and stability” (Ikenberry, 2007 p.43).  The rest of 
the world in return has to operate within this system and provide the hegemon with 
resources and logistics. The open, integrated and stable system of the world market is 
vital to the hegemon in various ways (Ikenberry, 2007). Firstly, it provides the 
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hegemon with access to domestic markets across the world, and also to technology 
and other resources needed for domestic economic security and growth.  The stable 
hegemonic order also minimizes the cost of enforcing orders and rules since the less 
powerful states have already willingly agreed to uphold them.  Secondly, it gives the 
hegemon the opportunity to influence other states‟ political and economic orientation 
through the creation of close-knit economic ties to balance power and hinder strategic 
rivalry. Finally, it promotes the evolution of political systems amongst other states 
that are more conducive to the hegemon‟s security and interests.
 
With the increasing consciousness in the ex-colonies of their right of equality 
amongst nations, the US had to undertake less confrontational ways to achieve its 
purpose.
21
  Less powerful states were dragged into this order through so-called 
„modernization‟ and „developmental‟ ideology, aimed at promoting social change and 
economic development in „underdeveloped areas‟ Hoogvelt (2001).  As Hoogvelt 
(2001) argued further, the aim was not purely altruistic as such but was designed as a 
strategic campaign amidst the hegemonic race of the Cold War:  
“... it was soon realized that the transplantation of capital and 
technology to the Third World would not bear fruit unless it was 
accompanied by wider and consistent social, cultural and political 
changes” (Hoogvelt, 2001 p. 35). 
 
During this period, modernization becomes not just a theory but a logic that is 
prescriptive and normative (Hoogvelt, 2001). Third World countries have to develop 
socially and economically in the way the stronger countries (especially the US and 
                                                 
21
 Nevertheless, direct military action was not altogether abandoned as proven in some cases (see e.g. 
Hoogvelt, 2001 p.34). 
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Western Europe) have developed to fit the latter‟s purpose, ignoring cultural and 
social differences:  
“... the compatibility or „correspondence‟ between certain advanced 
economic institutions (money, markets, occupational specialization, 
and profit maximization) on the one hand and certain „modern‟ 
political, cultural and social forms on the other, thereby turning the 
latter into necessary pre-requisites or „logical requirements‟ for the 
former” (Hoogvelt, 2001 p. 35). 
 
 early as 1952, through the Ford Foundation, the US 
established research and education cooperation with leading Indonesian universities, 
most notably the University of Indonesia. 
 
Following the above sequence of events, the country was set to fully accept Western 
direction of its accountancy profession. However, the establishment of a Western-
oriented profession encountered a serious challenge during the second half of the 
1950s. The full influence of the US system was disrupted following the country‟s 
radical political swing in orientation towards the eastern bloc (the Moscow–Peking 
axis). To a large extent, this change of ideological orientation was a combination of 
the perceived failure of Western-style liberal democracy and the political thinking of 
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President Soekarno. The next section describes this turmoil and its effect on the 
trajectory of the early history of the Indonesian accountancy profession. 
4. 4. 2. The stagnation period during the era of guided democracy (1957 – 1966) 
The inclination of Indonesian leaders towards the Communist bloc had affected the 
development of the profession in at least two ways. First, the market for accounting 
services was reduced because users of accounting services had been the Dutch and 
other Western companies.  Following the shrinking of the market, Dutch and other 
foreign accounting firms ceased their operations. By 1958, as a consequence of 
Soekarno‟s political thinking that radically changed Indonesia‟s political orientation, 
there were eventually no foreign accounting firms operating in Indonesia. The 
existing local accounting firms on the other hand had to rely on works offered by the 
government. However, the public sector was far from adequate to sustain the growth 
of the profession for two reasons. First, the government was reluctant to offer 
accounting jobs to external accountants. A government official from the state audit 
agency was quoted as having said to an accountant: “all sectors in which there is even 
a cent of public money are solely government affairs and are closed to public 
accountants” (quoted in Sapiie, 1980). Furthermore, the fee for these government 
engagements was very low (Sapiie, 1980). The small audit and accounting market and 
the government‟s reluctance to provide accounting work to public accountants had by 
and large distorted the development of the professional infrastructure of the newly 
born profession for approximately a decade following its formation. 
 
The second impact on the profession was more fundamental in changing the early 
development of the profession. The nationalization policy led to the exodus of Dutch 
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accounting lecturers out of the country. This proved to be a critical aspect shaping the 
future of accounting and the accountancy profession in Indonesia. With the Dutch 
accounting lecturers leaving the country, Indonesia had to look for their replacements. 
The US, realising that economic and political intervention would not work, quickly 
seized the opportunity to help the country overcome the shortage in accounting 
lecturers. Through the existing cooperation agreement between the University of 
Indonesia and UC Berkeley, the latter agreed to send some of their accounting and 
economic lecturers to Indonesia. The cooperation also provided scholarships to 
Indonesian students to study accounting in the US as well as supplying all the 
academic materials to the University of Indonesia. The cooperation resulted in the 
presence of two streams of accounting education in the country (Bresnan, 2006; 
Kahin, 1989): the old Dutch accounting system continued to be taught for non-degree 
courses and the US accounting curriculum was used for higher degree education. The 
dualism lasted for a decade. From its inception in 1953, the accounting programme at 
the University of Indonesia taught both the Dutch and the American systems and by 
1959, it produced accountants who were fully educated under the US system: 
“The curriculum of the Accounting Department of the University of 
Indonesia started with a Dutch program.  But after a period from 1956 
– 1958 of a mixed pattern between the American and the Dutch 
system, since 1958 the curriculum has been changed largely to an 
American style” (Hadibroto, 1990 p. 129). 
In the mid 1960s, despite the country‟s exacerbating relationship with the Western 
bloc,
22
 the US accounting influence continued to exist especially in the area of 
                                                 
22 By the end of the 1950s, Soekarno started his political propaganda claiming Malaysia, Singapore 
and West Papua (Irian Barat, Indonesian) as part of Indonesia. This campaign was supported by the 
Soviet Union but fiercely opposed by the US and the UK. Following this campaign, Indonesia chose 
to quit the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. As the US 
threatened to stop its aid to Indonesia, Soekarno fired back with his famous “Go to hell with your 
aid!” slogan (e.g. Bresnan, 2006, Mortimer, 2006).  
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accountancy higher education.  One of the enabling factors was the ongoing Ford 
Foundation projects of education cooperation which produced US educated elites in 
the country.  One of the key players in the country‟s adoption of the US accounting 
system was Suhadji Hadibroto, who graduated from the University of Michigan.  His 
PhD thesis in 1962 was a comparative study of the Dutch and the US accounting 
system. The comparison covered topics such as the construction of accounting theory, 
theory of accounting principles, theory on profession, and accounting and auditing 
practice. His thesis generally implied the superiority of the US system over the Dutch, 
hence recommended its adoption in his thesis. The following are some excerpts from 
his thesis:  
“The pragmatic approach to accounting theory formation is more 
appropriate for Indonesia. 
... Indonesia which is still in the early stage of economic development 
needs more workable theories and should not spend too much time 
constructing scientific theories which do not contribute directly to the 
overall development of the country. ... 
Broad principles such as „good business practice‟ in Dutch accounting 
theory is non-operational and gives no definitive rules of what is assumed 
to be good practice.  The notion „generally accepted accounting principles‟ 
with their clear and detailed guiding standards advanced by American 
theorists is more useful for the profession. ... 
A corollary recommendation in connection with accounting theory is that 
the provision of a set of guiding standards such as those issued by the 
AICPA would also be appropriate.  The „Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia‟ 
(Indonesian Accountants‟ Institute) should take the initiative for issuing 
guiding standards which should then be endorsed by the Department of 
Finance” (Hadibroto, 1990 p.153-154).  
 
This section has shown that the professionalization process between 1957 and 1966 
has gone through a period of stagnation and disruption of the full Americanization of 
the Indonesian accountancy profession. Two factors contributed to this: first, the 
Dutch colonial legacy that left virtually no accounting infrastructure to build the 
profession, and second, the strong challenges posed by both the world polity as well 
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as the condition of Indonesian politics during the late 1950s. The political turbulence 
brought by the liberal democracy system during 1949–1955 gave the opportunity to 
President Soekarno and his anti-Western political thinking to seize power. His 
political ideology was concurrent with the rise of the Eastern political bloc led by the 
Soviet Union and the People‟s Republic of China during the late 1950s until the late 
1960s. This political swing resulted in the nationalization of foreign (mainly Dutch) 
companies and the adoption of a closed and centralized economic system, thus 
reducing the need for the accountancy profession. Consequently, the 
professionalization of accounting progressed very little. 
 
The section also shows that ideological investment through scholarships and 
educational cooperation proved to be a vital factor in overcoming and resolving 
challenges and obstacles to the Westernization of the accountancy profession in 
Indonesia. This turn of events had forced the US to adopt a more subtle strategy 
through educational cooperation. Realizing that political and economic strategies 
would not work, the US insisted on maintaining educational cooperation with 
Indonesia (Bresnan, 2006). The next section will show how the nurturing of a group 
of elites was vital in determining the history of not only the profession but also the 
country in general.  
4. 4. 3. Regime change and the switch to the American system (1965-1973) 
The aspiration for full adoption of the US accounting system finally became a reality 
during the second half of the 1960s. In 1966, Soekarno‟s Old Order regime collapsed 
following a failed bloody coup d’etat, allegedly by the communist faction of the 
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military.
23
 The succeeding regime was under the leadership of Soeharto, the head of 
KOSTRAD (the Indonesian Army Strategic Command).  Some writers believed that 
the Ford Foundation students had played an indirect yet essential role in this political 
drama. They are believed to have successfully indoctrinated high-ranking officers 
within the Army with Western economic thinking (e.g. Ransom, 1975). Under 
Soeharto‟s leadership, the country made a “U-turn” in its political orientation towards 
the Western bloc. It instantly opened its economy by allowing the flow of foreign 
investments into the country with the enactment of Act number 1/1967 concerning 
Foreign Investment. A year later, the country was already preparing to establish its 
own capital market. A special task force was set up by Keputusan Direksi Bank 
Indonesia (Decree of the Board of Directors of Bank of Indonesia) number 4/16 Kep-
Dir on 26 July 1968 to help in the preparation for the establishment of the capital and 
financial market.  In 1976, Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal (BAPEPAM), the 
country‟s capital market authority was formed (Bapepam, 2007).  
 
In anticipation of the possible increase in demand for accounting services following 
the establishment of the capital market, the IAI in its general meeting in 1973 issued 
PAI (Prinsip Akuntansi Indonesia, literally the Indonesian Principles of Accounting) 
and NPA (Norma Pemeriksaan Akuntan, literally Accountants‟ Examination Norms). 
These were, respectively, the first accounting and auditing standards in Indonesia. An 
account of how these accounting standards were drafted was given by one of the 
members of the drafting committee 34 years later: 
“…. As described earlier, it was the time of preparation of the opening of the 
capital market. For that purpose, Drs. Radius Prawiro elected several 
                                                 
23
 There were various views as to who was behind the coup but many believed that the US was behind 
it (see e.g. Griswold, 1998). 
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accountants (to prepare the accounting and auditing standards). The 
combination between old and young accountants, between practitioners and 
academics ended up in the predictable debate as to whether to adopt the Dutch 
or the American system. Drs. B. Soenasto bought and distributed a book by 
Paul Grady, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. It was 
this book that we referred to in drafting Prinsip Akuntansi Indonesia (Standar 
Akuntansi Keuangan; Financial Accounting Standards) (Tuanakotta, 2007 p. 
338; the words in italic are in original). 
As can be seen in the above quote, the US-educated accounting elites have played an 
essential role in determining the direction of the professionalization. Radius Prawiro, 
a former military officer, was one of the students sent to the Netherlands in the early 
1950s. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, he held the position of Governor of the 
Bank of Indonesia, the Indonesian Central Bank (1966 – 1973). The position was held 
concurrently with the post of Governor of the IMF Indonesian Representative Office 
(1967-1971) and Vice Governor of the ADB Indonesian Representative Office (1967-
1971). The second important figure, Drs B. Soenasto, was one of the earliest 
registered accountants. During the UC Berkeley–University of Indonesia cooperation, 
he was an assistant to Robert Dinman, a lecturer assigned to teach auditing in 
Indonesia (Tuanakotta, 2007). By the mid 1970s, the full switch to the US system 
became a reality: 
“Universities‟ economic master graduates are not the only ones that will 
bring the mission to spread and develop the American accounting system 
by practicing it …, be it in a small company or the state…. But also all 
the undergraduates and drop outs who do not further their education and 
choose to work. All these are the factors that helped the application of the 
American system (Sapiie, 1980 p.193).  
This section presents evidence of how the fundamental change in Indonesia‟s politics 
had paved the path of the early development of the profession. The instalment of the 
New Order into power was not a mere change in national political leadership. In 
addition to providing political support to the New Order, the US influence was also 
channelled through the students of the Ford Foundation educational cooperation 
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programmes who became vital domestic actors in changing the direction of 
Indonesia‟s development ideology. The cooperation enabled the US to groom the 
country‟s future elites which were receptive to its economic and political ideals. In 
other words, such projects had become a vital catalyst in influencing the Indonesian 
civilian and military elites to accept capitalism. Western-oriented intellectuals 
together with the army later ended Soekarno‟s socialist-oriented Old Order and 
changed the orientation of Indonesian politics towards the US. With its ties with the 
Western powers, particularly the US, it was not surprising that the change of regime 
had also meant the change in the country‟s power configuration and system of 
political economy. As the country opened its doors to foreign capitalists, the Western-
style accountancy profession gained its momentum. The US managed to reap what it 
planted two decades earlier. The Ford Foundation projects established the first 
accounting degree programme, provided funding to open other accounting 
programmes in other universities in the country, provided the lecturers and even 
supplied the teaching materials. Indeed, the students benefitted from the cooperation 
that changed the path of the development and organization of Indonesian accounting. 
These students established the first accounting association and masterminded the 
direction of the country‟s orientation towards the US system.  
4. 5. Summary and conclusion  
The central argument of this chapter is that the early development of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession was inseparable from the wider dynamics of a newly 
independent country, heavily influenced by the changing relationship between 
countries following the demise of the colonial world order. Similar to other newly 
independent countries during the mid 20
th
 century, Indonesia was heavily shaped by 
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the interaction of rival sets of material, institutional and ideological configurations 
emanating from the changing global order between the 1950s and 1970s. First, 
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the end of colonialism gave Indonesia the status of what Robert Cox termed 
as a „protostate‟: a political structure that tried “more or less to successfully 
monopolize the capacity for exercising political force within the national territory but 
has not acquired either a firm social basis of consent or administrative capacity to 
formulate and apply economic policies” (Cox, 1987 p.218). Deciding the national 
strategy for achieving economic growth and development was thus a divisive 
dilemma in post-independence Indonesia. This was exacerbated by the Dutch colonial 
legacy and the various roots of Indonesian nationalism. After 350 years of 
colonization, the Dutch left Indonesia in a “social power vacuum due to weakness and 
fragmentation of social power” (Robison, 1988 p.49). When the country gained its 
independence, it was confronted with one of the most intense ideological struggles 
between the social and political factions striving to lead the country into either social 
revolution or reconstruction of capitalism (Robison, 1988).
24
 Unlike many other ex-
colonies, the newly independent Indonesia had neither clear proximity to nor close 
support from any of the then superpower blocs in terms of strategies for economic 
development.
 
It was in the above circumstances that the accountancy profession emerged and 
consolidated. Going back to the colonial time, „modern‟ accountancy was introduced 
in Indonesia during the last decades of the Dutch colonial administration mainly to 
serve the Dutch capitalist interests that were about to invest in the colony following 
the adoption of the „liberal economy system‟.  However, accounting had always been 
exclusive only to the Dutch; so much so that at the time of Indonesian independence, 
                                                 
24
  Nowhere else had the ideological battle been as intense as in Indonesia (at least in Asia) during this 
early period of the Cold War. Islam had perhaps become a factor that differentiated the struggle 
from elsewhere within the ex-colony world. It is a massive social force but at the time it was not 
necessarily a unified ideological force (see e.g. Mintz, 1965). 
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there was only one indigenous Indonesian who was an „accountant‟. As in any 
colonized societies, the emergence of the accountancy profession cannot be attributed 
solely to the dynamics of the local people, due to the lack of leading circumstances 
such as an active community of accountants and the existence of an accounting 
market (see e.g. Dyball et al., 2007; Birkett and Evans, 2005). In the case of 
Indonesia, the Dutch colonial administration itself had no intention nor made any 
effort to integrate accounting amongst the local people, and completely segregated the 
economy between local indigenous people (or the “pribumi”), the Eurasians and the 
Europeans. Constraining pribumis to only farming activities meant they had no 
exposure to business activities and practically no contact with accountancy, resulting 
in virtually no Indonesians being qualified as accountants. Despite these conditions, 
the country was quick in establishing the foundation for an accountancy profession. 
Within five years of achieving a stable administration, Indonesia passed an Act in 
1954 that set the foundation of the accountancy profession in the country and 
provided legal boundaries for the profession. Three years later, a professional 
association was formed, despite the fact that the number of accountants at that time 
did not exceed “the number of fingers in one hand” (Tuannakotta, 2007). The two 
events indicated that the adoption of Western-like accounting infrastructure seemed 
imminent during the first half of the 1950s. 
 
A stronger explanation thus may lie in the argument that the modernization of the 
accountancy profession was affluent with foreign interests. The increase of foreign 
direct financial interest and the proliferation of educational as well as technical aids 
and cooperation provide strong indication that the professionalization process was 
part of the efforts by global powers (especially the US) to integrate Indonesia into the 
   
166  
 
new global capitalistic order. However, unlike the accountancy profession in other 
ex-colony countries during that time (especially former British colonies), the 
accountancy profession in Indonesia was not a continuation of the Dutch legacy. 
Instead, it fulfilled the needs of a new wave of foreign interests attempting to control 
the country. The process reflected the attempts by the US, as a new and rising global 
power, to influence Indonesia‟s accounting orientation as part of and in line with 
other changes at the wider level of the social, political and economic contexts under 
her leadership (e.g. Helleiner, 2005; Ikenberry, 2007).  
 
However, history is anything but linear. The chapter also shows that the implantation 
of the US-oriented accounting infrastructure was far from smooth as it faced 
challenges from the existing rivalling structures existing in Indonesia during the 
period in question. Despite having successfully laid down the foundation of the 
Westernization of Indonesian accounting in its early days of independence, the 
process of transformation faced material and ideological obstacles emanating from 
the fact that virtually no accounting infrastructure existed in the country due to the 
Dutch colonial administration as well as ideological divisions amongst Indonesian 
leaders during the first two decades following independence. The US‟s efforts 
involving modernization and developmental campaigns to change the social, political 
and economic institutions and orientation of Third World countries to fit the desired 
open world economy under its control, faced a stumbling block when Indonesian 
leaders moved towards the Soviet Union‟s model of development during the 
Soekarno‟s Guided Democracy between 1957-1966. The US influence could only be 
imparted by the nurturing of the country‟s elites through educational cooperation, 
which somehow survived political hostility towards the Western bloc during the 
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Guided Democracy era. The “modernization” of the profession only regained 
momentum when the New Order, a pro-Western political regime, gained control over 
the country in mid-1960s.  
 
Finally, the chapter also explained how the nurturing of an elite group posed to be a 
vital factor in influencing the history of the accountancy profession. As discussed in 
the chapter, political and economic pressures do not seem to be effective forms of 
global influence on the development of the accountancy profession in the case of 
Indonesia. A more subtle approach was needed and this was achieved through the 
building of a knowledge network within a group of Indonesian elites. These elites 
were directly and indirectly involved in orchestrating the switch of orientation in 
accounting practice and infrastructure. By the mid 1970s, the Indonesian accountancy 
profession seemed ready to adopt a Western-style accountancy profession, 
particularly the US model. The next chapter will discuss how and why such 
expectation had not come to fruition during the last 20 years of the New Order‟s era 
between 1967 and 1997. 
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Chapter 5 : Globalization, Politico-business regime and the Accountancy profession under the New Order (1967 - 1997) 
Chapter 5 
Globalization, the Politico-Business Regime and the Accountancy 
Profession under the New Order (1967-1997) 
 
5. 1. Introduction 
The development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia during the first decade 
following its establishment in the early 1950s until the mid-1960s was narrated in the 
last chapter. This chapter continues the enquiry by analyzing the second period in the 
history of the Indonesian accountancy profession when a new political regime known 
as the New Order took power in 1967 and governed Indonesia for 32 years. Unlike 
the tumultuous period of the 1950s and 1960s, this period enjoyed political stability 
and economic growth under the leadership of Soeharto, Indonesia‟s second president 
and the founder of the New Order. The narrative in this chapter shows that, despite 
the economic growth and political stability brought about by the New Order regime, 
the profession did not develop as might be expected given the economic growth and 
the New Order‟s good relationship with Western power. Possible factors contributing 
to the slowdown in the Westernization of the profession are discussed.  
 
Figure 5-1 presents the structure of Chapter 5. To set the context for understanding 
major events in the development of the Indonesian accountancy profession during the 
New Order era, Section 5.2 starts by describing the central features and major actors 
of the New Order as a political regime with strong business interests. Section 5.3 
describes the economic growth and political stability of the New Order era and the 
New Order‟s various strategies of economic management throughout its rule. Section 
5.4 describes the development of the accountancy profession in relation to changes in 
   
169  
 
the New Order‟s economic development strategy. The chapter ends with the summary 
and conclusion in Section 5.5. 
Figure ‎5-1: The structure of Chapter 5 
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5.4.2. The dormant period (1980-1987): increasing government 
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5. 2. The New Order as an alternative social structure: central features and 
major actors of a politico-business regime 
The New Order played a very crucial role in shaping the development of the 
profession through its choice of economic policies and development strategy. 
Established as a Western-backed political regime during the transition of power in 
1965-1967, the New Order grew into a prevalent political power with strong business 
interests. In effect, the New Order had become a politico-business regime in which 
the political elites used their power to build the economic emporium of the domestic 
conglomerates (mostly the political elites‟ cronies and family members), which in 
turn provided material support to sustain the New Order political reign. Combined, 
the two factors (the New Order‟s openness to Western power and the politico-
business coalitions with the domestic conglomerates) had constantly swayed the New 
Order‟s economic development ideologies along the spectrum of open and 
interventionism economic policy. Throughout the New Order‟s era, the country 
experienced economic policies that bear the reflection of economic nationalism, 
populism, predatory behaviour and liberalism, all in different intensities at different 
points of time (Robison, 1997).  
 
Why and how such variations prevailed may be attributed to the regime‟s policy-
making structure and process, which was heavily influenced by the interactions 
between politicians and bureaucrats who had diverse economic interests (see e.g. 
Cassing, 2000; Rosser, 2002). Within the New Order, the presidency was the pivotal 
point of the regime‟s social and economic policies. Over the years, a circle of power 
grew immediately around the president (Cassing, 2000) and there were two camps of 
politicians and bureaucrats within this high political rank: the technocrats and the 
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politico-business bureaucrats. The technocrats and politico-business bureaucrats had 
different and conflicting views on how the country‟s economy should be 
administered. When the technocrats had more say in the inner circle, then the country 
would swing towards an open market economy, and when the politico-business camp 
had more say in the inner circle, then they would bring the country towards a 
protective and interventionist model of economy. This opposing tendency of the two 
camps to a large extent reflects the opposing interests of the international capitalists 
and the local conglomerates respectively. Figure  5-2 depicts this intricate relationship 
between the major actors.  
Figure ‎5-2: The New Order major actors 
 
 
As the figure shows, the starting point in understanding the New Order and its choice 
of economic orientation is to acknowledge the important actors who have the capacity 
to influence the choice of policies. Four major actors played crucial parts in directly 
and indirectly orchestrating the thematic fluctuations of the New Order‟s economic 
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policy orientation. Their influence over economic political decisions can be analyzed 
at two levels. The first level is the inner circle of power which includes the 
presidency, the liberal-market-oriented camp of bureaucrats (the techno-bureaucrats 
or simply “the technocrats”) and the nationalist, interventionist-economy-oriented 
bureaucrats (“the politico-business bureaucrats”). At the second level, outside the 
political power boundaries, there are those interest groups who, because of their 
economic and political connections, have considerable ability to influence economic 
policymaking. The two major groups are the global capitalists and the large domestic 
business groups or the conglomerates. There is also the local smaller business group 
whose influence has usually been insignificant. Each of these major actors will be 
discussed in turn in the following sections. 
5. 2. 1. President Soeharto  
The most important actor is Soeharto, the President himself. Not only was he the 
founder of the regime that took over the country from 1967 to 1997, but also 
remained as the single central and dominant figure over the 32 years of the New 
Order‟s reign. According to the 1945 constitution, which was reverentially adopted 
by the New Order regime, the president as head of government already held a strong 
and powerful position in the Indonesian political system. However, through his 
political style, President Soeharto succeeded in nurturing his position to a point of 
enormous and irreplaceable centrality. This was made possible by gradually 
eliminating political rivalry at all levels through various mechanisms including 
issuing legislations that made state ideology (Pancasila or the Five Principles) to be 
the only permitted political ideology of any political or public movements; restricting 
and silencing oppositional activities through military and policing operations; and 
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controlling ideological diversities and political aspirations through simplification of 
political parties
25
 and establishment of government-controlled NGOs. Other state 
institutions such as the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People‟s Representative 
Assembly, the parliament), were made powerless as many of their members were 
either elected through an undemocratic election system or appointed by the President. 
This caused the New Order to be regarded as a patrimonial regime. 
 
President Soeharto managed to achieve his position due not only to his political 
ability and the support of the military, but also to feudal inheritance and Javanese 
cultural belief that treated state officials as royal nobility who have power over them 
and whom they must obey. The Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, often 
considered Soeharto (himself a Javanese) as a king, a father and God‟s representation 
to them (see e.g. Wahyudi, 2005). Over the years, such centrality led to unavoidable 
consequences: Soeharto became the nucleus of an exclusive power circle of political 
elites, comprising the people closest to him. As the regime grew stronger, so did the 
centrality of this circle of power, resulting in all major government policies being 
determined by the inner circle of power. Virtually all strategic policies and decisions 
had to go through a consultation with the President and, after obtaining his blessings, 
these decisions would go ahead unchallenged and would be implemented almost at all 
                                                 
25
 In the first election during the New Order regime in 1971, ten political parties participated in the 
election. Soeharto simplified the political parties by both reducing and limiting the number of 
political parties to just three in the 1977 general elections. All parties with an Islamic background 
were fused into the United Development Party, while nationalist parties were merged into the 
Indonesian Democracy Party (e.g. Mujani, 2008). The ideological oppression impacted the social 
and economic life of Indonesians. Islamic ideology and its manifestations had been subdued from 
the nation‟s political and economic agenda during the New Order and were only resurrected in early 
1990s when Suharto (an „abangan‟, a term representing Indonesian Muslims who adhere less strictly 
to Islam and often mix Javanese culture in the practice) approved the formation of Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) under the 
leadership of B.J. Habibie, the then Minister for Research and Technology. 
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costs (Cassing, 2000). In other words, the dynamics of the New Order economic 
policy can largely be explained by the dynamics within the power circle.  
 
There are two influential groups of bureaucrats within this power circle. The first 
group consists of bureaucrats who tended to advocate a nationalist agenda while the 
other tended to support the market economy. The opposing views held by the 
politico-business bureaucrats and the technocrats resulted in struggles to influence the 
country‟s economic policies. 
5. 2. 2. The politico-business bureaucrats  
The politico-business bureaucrats are the first of two important groups of high-
ranking individuals who had significant influence over the New Order‟s economic 
policy-making. These were politicians and state officials who were either within the 
inner ring of the presidency or had access to that circle. A major characteristic of this 
group is their inclination towards a nationalist economic policy and strong belief that 
the state should protect the interests of domestic business and prevent foreign 
business‟ expansion and domination. They manifested their economic development 
agenda through their advocacy of economic protectionism and interventionism
26
. In 
addition, they also supported public investment in business activities in the form of 
state-owned enterprises. 
 
Despite their seemingly nationalist motives, the intention of the politico-business 
bureaucrats was far from that of genuinely acting in the public interest. Instead, they 
were interested in an interventionist economy largely because it would be beneficial 
                                                 
26
 The term generally refers to the involvement of the government in the economy by influencing the 
working of the market through regulations and/or subsidies.  
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for their own economic and political positions. In other words, the politico-
bureaucrats were the main culprits responsible for the regime‟s rent-seeking behavior, 
which was another important feature of the New Order. Rent-seeking was manifested 
in the form of business monopoly through concessions of industrial forests; import 
and export licenses; and domestic trade monopoly licenses (tata niaga) of key 
commodities such as rice, sugar, palm oil, and clove (e.g. Loughlin et al., 1999 
Wiradiputra, 2004). Other forms of facilitation include exclusive access to state 
financing i.e. subsidized bank credit (Rosser, 2002). 
5. 2. 3. The Technocrats 
The views of the politico-business bureaucrats were strongly contested by the second 
influential group of high-ranking officials, the technocrats, who wanted the 
Indonesian economy to be built through an open and market-oriented policy regime. 
They argued that the government should keep its involvement and intervention in the 
country‟s business and economic spheres to a minimum level. In addition, most of the 
policies that this group advocates tend to be outward-looking as they are deemed the 
best way to achieve integration with the global economy. Some of the policies for 
liberalizing the domestic market and encouraging foreign capital flows include 
applying conservative monetary and fiscal policies; reducing bureaucracy in 
investment and market deregulations; promoting a “friendly” regulatory framework 
for foreign direct investment; and establishing strong capital markets and a strong 
financial services industry. 
 
The appeal of a market economy to the technocrats is not surprising since most if not 
all of them, had their education in either the Netherlands or the US. The emergence of 
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this group can be traced back to the early 1950s when Indonesia turned to the US for 
help in educating the country‟s potential leaders (discussed in Chapter 4). One project 
that stood out in particular was the cooperation between the University of Indonesia 
and the University of California in Berkeley. The cooperation was mainly in 
economic studies where students such as Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Radius 
Prawiro and JB Sumarlin from the University of Indonesia were sent to study 
economics in the US (e.g. Borsuk, 1999; Kahin, 1989). When the New Order took 
control of the country with the support of the US, it was not surprising to find the 
Berkeley-educated students being the preferred choice for economic policy makers. 
Due to their educational background, this group was nicknamed the “Berkeley 
Mafia”. During the early years of the New Order, many of these technocrats held 
some of the most strategically important positions in the regime‟s government. For 
instance, the Finance Minister was Ali Wardhana, Minister for Trade and Industry 
was Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and 
Head of Bappenas (National Development Planning Agency) was Widjojo Nitisastro,  
and Radius Prawiro was the governor for the central bank (Kepustakaan Presiden-
presiden Indonesia (Library of the Indonesian Presidents), 2009a).   
 
Throughout the New Order‟s 32 year reign, the technocrats remained one of the most 
important groups in shaping Indonesia‟s economic policy, despite the fact that most 
(if not all) of them were not politicians with a strong base of constituency. Their 
relative strong position was due to their close connection with the international 
community, in particular the US. Their influence was most prevalent at times when 
Indonesia was in economic difficulties. For example, market-oriented policies were 
introduced at full speed during the economic recovery period (1967–1973) and during 
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the post-oil-boom recession (1987–1997). During these times, the country was forced 
to turn to foreign money to finance its economy and, as capital flowed into Indonesia, 
the technocrats were in full control of the economic policy with the support of 
international and regional financial and donor organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Such support was in congruence with the need to guarantee the free flow of 
international capital as well as to guard the security and profitability of these capitals. 
5. 2. 4. The domestic business groups  
One consequence of the New Order‟s remarkable economic performance was the 
creation of powerful business groups amongst certain sections of Indonesian society. 
Rosser (2002) divided these local business interests into two broad groups. The first 
group is composed of large business groups which he termed the conglomerates, and 
the other consists of smaller business groups which he labelled the petty bourgeoisie 
and “other marginalized elements”. Of central importance to this study is the link 
between those business groups, particularly the conglomerates, with the New Order‟s 
political elites. A survey of Indonesia‟s 300 largest business groups showed that the 
majority of these conglomerates started their business during the New Order era 
(Wibisono, 1997). The link between the conglomerates and the political elites 
becomes clearer when analyzing their direct association with the President which may 
have been familial, friendship, or institutional, as reflected by four major groups of 
conglomerates. These groups are the Chinese conglomerates, the indigenous 
conglomerates (including business groups under Soeharto‟s family), various yayasan 
(charity funds) established by Soeharto, and finally the armed forces business groups. 
By 1994, the top 25 business conglomerates in Indonesia consisted of those four 
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major groups as shown in Table  5-1.  Out of the four groups, the Indonesian-Chinese 
conglomerates were the most powerful economic force in Indonesia. 
Table ‎5-1: Indonesia’s major domestic conglomerate groups 
Group Principal Owner Principal activities 
Turn-
over
1
 
No. of 
Companies 
Salim Lim Sioe Liong Cement, finance, autos, 
agro-industry 
18,000 450 
Astra Prasetya Mulya Group 
and public 
Autos, estates 5,890 205 
Lippo Mochtar Riady Finance, estates 4,750 78 
Sinar Mas Eka Tjipta Widjaja Agro-industry, pulp & 
paper, finance 
4,200 150 
Gudang Garam Rachman Salim Cigarettes 3,600 6 
Bob Hasan Bob Hasan, Sigit 
Harjojudanto
P,S
 
Timber, estates 3,400 92 
Barito Pacific Prajogo Pangestu Timber  3,050 92 
Bimantara Bambang Trihatmoddjo
 
P,S
 
Trade, real estate, 
chemicals 
3,000 134 
Argo 
Manunggal 
The Nin King Textiles 2,940 54 
Dharmala Soehargo 
Gondokusumo 
Argo-industry, real 
estate 
2,530 151 
Djarum Budi and Michael 
Hartono 
Cigarettes 2,360 25 
Ongko Kaharudin Ongko Real estate, finance 2,100 59 
Panin Mu‟min Ali GunawanP Finance 2,080 43 
Rodamas Tan Siong Kie Chemicals 2,000 41 
Surya Raya Soeyadjaya Property, estates, trade 1,980 242 
Jan Darmadi Jan Darmadi Real estate 1,940 60 
CCM / Berca Murdaya 
Widyawimarta Poo 
Electronics, electricity 1,800 32 
Humpus Hutomo Man- dala 
Putra
 P,S
 
Oil, trade, chemicals 1,750 11 
Gadjah 
Tunggal 
Sjamsul Nursalim Tyres, finance, real 
estate 
1,650 49 
Raja Garuda 
Mas 
Sukanto Tanoto Pulp & Rayon, Finance 1,590 66 
Gemala Wanandi Chemicals autos 1,550 78 
Pembangunan 
Jaya 
Several Real estate 1,390 57 
Metropolitan Several Real estate 1,200 57 
Soedarpo Soedarpo Sastrosatomo
P
 Shipping, trade, 
pharmaceuticals 
1,200 35 
Tahija Julius Tahija
P
 Finance 1,200 39 
 
Adapted from Hill, 1996 
Note: 1 In Rp million as of 1996  
“P” denotes conglomerates that belongs to indigenous Indonesian (“pribumi”), other 
than these belong to Chinese Indonesian  
“S” represents members of Soeharto family, mainly Soeharto‟s sons. 
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Figure  5-3 shows the business ownership held by various conglomerate groups. It can 
be seen that the Sino-Indonesian groups accounted for 66% of the 200 largest 
businesses in the country. The Salim Group (see Table  5-1), founded by Lim Sioe 
Liong in the early 1940s, was by far the largest conglomerate. This group started its 
business by providing logistics to the army, which led to the closeness between Lim 
Sioe Liong and Soeharto when the latter was in charge at Kodam Diponegoro, the 
regional military command unit of Central Java (see Aditjondro, 2008).  
Figure ‎5-3: Business ownership of conglomerate groups as of 1997 
 
Adapted from Evans (1997) as cited in Tabalujan, 2001 
The business activities of the Soeharto family constitute about 5% of conglomerate 
ownership, further demonstrating the strong politico-business links in the New Order 
era. Their cumulative wealth earned them the recognition as Asia‟s 9th richest family 
in 1997 (see e.g. Reuters, 1997), and by 1999, an investigation by TIME magazine 
reported that the family‟s fortune was worth US$15 billion (Colmey and Liebhold, 
1999). Cronyism and nepotism were also prevalent in the form of yayasan, a form of 
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pseudo-charity institution set up to gather and manage charitable funds to supposedly 
finance not-for-profit social, cultural or religious activities. However, in practice, they 
operated as profitable business ventures and enjoyed corporate tax exemption during 
the New Order era. These pseudo-charities, especially the various yayasan set up by 
Soeharto‟s family, constituted a big business empire on their own with wealth that 
supposedly had surpassed that of both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford 
Foundation (see e.g. Aditjondro, 2004). Appendix 6 presents some accounts on the 
wealth of Suharto‟s family and his yayasan. 
5. 2. 5. International capitalist groups 
Foreign presence and influence in Indonesia is not a phenomenon associated only 
with the New Order as they were also present during the pre-New Order period 
(1949-1966). However, there are differences between the two periods in terms of who 
exerted such influence and how. In the period leading up to the New Order, foreign 
influence came from powerful countries through direct financial investment in the 
form of aid, debt, or grants. Another important feature of this period was the fact that 
there had been competition between the powerful countries to assert their influence 
not only in Indonesia but also other ex-colony countries, as explained in Chapter 4. In 
contrast, the influence and pressure of foreign economic forces in the New Order era 
was not only channelled through direct investment by rich and powerful individual 
countries but also through inter-governmental organizations in the form of debts and 
financial aid. As soon as the New Order came into power, in 1967, Indonesia re-
joined the IMF and pleaded for its help in restoring the country‟s decaying economy, 
and a special group, called the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), was 
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formed.
27
 Similarly, the World Bank also made a comeback to the country under the 
new regime. Thus, the economic success of the New Order could not be detached 
from the strong influx of foreign support from the Western countries through IGGI 
and international organizations such as the World Bank. Table  5-2 shows the flow of 
foreign money into Indonesia in the form of both debts and direct investment during 
the New Order era. It can be seen from the table that foreign debts have constantly 
been much larger than foreign direct investment. Table 5-4 also shows that both 
foreign debts and investment increased significantly whenever the New Order 
adopted a more open economic regime i.e. during the economic recovery and 
industrialization period.  
Table ‎5-2: Foreign debts and investment in Indonesia (1970-1997) 
Year 
Total external debt FDI, net inflows 
Value  
(current US$ million) 
Change 
(%) 
Value  
(current US$ million) 
Change 
(%) 
1970 4,528.07 - 145.38   
75 11,497.81 153.92 1,292.06 788.75 
80 20,937.70 82.10 300.09 -76.77 
85 36,715.22 75.35 310.00 3.30 
90 69,871.53 90.31 1,093.00 252.58 
95 124,398.32 78.04 4,346.00 297.62 
96 128,936.70 3.65 6,194.00 42.52 
97 136,272.59 5.69 4,677.00 -24.49 
Adapted from The World Bank (World Development Indicators Online), 2008 
As described in Chapter 4, the involvement of Western countries (especially the US) 
in the overthrow of Soekarno and the installment of Soeharto (see e.g. Ransom, 1975; 
Scott, 1985) dramatically changed the country‟s allegiance towards the Western bloc 
                                                 
27
 IGGI was initially founded as the coordinating forum for Indonesia‟s creditors comprising countries 
such as  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Holland, New 
Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, England and the US (other countries such as Denmark, Finland and 
Ireland joined the group later). 
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countries. Undeniably, the allegiance also paved the way for international capital to 
exert its influence over the country. Shortly after the installment of Soeharto, a 
conference entitled “To Aid in the Rebuilding of a Nation” was held between 
Soeharto‟s team (mostly the “Berkeley Mafia”) and the world‟s most powerful 
capitalists (Pilger, 2003). The three-day conference held in Geneva was sponsored by 
Time-Life Corporation and “all the corporate giants of the West were represented: the 
major oil companies and banks, General Motors, Imperial Chemical Industries, 
British Leyland, British-American Tobacco, American Express, Siemens, Goodyear, 
the International Paper Corporation, US Steel” (Pilger, 2003 p.39). 
 
Having considered the central features and the major actors in the New Order regime, 
it is apparent that the different economic and political interests of the actors had 
profound effects in shaping the New Order‟s political decision-making. The next 
section explains Indonesia‟s main economic policies under the leadership of President 
Soeharto. 
5. 3. Indonesia under the New Order regime (1967–1997) 
The New Order was a governmental regime that had a pervasive influence on many 
aspects of the life of Indonesians, and the political power and economic interests of 
both local and global actors influenced the development of the accountancy 
profession. Each of these interest groups formed a coalition with different factions 
within the highest bureaucratic ranks who had power to shape the country‟s choices 
of economic policies, and in turn, had significant impact on the dynamics of the 
country‟s accountancy profession.  
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5. 3. 1. Economic growth and political stability  
The 32 years of the New Order administration were a time when Indonesia 
experienced political stability and enjoyed spectacular economic growth. When 
Indonesia underwent a power transition between 1965 and 1966, it was a nation on 
the brink of economic breakdown. The calamity was inherited from the political and 
economic choices made during the last years of Soekarno‟s Old Order administration. 
At the time of Soekarno‟s politics of confrontation, most of the country‟s population 
had very little wealth, low purchasing power while the inflation rate reached the 
figure of nearly 600%. Figure  5-4 summarizes Indonesia‟s economic problems as 
shown by some main indicators during the first half of the 1960s, the last years of 
Soekarno‟s regime.  
Figure ‎5-4: Indonesian main economic indicators, 1960-1965 
 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
National Domestic Products (NDP) 391 407 403 396 407 430 
Income per capita change -1.6 1.7 -3 -4 0.3 3.2 
Inflation 20 95 156 129 135 594 
 
Adapted from Hill, 1996. Note: NDP in Rp billion at 1960 prices, per capita income in %, 
inflation in % increase of consumer prices index. 
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The poor economic conditions were successfully overturned by Soeharto, who took 
control of power during 1967-1997. His administration was called the New Order 
regime. Not only was his regime able to stabilize the economy but also managed to 
achieve it in a relatively short time. Over the next 32 years, the New Order was able 
to maintain good economic performance as shown in Figures 5-5 and 5-6. The 
inflation rate dropped from 600% in 1965 to below 20% in the space of just three 
years and in 1971, the rate hit a single figure (2.74%).  Figure  5-5 shows that the 
economy grew at a faster rate, an average of 7%, during the same period. After the 
brief hiccups of rising inflation during 1971-1974 and 1978-1980 (the dashed line in 
the figure), the country embarked on stabler and steadier economic growth as 
indicated by the GDP growth figures increasing at the rate of no less than 5% per 
year.  
Figure ‎5-5: Indonesian inflation and GDP growth, 1967-1997 
 
Source: The World Bank (World Development Indicators Online), 2008   
Figure  5-6 further shows that both GDP and GDP per capita figures steadily increased 
over the years. After the period of economic contraction during 1961-1966, the 
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country‟s GDP in 1967 was just over Rp208 billion, but by 1997, Indonesia‟s GDP 
had grown to a staggering Rp1,525 billion, representing an increase of more than 7 
times its size in 1967 (the continuous line). In just over 30 years, the New Order had 
increased the GDP per capita figure by more than 4 times from Rp1.6 million per 
capita in 1967 to Rp7.2 million in 1997 (the dotted line in Figure 5-6). The 
remarkable economic performance had certainly transformed the wealth and quality 
of life of Indonesians. 
Figure ‎5-6: Indonesian GDP and GDP per capita figures, 1967-1997 
 
Source: van der Eng, 2005 
This remarkable development has caused the country to be regarded as one of the 
“Asian Miracles” in terms of economic achievement, as commented on by the World 
Bank: 
“Indonesia has been remarkably successful in achieving its development 
objectives over the past twenty-five years: income per capita has risen from 
US$50 in 1967 to USS650 today; poverty has been reduced from 60% to an 
estimated 15%; life expectancy at birth has increased by 20 years (almost 
50%); and with the achievement of universal primary education, adult 
illiteracy has been cut by two thirds. While still a low-income country, its 
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tradition of sound economic management, the structural reform in the 1980s 
and past investments in human resources and infrastructure have laid the 
foundation for continued progress in the decades ahead” (The World Bank, 
1994a p. xi). 
 
Although the economic success of the New Order administration is admirable, there 
have been some criticisms that the success was coincidental, exploitative and 
unequally distributed (Hill, 1996). It is said to be coincidental as it relied heavily on 
the increase in favourable terms of international trade such as an increase in oil 
prices. It is deemed exploitative as the growth relied on unrecoverable natural 
resources. Finally, there have been arguments that success was only enjoyed by 
certain groups in society, most notably those who were close to the political leaders.  
 
The economic success does not tell the whole story of the New Order administration. 
What has attracted more attention from various observers is the nature of the regime 
itself as a political and economic actor as well as the way it was able to accomplish 
the aforementioned economic success. As a political regime, the New Order had been 
able to rule over such a long period and keep a balance between political dominance 
and economic performance. This in turn kept social discontent at a minimum level. 
On another front, the New Order was also successful in appeasing internal sentiment 
against foreign powers without directly confronting against them.  
 
The aforementioned success and nature of the regime has led many scholars to regard 
the New Order as a complex political and economic administration, some of which 
emanated from its patrimonial nature and the diverse interests of its leaders - 
politicians and bureaucrats as well as coalitions with outside interests. Understanding 
the complexity of the New Order administration is important in comprehending the 
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history of the profession given its pervasive domination as well as economic success. 
The next section will elaborate the central features and major actors of the New Order 
regime. 
5. 3. 2. The New Order’s different strategies of economic management  
Understanding the pattern of the New Order‟s economic performance over time 
requires breaking the period into various sections to reflect the different economic 
circumstances.  A common periodization of the New Order‟s economic history is to 
divide it into three major periods (see e.g. Hill, 1996; Soesastro, 1999): the early 
recovery period (1967-1973); the oil boom period (1974-1988); and the 
industrialization period (1988-1997).
28
 Throughout these periods, the New Order 
government adopted different and sometimes conflicting economic policies, which in 
turn affected the development of the country‟s accountancy profession.  
5.3.2.1. The early recovery period (1967–1973) 
The Old Order regime‟s ideology (a blend of the nationalist aspiration of President 
Soekarno and the flourishing influence of Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian 
Communist Party)), resulted in economic and political instability. The wave of 
hostility towards Western interests in the country reached its height between 1957 and 
1965. In fact, Soekarno was considering nationalizing all US business interests in 
Indonesia when Soeharto ousted him from power in 1965-1966  (e.g. Pease, 1996; 
The US State Department, 2001).  
 
                                                 
28
 Other observers such as Hill (1996) and Rosser (2002) further divided the post-oil boom era into two 
periods: the “adjustment to lower oil prices” period (1982–1986) and the economic liberalization 
period (1987–1996). 
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The change in attitude towards Western powers was evident during the early years 
following the change of political leadership from President Soekarno to President 
Soeharto. Due to the turbulent economy inherited from Soekarno‟s administration, the 
first period (1967-1971) under the New Order was marked by policies that were 
aimed at economic stabilization and rehabilitation. Immediately after Soeharto 
assumed power, he realized the importance of economic stability in supporting 
political stability, hence he focused on economic development.  The first step was to 
stabilize inflation and to ease the burden of foreign debts. This was achieved by 
controlling inflation through tight monetary and fiscal policies and rehabilitating 
relationships with foreign sources of much-needed funds to finance the economy 
(Hill, 1996). In other words, the economic policy during this era was very 
accommodative to the flows of foreign capital, be it in the form of direct investment 
or debts. 
 
Parallel to the political support given by the West, particularly the US, Western 
money, President Soeharto also realized, was the only direction for fuelling the 
economy (see e.g. Memorandum for the US President from Henry A. Kissinger dated 
18 July 1969; Memorandum of conversation between President Suharto of Indonesia 
- the President of USA - Dr. Kissinger on 21 May 1970). Hence, the role of 
technocrats was vital in implementing Western-oriented economic policies as they 
had strong affiliations and support from Western countries, Indonesia‟s primary 
donor countries. By 1967, Indonesia took various structural adjustment actions as 
required by the IMF following the reinstatement of its membership. These 
adjustments were largely intended to accommodate the transition towards a market 
economy especially in providing the legal and institutional framework for business 
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invasion by large (Western) multinational corporations. It was in that year that Act 
number 1/1967 regarding Foreign Investment was enacted. Interestingly, in the same 
year, Freeport-McMoran, a US mining corporation, was granted a 30-year concession 
of copper and gold mining in the Erstberg District in Irian Barat (West Papua) 
province, which was considered the largest above-ground gold and copper depository 
(Cloos, 1997). Freeport “became the first foreign company to sign a contract with the 
new government in Jakarta and became a significant economic and political actor in 
Indonesia” (Leith, 2002 p.3). The enormous influence of Western capitalists in the 
early years of the New Order is described in Jeffrey Winters‟29 comments on the 
aforementioned Geneva conference (see section 5.2.5):  
“… the Indonesian economy was carved up, sector by sector. „This was done in 
the most spectacular way‟ … . „They divided up into five different sections: 
mining in one room, services in another, light industry in another, banking and 
finance in another; and what Chase Manhattan did was sit with a delegation and 
hammer out policies that were going to be acceptable to them and other 
investors. You had these big corporate people going around the table, saying 
this is what we need: this, this, and this, and they basically designed the legal 
infrastructure for investment in Indonesia. I‟ve never heard of a situation like 
this where global capital sits down with the representatives of a supposedly 
sovereign state and hammers out the conditions of their own entry into that 
country” (quoted in Pilger, 2003 p.41) 
 
5.3.2.2. The oil-boom period (1974–1988) 
Given the sheer influence of the global capitalists in the early years of Soeharto‟s 
regime, Indonesia‟s integration into the global market economy seemed imminent. 
However, from the mid-1970s, the New Order started to lean towards protectionism 
and interventionist policies and one of the primary reasons for this was the 
improvement of Indonesia‟s terms of international trade, coupled with the increase in 
oil prices (Booth, 1998). Indonesia‟s oil price climbed from less than US$3 per barrel 
                                                 
29
 He is a professor at the North-western University in Chicago and an expert on Indonesian politics. 
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in 1972 to US$30 in 1981, causing a significant increase in the proportion of oil 
exports in Indonesia‟s total export - from 37% in 1970 to 82% in 1982 (Vatikiotis, 
1998). As a result, the country‟s GDP and income per capita grew at an average of 
7% and 5% respectively. Another important reason may have been public sentiment 
against foreign interest during the period of the early 1970s.  Many factions within 
society still believed and supported the aspiration of the founding fathers (among 
whom was Soekarno) to make Indonesia a socialist state. The fifth pillar of 
Pancasila, the country‟s ideology set up by Indonesia‟s founding fathers, bears the 
vision to achieve “social justice to all Indonesian citizens”. This is the core 
foundation of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which dictates that “all areas in the 
economy which bear crucial importance to the welfare of the Indonesian people must 
be controlled by the state”.  Seeing the New Order‟s open policy as a direct 
opposition to this idealism, public sentiment against foreign involvement in the 
economy started to mount in early 1970s and by the mid-1970s, the protests got 
stronger and culminated in the “Malari” incident.30 
 
The combination of the two factors was the reason for the New Order‟s reluctance to 
completely adopt free-market economy policies. Instead, it tried to balance the 
pressures of international capitalist support and the populist nationalist sentiment (see 
Vatikiotis, 1998; Rosser, 2002) by continuing to open its economy to foreign 
investment but also introducing policies that, to some commentators, were directly 
opposed to the open economic policies introduced in the early years of the New Order 
regime (Soesastro, 1999). The state was the dominant actor in the country‟s economy 
                                                 
30
 Malari, short for “Lima Belas Januari” - literally meaning “fifteenth of January” - was a social riot 
that took place on 15 January 1974. The incident was triggered by anti-foreign-capital protests by 
students which culminated during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to Jakarta from 14 to 17 
January 1974. 
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as it established foreign trade and investment barriers to protect local businesses and 
increase spending and investments in state enterprises formed during Soekarno‟s era. 
One such state enterprise is Pertamina, the national oil company, which gained more 
importance while new state enterprises such as IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang 
Nusantara or National Aeroplane Industry) and PAL Indonesia (Indonesian maritime 
technology developer) were set up under the agency umbrella of Badan Pengkajian 
dan Penerapan Teknologi (the Agency for Assessment and Application of 
Technology) to encapsulate ambitious state projects in hi-tech industries.  
 
Another consequence of the regime‟s economic policies during this period was the 
flourishing of large domestic business groups, which hindered the expansion of 
international capitalist interests in Indonesia (see Section 5.2.4, where the importance 
of these domestic conglomerates was discussed). By the early 1980s, Indonesia 
became “a highly regulated and controlled economy, and the role of the government 
was undoubtedly stronger than at any time since the 1930s” (Booth, 1998 p.320). By 
the mid-1980s, the domestic business groups had already established themselves as a 
strong coalition with the bureaucrats, exerting considerable pressure towards 
protectionism and interventionism in many areas of the economy. As a result, 
according to some commentators, the Government often introduced contradictory 
measures of reforms during this time. Deregulation and de-bureaucratization, for 
example, were accompanied by trade and investment restrictions in other areas. 
Deregulation in the financial sector was not accompanied by prudent measures. Such 
contradictions had inadvertently benefited the local conglomerates as they provided 
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them with considerable access to public fund through the banking sector (see e.g. 
Chua, 2008).
31
  
 
The failure of establishing the security exchange market is another indicator of the 
failure of the Western capitalist model in penetrating Indonesia‟s economy during this 
period. As described in Chapter 5, the Government of Indonesia had attempted to 
establish a security exchange market since the early period of the New Order (albeit 
rather reluctantly
32
) with 24 companies listing their shares and 3 companies issuing 
bonds (Yunus, 1992). However, the development of the capital market came to a halt 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s due to the increase in the Government‟s 
revenue which led to state intervention in the economy and the rise in importance of 
domestic conglomerates. As a result, the Indonesian security market never grew and 
by 1986, it was considered the least developed in the region and perhaps also in all 
countries adopting a capitalist system (Foo, 1988, Vatikiotis, 1998).  
 
The era of total state protection and intervention in the economy, however, did not 
last long. As the price of oil began to fall, the New Order regime had to alter their 
strategy for building Indonesia‟s economy.  
5.3.2.3. The industrialization period (1988–1997) 
As the oil price plummeted, the New Order government began to realize that it could 
no longer build the economy by relying on its exports of commodities and natural 
                                                 
31
 Other writers such as Booth (1998) argued that this was not the case; rather, it was only “a symptom 
of the limitations of the deregulation process” (p. 322). 
32
 In addition to the fact that the New Order was closer to Western economic thinking during its early 
years in power, the Government‟s intention in establishing the security exchange market at the time 
was to create a channel of distributing wealth across various sections of society (Rosser, 1999) due 
to increasing social tension during the mid-1970s (see footnote 30). 
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resources and, hence, embarked on industrialization of the Indonesian economy. 
Since the free flow of capital was needed to support the industrialization policy, the 
regime changed its orientation towards economic openness to attract foreign inflows. 
Public spending and expenditure were cut and various reforms in taxation, banking 
and custom duties were introduced. The New Order‟s resistance towards the 
liberalization policy changed in the last years of the 1980s as it faced dwindling 
revenue and escalating debts, and had no choice but to open the country to the inflow 
of foreign money. Accepting monetary aids and debts had meant that the government 
needed to comply with the policy prescription imposed by the creditors. From 1987, 
the appointment of the technocrats in strategic policy-making posts was vital to the 
efforts of overcoming the impacts of oil price drop and the monetary crisis from the 
maturing debts incepted in the early years of the New Order.  
 
The technocrats introduced new and more comprehensive liberalization efforts which 
lasted for the next ten years. The last decade of the New Order was thus an era of 
massive deregulation in the financial sector and capital markets. First, Pakdes 87 
(Paket Desember or December Package 1987), introduced de-bureaucratization in 
listing and issuing securities, eliminated listing fees, lifted the limit of share price 
movement, allowed foreign investors to buy shares in public companies to a 
maximum of 49% and opened new over-the-counter markets. This was soon followed 
by Pakto 88 (October Package 1988) and Pakdes 88 (December Package 1988), 
which, between them, further stimulated the capital market by introducing tax on 
interests gained from bank deposits and allowed private companies to set up and run 
the security market. In 1990, the government issued Keputusan Presiden Republik 
Indonesia (hereafter Keppres: Decree of the President of Republik Indonesia) number 
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53 year 1990 regarding Capital Markets. The decree re-established Bapepam under 
the MoF as the supervisory and regulatory body of the Indonesian capital markets. 
The peak of the capital market restructuring was the enactment of Act number 8 year 
1995 concerning Capital Markets. In addition to the restructuring of the capital 
market, other related sectors also undertook major restructuring during this period. 
The period of the first half of the 1990s witnessed the enactment of various high-level 
pieces of legislation that were intended to transform the country‟s business sector in 
general and financial sector in particular. They were the Insurance Act (Act number 2 
Year 1992), the Banking Act (Act number 7 Year 1992), and Pension Fund Act (Act 
number 11 Year 1992). On a wider basis, a new Limited Companies Act was also 
enacted (Act number 1 Year 1995). In many ways, these Acts represented a dramatic 
and extensive change in Indonesian economic management in the space of less than a 
decade. Just ten years earlier, the country‟s commercial code had been labelled as 
grossly out of date (Foo, 1988), having maintained Wetboek van Koophande, the 
commercial code inherited from the Dutch, since 1847. 
 
In short, Indonesian economic management during the New Order was a constant 
fluctuation along the spectrum of interventionism and protectionism at one end and 
market-oriented economic policy at the other end. The next sections discuss how and 
to what extent this context influenced the development of the accountancy profession 
in the country. 
5. 4. The accountancy profession during the New Order  
The constant swing in economic policies between interventionism and liberalism 
under the New Order had directly affected the profession, especially in terms of the 
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development of its professional infrastructures. Indirectly, the political culture 
influenced the structural arrangement of the profession and its relationship with the 
state. As argued in Chapter 3, as the development of the profession followed the 
system of political economy, it is necessary to periodize the history of the profession 
to facilitate the analysis and reflect the development of the accountancy profession 
within the wider socio-political context of Indonesia under the New Order. For the 
purpose of this study, the history of the profession is divided into three sub-periods: 
the ardent period, the dormant period and the revival period. During the ardent period 
(late 1960s – late 1970s), the profession entered a period of new excitement following 
the opening of Indonesia‟s economy. In the dormant period (early 1980s – late 
1980s), the increasing influence of the politico-bureaucrats, which dragged the 
country towards interventionism, resulted in the stagnation of the profession. Finally, 
the liberalization programmes starting from the mid-1980s pushed the profession into 
a period of rejuvenation. The next three sections will elaborate on each of these 
periods in detail.  
5. 4. 1. The ardent period (1967–1980)  
After facing major ideological and political hindrances to building a profession akin 
to the Western model in the first decade of its establishment under the Old Order 
regime, the accountancy profession entered an ardent period under the New Order 
early administration.  
5.4.1.1. The return of foreign accounting firms  
The economic policy during this period, which encouraged  the flow of foreign 
capital into the country, triggered a boom in the accounting market and an increase in 
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the demand for accountants. The increase in the demand for accounting and auditing 
services, especially those of foreigners, changed the dynamics of the profession. In 
keeping with the enactment of the investment act packages (Act number 1 year 1967), 
Indonesia opened her door to foreign accountants. Frans Seda, the then Finance 
Minister, gave permission to several foreign accounting firms to cooperate with 
Indonesian public accounting firms. This was followed by a wave of cooperation 
between foreign and Indonesian accounting firms as shown in Table  5-3.  
Table ‎5-3: Foreign-local accounting firm cooperation in the early 1970s 
Year Foreign accounting firm Local accounting firm 
1971 Arthur Young Santoso Harsokusumo 
Sycip, Gorres & Velayo  Utomo Jososudirjo 
Turquand Young Go Si Tiem 
Price Waterhouse Tan Eng Oen 
Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co Soedjendro & Co 
Coopers & Lybrand Suparman 
1972 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co Sudomo & Co 
1974 Klijnveld, Kraijenhof & Co Go Si Tiem 
1975 Touche Ross International Hendra Darmawan & Co 
Adapted from Gade, 2002; Tuanakotta, 2007  
The opening of the accounting market for foreign accountants and accounting firms 
was a clear overturn of the previous policy of expelling foreign accountants (see 
chapter 4). The number of foreign accountants increased from 4 in 1968 to 94 in 
1976, an increase of almost 2400% (Sapiie, 1980). The influx of foreign accountants 
to the country was an obvious consequence of opening the economy (see e.g. 
Tuanakotta, 2007). The flow of foreign money into the country meant growing 
demand for accounting services. However, soon enough, there was growing 
discontent amongst local accountants who saw the mode of partnership cooperation 
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as giving too much opportunity to expatriate accountants, as described by one of the 
practitioners in that era:   
“... the discontentment of local accountants who had foreign cooperation may 
come to surface when their foreign counterparts replace local partner or when 
they left the partnership. 
 
The discontentment of local accountants who do not have foreign cooperation 
develops because they experience “unhealthy competition” and are losing key 
clients with whom they have had long relationship with. In their perceptions, 
unhealthy competition occurs because: 
 Foreign partners are too aggressive whereas local partners only act as 
puppets (the front man or stroman). In practice, there is no equality 
[between partners]. 
 Joint partnership firms violate the statutory rules [set up as conditions for 
their operations]. 
 There are doubts that foreign accountants are actually passing their 
knowledge and expertise to local accountants, as indicated in the persistent 
occurrences of staff and partner hijacking  between firms (which would not 
have happened if training and education [from foreign partners] programs 
run well) 
 There is neither time limit nor quota in numbers of foreign accountants that 
can work in the country.” (Tuanakotta, 2007 p.320, words in italics are in 
original, words in [brackets] are added). 
  
The growing resentment from local accountants subsequently caused the Government 
to pass statutory restrictions on foreign cooperation. The then Finance Minister, Ali 
Wardhana, issued Keputusan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia (hereafter KMK;  
Decree of the Finance Minister of Republik Indonesia) number 76  year 1971 which 
effectively put an end to joint partnerships (Tuanakotta, 2007) but still allowed 
correspondence relationships between Indonesian Kantor Akuntan (accounting office) 
with foreign accounting firms. One of the qualifying requirements for cooperation 
was the reciprocity principle i.e. a foreign accounting firm from a given country was 
permitted to operate in Indonesia if an Indonesian accounting firm was permitted to 
operate directly in that country (Article 2). Joint partnerships were also required to 
have a minimum number of foreign clients; not allowed to audit state-owned 
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enterprises; and not allowed to demand foreign investment facilities (such as tax 
holidays). In addition, foreign accountants were required to fulfil the requirements set 
in Act number 34/1954 (see Chapter 4) and had to contribute to the development of 
the profession in Indonesia. All these requirements had made it more difficult to form 
a joint partnership but it was the reciprocity principle that effectively terminated the 
joint partnership mode of operation.  
 
The stiffer government regulations caused foreign–local co-operations to take less 
obvious forms. Joint partnerships ceased to exist in legal forms and took a more 
elusive form of cooperation whereby local accounting firms used their foreign 
counterpart names without having any foreign accountants involved directly in the 
day-to-day operations except for advisory roles. This situation further exacerbated 
resentment amongst local accountants and another regulation,  KMK number 1681 
year 1976, which imposed further restrictions on the number of foreign accountants 
contracted, the number of clients and the length of joint partnership, was passed. 
Despite these efforts, the issue of foreign accountants and accounting firms remained 
problematic over the remaining period of the New Order era.  
5.4.1.2. The growth of the profession and professional infrastructure  
As mentioned earlier, another source of demand for the professional services of 
accountants had been the government itself through its regulations and investment 
activities. For instance, Pertamina, despite being a state enterprise, had to use the 
services of professional accountants as part of fulfilling the accountability 
requirements since it received much foreign financial assistance. By the end of the 
1970s, a series of tax regulations also created demand for accounting services. 
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Keppress number 52 year 1976, which set up the institutional framework for an 
Indonesian capital market and the introduction of incentives to stimulate companies 
to list their shares in capital stock (such as tax exemption for asset revaluation 
surplus), created demand for accounting services.  
 
Another regulation that created demand for accounting services was Instruksi 
Presiden Republik Indonesia (hereafter Inpres; Instruction of the President of 
Republik Indonesia)  number 6 year 1979 dated 27 March 1979 regarding Taxation 
Policy. The Inpres offered tax incentives to companies who prepared their financial 
statements according to the generally accepted accounting principles (Article 3.3) and 
had these statements audited by public accountants with an unqualified auditor 
opinion (Article 3.4).  For instance, the tax for providing a clean audited report for a 
company with a total profit of Rp100 million was 25% compared to 45% for non-
audited financial statements. A Finance Minister decree (KMK number 
108/KMK.07/1979) broadened the incentive package and to be entitled to the 
incentive, companies had to provide a calculation of the qualification‟s impact on 
profit or loss (Article 3.4). In addition, to improve audit quality, the decree required 
auditors to comply with their professional standards as well as introducing statutory 
sanctions for noncompliance in the form of either revocation or suspension of 
licences to practise (Article 6). Another regulation included in this package was KMK 
number 109/KMK.04/1979, which required companies to publish financial statements 
and allowed companies to revalue their assets.
33
  
                                                 
33
 The result of this revaluation was not taxable, provided that the company agreed to submit a written 
declaration stating that it would keep proper records and publish reports of its accounts according to 
corporate tax laws; submit balance sheets from the last three years; and submit the adjusted financial 
statements as of 1 January 1979.  
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The combination of foreign investments, government investments and tax regulations 
boosted the demand for services of professional accountants and triggered the 
development of professional infrastructure, especially the size of the profession i.e. 
the number of accountants. As indicated earlier in Chapter 4, the accountancy 
profession at the time of independence was simply non-existent as there was only one 
qualified accountant in 1945. The number increased to 10 accountants by the early 
1950s and 30 accountants in 1960. Having established a full administration as an 
independent country in 1949, the Government introduced training and education 
programmes in its attempts to fulfil the need for low- and middle-level accountants.
34
 
Shortly after the change of power to the New Order, under Keputusan Bersama (Joint 
Decree) between the Finance Minister and the Culture & Education Minister number 
Kep.302/Menkeu/1967 (3/PT/1967) on 15 December 1967, all the institutions were 
merged and became Institute Ilmu Keuangan (Institute for Financial Sciences, 
hereafter IIK). The position of IIK was strengthened by Keppres number 167/1968 on 
6 May 1968, as it operated under the MoF as a university offering degrees in public 
finance. Its establishment was welcomed in the accounting academic community; in 
particular, by the Faculty of Economy at University of Indonesia (BPPK, 2007). 
Through some ministerial decrees
35
, IIK was transformed into STAN or Sekolah 
                                                 
34
 A number of institutions were set up for this purpose: Kursus Djabatan Adjun Akuntan (Course for 
Accounting Technician) in 1953; Kursus Djabatan Pembantu Akuntan (Course for Assistant 
Accountant) in 1959; and Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Keuangan Negara (College of Public Finance) in 
1959, Akademi Djabatan Adjun Akuntan (Academy for Accounting Technician, which later became 
State Academy for Accounting Technician) in 1960. All graduates from these institutions worked 
for the government, mainly in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). 
35
 IIK was re-evaluated in 1974 following the issuance of Presidential Decree number 44 year 1974 
which established the reorganization of state ministries and their implemental regulations, in 
particular KMK number 405/MK/6/4/1975 regarding the Structure and Role Descriptions of 
Organizations with the MoF. The decree established the Finance and Education Training Agency to 
carry out all training and education responsibilities within the MoF. One of FETA‟s sub-units was 
STAN. 
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Tinggi Akuntansi Negara (State College of Accountancy, hereafter STAN) which 
would carry out training and education in accounting. STAN was later endorsed as an 
accounting education institution by the Ministry of Education and Culture through 
Ministerial Decree number 13495/MPK/1975 on 17 March 1975. Because of their 
operation as higher education, these institutions later played an important role in the 
profession in Indonesia. These institutions contributed an important feature of the 
profession in that accountants who work in government institutions constitute a major 
proportion of the IAI memberships (IAI, 2007a).   
  
Compared to the previous period, the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IAI) was 
also more active and gained more support from the Government during this period. 
Since its establishment in 1957, the IAI had only managed to hold one national 
congress in 1963. One of the outcomes from the congress was the election of Dr. 
Radius Prawiro as Chairman of IAI, a position he held until 1986 besides his other 
high-ranking positions in the New Order administration
36. The IAI‟s position 
strengthened in late 1969 when the Finance Minister imposed IAI membership as part 
of the requirement to obtain a licence to practise as a public accountant (The Asian 
Development Bank, 2003). It is necessary to explain briefly the two major groups of 
accountants in Indonesia: public-practising and non-public-practising accountants. 
Non-practising accountants are those who work as management accountants, 
government accountants and academics. Public-practising accountants, popularly 
                                                 
36
 These include the positions of Deputy to the Minister of State Audit Office and Deputy to the 
Minister for Central Bank Affairs (1965), Governor of Bank Negara Indonesia, later Bank Indonesia 
(1966-1973), IMF Governor and Vice Governor of Asian Development Bank for Indonesia (1967-
1971), Member of Presidential Economic Advisory (1968), Chair of Board of Governor of IBRD 
(1971-1973), Minister of Trade (1973-1978, 1978-1983), and finally of Finance Minister from 1983 
until 1988 (Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia (Encyclopedy of Indonesian Public Figures), 2005; PDAT, 
2009b). 
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known as “public accountants”, are those who hold the licence to open a public 
accounting firm and offer financial audit services. To obtain a licence as a public 
accountant, one must, among other requirements, be registered at the Ministry of 
Finance and pass the Indonesian CPA examinations. It is also necessary to emphasize 
that the Government does not allow public accountants or public accounting firms to 
offer only accounting services. 
 
An important infrastructural landmark for the profession in 1973 was the issuance of 
the first Indonesian accounting and auditing standards, which was a combined effort 
of the Government and the IAI. In August 1972, the Executive Chair of the Agency 
for Supervision of Financial and Capital Market formed “the Task Force for 
Compilation of Materials and Structure of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards” and Yayasan Pengembangan Ilmu 
Akuntansi Indonesia (YPIAI; the Foundation for the Development of Indonesian 
Accountancy). On the other hand, IAI formed Komite Norma Pemeriksaan Akuntan 
(Committee for Accountant‟s Examination Norms) in 1973. Both committees were 
the mastermind of Prinsip Akuntansi Indonesia (PAI, Indonesian Accounting 
Principles) and Norma Pemeriksaan Akuntan (NPA, Accountants Examination 
Norms), the first Indonesian accounting and auditing standards respectively. The 
1974 PAI was compiled based on Paul Grady‟s “Inventory of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises” in Accounting Research Study 
number 7, which was published by AICPA in 1965. Clearly, the two standards were 
issued as part of government efforts to prepare the capital market and did not emerge 
from the need of the Indonesian business complexity. The fact that the standards were 
heavily influenced by US accounting and auditing standards strengthened the 
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conclusion and indicated the influence of the US accounting thinking on professional 
infrastructure development.  
 
Another significant development in professional infrastructure was the formation of 
the public accountants‟ section of the IAI in 1977. Despite the relatively small 
number of members of the IAI, public accountants lobbied Radius Prawiro with the 
suggestion that they should form their own association but not separate from the IAI. 
This new association was named IAI Seksi Akuntan Publik (IAI Public Accountants 
Section), with Theodorus Tuannakotta as the first Chairman. IAI continues to be an 
umbrella organization hosting different sections of its members based on the type of 
employment. Besides the public accountants section, there were also an educator 
accountants section, a management accountants section and a government 
accountants section.     
 
In short, the period during the late 1960s and 1970s was an exciting and optimistic 
episode for the Indonesian accountancy profession. Accounting markets blossomed as 
demand for accounting and auditing services significantly increased as a result of 
flows of foreign investment into the country. The profession developed close ties with 
the state and the adoption of the American accounting system was made possible. 
Several regulations were passed by the government to ease local accountants‟ 
resentment amidst its commitment to a market-oriented economy. It was to be 
interesting to see the impact on the profession in the following period when the 
country‟s socio-political and economic landscape dramatically changed.  
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5. 4. 2. The dormant period (1980-1987): increasing government intervention 
While the first period of the New Order was a period of excitement for the profession, 
the second decade of the New Order was a period of slow development of the 
profession. In this period, increasing revenue from oil had transformed the New Order 
into a strong regime, increased the influence of the nationalist bureaucrats and 
enabled the development of large and powerful domestic family-based 
conglomerates. Hence, there was little incentive for the Government to develop the 
profession, as domestic businesses (which are mostly family-owned) had little interest 
in accounting and auditing. As a result, the professional infrastructures were virtually 
stagnant in the first half of the 1980s.  
 
The Government‟s reluctance to support and develop the accounting profession was 
because the Government did not see the profession as being effective in helping the 
Government increase tax revenue. An early assessment of the tax incentive packages 
introduced by Presidential Instruction number 6/1979 indicated that tax incentives 
were not an effective stimulus for companies to publish audited financial statements. 
In January 1980, for, example, the Director General of Tax reported that only 3.5% of 
all companies took advantage of the tax incentive package by voluntarily publishing 
audited financial statements. One possible reason for the small number was that the 
majority of the companies were family-owned ones who would rather negotiate their 
tax liabilities than publish their financial positions and income. The use of financial 
reports and independent audit as instruments of tax incentives was finally abandoned 
in 1984, only five years after its introduction. This was a blow to the accountancy 
profession as this reduced the market for accountancy services.     
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Parallel to the shrinking of the market, the development of professional infrastructure 
had also undergone a major setback. In addition, the Government also increased its 
role in regulating the profession in this period. In 1981, a report by a special 
committee set up by the MoF (KMK number 302/1981) revealed that the 1979 tax 
incentive packages had inadvertently lowered tax revenue due to fraudulent financial 
reports being submitted by companies in their attempt to benefit from the incentives. 
While the MoF‟s committee had a specific investigative task, it was nevertheless an 
important leap in terms of government involvement in professional matters. For the 
first time, the Government questioned the profession‟s independence. Shortly after 
the report, a major change took place when the Government decided to assume a 
quality review function and take more control as it deemed the profession to be 
ineffective. The President assigned BPKP (Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan 
Pembangunan or the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency), the 
government‟s internal audit office (Keppres number 31 year 1983), the power to 
perform periodic reviews over public accountants and public accounting firms. In 
effect, this meant that peer review, a form of professional quality assurance, was 
taken away from the profession. The two events thus marked a significant leap from 
the previous period whereby the government‟s involvement was limited to registering 
and granting the licence to practise to accountants and licence to operate to 
accounting firms.  
 
Further government involvement in regulating the professional infrastructure was in 
the entry qualification mechanism. In 1980, the Directorate for Higher Education of 
the Ministry of Education and Culture issued Decree number 15/1980 regarding 
Ujian Negara Akuntansi or UNA (National Accountancy Examinations). As stated 
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under Act number 34/1954, only accounting graduates from public universities could 
automatically use and be registered as accountants in the MoF. Graduates from 
private universities, on the other hand, had to pass an examination for degree 
equalization (see Chapter 4). However, by 1980, a joint committee set up by Act 
34/1954 to conduct the examination faced difficulties in fulfilling its responsibility, as 
the number of private universities was on the increase. Decree number 15/1980 was 
issued to overcome the problem by establishing UNA, a nation-wide examination 
system for accountancy. There are two levels of UNA: UNA dasar (basic UNA) and 
UNA profesi (professional UNA). To obtain the accountant title (i.e. become a 
registered accountant), an accounting graduate had to pass both levels of UNA. UNA 
was therefore a further barrier to the profession because the MoF would later rule that 
a public accountant licence could only be granted to a registered accountant. 
 
Faced with these unfavourable changes, the profession reacted with several courses of 
action.  In October 1982, the IAI held its fourth national congress. Amongst its major 
aims was the revision of Prinsip Akuntansi Indonesia (PAI) and Norma Pemeriksaan 
Akuntan (NPA). In this congress, the IAI set up two special task forces for the 
revision: Komite Prinsip Akuntansi Indonesia (KPAI; IAI Committee for Indonesian 
Accounting Principles) and Komite Norma Pemeriksaan Akuntan (KNPA; IAI 
Committee for Accountant‟s Examination Norms). With regards to PAI, the 
committee recommended the inclusion of two specific accounting standards: 
Accounting for Foreign Currency Transactions and Translations (Statement number 
1) and Capitalization of Interest during Construction Period (Statement number 2).  
On the other hand, three exposure drafts of NPA supplements were also published by 
the NPA committee: Communication between Predecessor and Successor Auditor 
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(NPA Supplement number 1); Client Representation Letter (NPA Supplement 
number 2) and Audit Report on Comparative Financial Statements (NPA Supplement 
number 3). A year later, these revisions were approved and codified in 1984 PAI and 
NPA. Compared to the 1974 version, the 1984 versions of PAI and NPA were more 
detailed. In fact, practitioners and IAI hailed these revisions as fundamental and 
comprehensive (IAI, 2008b; Nasution, 2003). 
 
As the oil price plummeted, the government turned to foreign money to fuel its 
economy. As a result, the Government showed some efforts to develop the 
profession. In 1985, YPIAI was replaced by Tim Koordinasi Pengembangan 
Akuntansi Pengembangan (Coordinating Team for Accountancy Development; 
CAAD). Its primary mission was “to develop accounting education, the accountancy 
profession, a set of professional standards and a code of ethics” (Delloitte, Touche 
Tohmatsu Emerging Markets Ltd, 2000 cited in The Asian Development Bank, 2003 
p.50). A year later, a more fundamental transformation shaped the future of the 
profession. On 26 August 1986, Radius Prawiro (the then Finance Minister) issued 
KMK number 763/KMK.011/1986 (the 1986 decree) regarding Public Accountants 
which strengthened the legal basis for the institutional framework of the profession. 
The decree endorsed the IAI as “the professional association of accountants 
recognized by the government” (Article 1 point c) and its membership is a mandatory 
requirement to apply for a licence to practise as a public accountant (Article 4.h). 
However, the decree also stated that the MoF was to help develop the profession 
(Article 14) and reinforced that the responsibility of supervising accounting firms‟ 
adherence to rules and regulations lay with BPKP (Article 17).  
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There were also rules in the 1986 decree that sent mixed messages about the 
government‟s position, especially on issues related to the operation of foreign 
accountants and accounting firms in Indonesia. On the one hand, the decree continued 
on from the regulation of the previous period to prohibit foreign nationals from 
becoming public accountants in Indonesia (see Section 5.4.1.1). Article 4.1 stipulated 
that only Indonesian citizens who resided in Indonesia could obtain the licence to 
practise as a public accountant and open an accounting firm. Furthermore, the decree 
clearly stated that, “Alien citizens are prohibited to conduct public accountant 
practice” (Article 6). Interestingly, however, the decree allowed the operation of 
foreign accounting firms as long as they cooperated with local accounting firms 
(Article 12). These firms could also hire foreign accountants on the condition that 
these accountants were required to “... improve accounting technical knowledge and 
capabilities within the [local] accounting firm” (Article 12.2, word in bracket added). 
In this regard, the Government had held its position since the previous decade in 
terms of protecting the profession from the direct operation of foreign accounting 
firms (see Section 5.4.1.1). 
 
In short, the period between 1980 and 1987 had been a period of confusion for the 
profession. In the first part of the period, the government seemed to withdraw itself 
from supporting an independent profession. This was largely because the country had 
been able to achieve relative autonomy in its economic development. As the country 
slumped into crisis due to declining export value and maturing foreign debts, the 
second part of the period saw the start of a new wave of foreign influence on the 
profession. However, due to the strong coalitions between domestic business interest 
and the nationalist bureaucrats, the influence seemed to be slow. This impact was 
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summed up by an observer who commented that “In Indonesia, accounting standards 
are not well-developed, the number of well-trained accountants is limited, and the 
accountancy profession is not effectively regulated by itself or by outside parties” 
(Gray, 1989 p.6). The World Bank further commented:  
“The Government of Indonesia has recognized the importance of setting and 
enforcing standards, and of generally enhancing the quality and reputation of 
the accounting profession; however its efforts to date appear to have had 
limited impact. Enterprise financial statements are not yet prepared 
consistently according to a generally accepted set of accounting standards; 
and even if audited by local accounting firms, such financial statements 
often are given limited credibility by investors, lenders and concerned 
government agencies.” (The World Bank, 1994b p. 2)  
 
In the end, the drive towards progress in the profession again occurred due to another 
external pressure. Parallel to its need to find alternative means of fuelling the 
economy, the Government introduced the financial sector and capital markets reforms 
starting in late 1988. These reforms speeded the development of the accountancy 
profession, as will be narrated in the following section. 
5. 4. 3. The revival period (1988 – 1997) 
In many respects, the last decade of the New Order adopted an economic 
development strategy that was a substantial overturn of that of the previous period. As 
described in the previous section, the end of oil windfall profit and increasing foreign 
aid and debts from international and regional inter-governmental institutions (most 
notably the World Bank and the ADB) had increased pressures on the Government to 
liberalize and industrialize the economy. As a result, there were dramatic 
transformations and restructuring of the professional infrastructure. Progress took 
place in virtually every aspect of the profession and there was a change in the 
Government‟s attitude towards professional autonomy. While the government seemed 
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to withdraw its support for developing an independent and self-regulatory profession 
in the preceding period, it took steps to build a fully independent accountancy 
profession in this period.  
5.4.3.1. Industrialization and the creation of demand for accountancy  
As in the first liberalization era during the early years of the New Order rule, drives 
towards institutional reforms of the accountancy profession from the late-1980s until 
the mid 1990s were largely due to pressure from the World Bank and the ADB, two 
of the biggest IGGI/CGI
37
 creditors besides Japan (see e.g. Bank Indonesia, 2000; 
The Library of Congress, 1992). They were critical of the weak status of the 
accountancy profession in Indonesia as there was “a general absence in Indonesian 
law of regulations which would require and enforce basic standards of accounting, 
auditing and reporting, other than for certain financial institutions and listed 
companies” (The World Bank, 1994b p. 2). Hence, in order to fulfil the open 
economy and financial liberalization policy, it was important to have a strong 
professional infrastructure to support the capital market.
38
 Various efforts were 
undertaken by the global institutions as part of their wider agenda of integrating 
Indonesia into the global economic order through free trade and the free flow of 
capital, and a fully functioning Indonesian capital market was essential for the 
                                                 
37
 IGGI stands for Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia, a creditor forum for Indonesia set up in 
1968 (see Section 5.2.5). Until early 1992, IGGI was under the leadership of the Netherlands despite 
its insignificant proportion of debt. It was dismissed on 25 March 1992 with a letter from Radius 
Prawiro (the then Coordinating Minister for Economy, Monetary and Industry Affairs). The 
Indonesian Government (particularly Soeharto) was annoyed by the Dutch‟s comments regarding 
Indonesia‟s human rights conditions, most notably the comments on the Indonesian Government‟s 
treatment of Santa Cruz East Timor protesters in November 1991 (see e.g. Margana, 1992). The 
Government regarded the Netherland as using debts as political intimidation and thus refused to 
accept further financial aid from them. Since 1992, IGGI creditors (minus the Netherlands) formed 
the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI). 
38
 For example, since 1986, ADB launched a Financial Reform Programme in Indonesia to develop 
domestic capital markets (see e.g. The Asian Development Bank (Operations Evaluation 
Department), 2008). 
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purpose. The attempt at integrating the country into the global financial and economic 
system was not new as it was part of the agenda of liberalization of the early 1970s.  
 
The structural and institutional transformations in the late 1980s and the first half of 
the 1990s (see Section 5.3.2.3) without doubt had a direct impact on the accountancy 
profession. A capitalistic financial sector and capital markets simply would not be 
sustainable without the accountancy profession. Keppress number 53 year 1990 
embedded the legal basis for the accountancy profession as one of “the supporting 
professions” of the capital market (Article 16). This simply means that the Decree had 
widened the markets for accounting services. KMK number 1548/KMK.013/1990, 
consisting of 220 articles, explained in detail the rules and institutional arrangements 
of the Indonesian capital market. One of the most significant policies was the decision 
to separate the roles of the capital market operator and regulator, both previously 
assigned to Bapepam
39. Many of Bapepam‟s new functions were supervisory in 
nature and one of them was to supervise the accountancy profession as it was one of 
the supporting services for the capital market (Article 1 bullet 65). Accountants who 
wished to offer their services to publicly listed companies had to register with 
Bapepam and comply with its rules and regulations in rendering professional services 
in the capital market. Insurance Act number 2/1992 required all insurance companies 
to submit the statements of financial position (balance sheet) and profit and lost 
calculation (Article 16). The Banking Act number 7/1992 stipulated even tighter 
requirements and requires all banks to submit audited balance sheets and profit and 
loss accounts (Article 34) and release these documents to the public (Article 35). In 
                                                 
39
 Bapepam‟s name was revised from its original name of Badan Pelaksana Pasar Modal (Capital 
Market Executive Agency) in 1977 to Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal (Capital Market Supervisory 
Agency). 
   
212  
 
Act number 11/1992, a pension fund had to submit its financial statements as part of 
an annual operational report (Article 52) and had to have these statements audited by 
a public accountant every year (Article 14). The 1995 Company Act requirements 
captured even wider constituents and Article 56 states: 
“Within five (5) months following the annual closing of a company‟s accounts, 
the company‟s board of directors prepares an annual report to be presented to 
the shareholders general meeting, which should include at least:  
b. a document of “annual calculation” consisting of a balance sheet, a profit 
loss calculation and accompanying explanatory notes to those documents; 
c. a consolidate balance sheet of all companies in a holding group, in addition 
to the balance sheet of each member company  
d. a report about the condition, the operation and the result of operation  
e. the main activity(-ies) of the company and any changes happened within 
the last accounting year; 
f. details of problems which had impacts on the operation of the company  
g. the names of members of board of directors and commissioners; and  
h. the amount of salary and other remuneration given to members of the 
board of directors and commissioners.” (Limited Companies Act number 
1/1995) 
 
Article 57 makes it obligatory for all members of the board of directors and 
commissioners to sign the financial statements. The Act also required companies to 
prepare the financial statements in accordance with Standar Akuntansi Keuangan 
(Financial Accounting Standards) and provide explanations if otherwise (Article 59). 
Moreover, a financial audit was mandatory if “the company‟s main business involves 
raising money from the general public” or if “the company issues debt instrument 
securities” or if “the company is a public company” (Article 59). This Article also 
required the audited financial statements to be accepted by the shareholders in the 
annual general meeting and be published in two daily national newspapers. All this 
high-level legislation strengthened the legal basis for the existence of the accountancy 
profession.  
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5.4.3.2. The need for global-oriented professional infrastructure    
In keeping with the above structural transformations, there were also significant 
efforts to consolidate and restructure the accountancy profession‟s infrastructure. This 
perhaps was the starting point of the direct involvement of inter-governmental 
organizations, particularly the World Bank, in updating and synchronizing the 
accountancy profession to support wider business and economic restructuring. On 17
 
May 1988, the World Bank approved a loan to Indonesia totalling US$113 million 
specifically to fund an “Accountancy Development Project” meant for “the 
improvement of accounting practices in both the public and private sectors” (The 
World Bank, 1988). In achieving its objective, the project provided supports and 
assistance both to the Government and the profession (through the Indonesian 
Institute of Accountants) in developing the professional infrastructure (including 
technical standards and code of ethics); modernizing and improving the 
Government‟s accounting and auditing system; and improving the quality of 
accountancy education and training. 
 
Such substantial funding had effectively boosted the surge towards an Indonesian 
accounting system and profession capable of supporting the requirements of the wider 
restructuring initiatives. Given the World Bank‟s position as Indonesia‟s biggest 
creditor, the loan (Loan number 2490-IND) certainly exerted considerable pressure 
on the government to implement strategies to improve both public and private sector 
accountancy. In the government accountancy sector, major improvements were made 
in the installment of new Government accounting system software. However, the 
biggest change took place in the private sector where efforts were undertaken to 
“ensure that financial accounting, reporting and auditing in private sector enterprises 
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meets consistently high international standards” (The World Bank, 1994b p. 6). The 
report also emphasized the centrality of the Government in providing “guidance and 
support to the process of drafting and issuing accounting and auditing standards” 
since the profession is still „maturing‟ and “[ensuring] adherence to these standards” 
(The World Bank, 1994b p. 6). Specifically, the report also contended that the efforts 
should be best done through “a coordinated effort in capital market regulations, 
company and commercial law development, testing and licensing of public 
accountants and the strengthening of the Indonesian Accountants Institute” (The 
World Bank, 1994b p. 6). The World Bank‟s role was to provide technical assistance 
as well as funding of well-focused overseas higher education for a selection of staff 
who would then train and supervise all the above transformations.  
 
The initial project ended on 30 June 1995 but it was extended on 22 September 1994 
with the Second Accountancy Development Project on the grounds that it would 
“further support the Government for the modernization of the Government 
Accounting System and the enhancement of the credibility and usefulness of financial 
information in the private and public sectors” (The World Bank, 1994b p. i).  A 
further loan amounting to US$ 33.9 million was made available to cover the 
anticipated expenditure of software and hardware procurement, overseas training and 
education as well as technical assistance. It was designed to support the restructuring 
process for the next 7 years and the milestones for the project were clearly specified. 
The project appraisal report stated that the loan “negotiation” had earned the World 
Bank “assurances” from the Indonesian Government that a detailed approach and 
work plan had been adopted (The World Bank, 1994b). This detailed work plan was 
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listed in Schedule 5 (Implementation Program) of the loan agreement which stated 
that: 
“2. The Borrower shall, in a manner and substance satisfactory to the Bank: 
(a) by June 30, 1996, adopt and, thereafter, implement or cause to be 
implemented the detailed approach and work plan for professional 
accountant qualifying examinations;  
(b) by July 31, 1996, complete the requirements documents for the 
Government Accounting System Second Release (GAS R.2.0); 
(c) by May 31, 1997, adopt at least 15 accounting and 15 auditing standards;  
(d) by September 30, 1997, complete the enrolment process of at least 18 
candidates for the overseas degree training program;  
(e) by October 31, 1997, adopt and, thereafter, enforce or cause to be enforced 
at least 30 new rules and 10 disclosure guidelines for the     regulation of 
Capital Markets;  
(f) by November 30, 1997, complete and, thereafter, implement or cause to be 
implemented a pilot data communications system;  
(g) by November 30, 1997, complete the acceptance tests of GAS R.2.0; and 
(h) by July 31, 1999, adopt at least 40 accounting and 16 auditing standards.” 
(Loan Agreement number 3801 IND between the World Bank and the 
Government of Indonesia dated 21 October 1994)  
 
In the area of public sector accounting, the Accountancy Development Projects were 
able to meet most of their objectives, most notably in completing a new government 
accounting system, and significantly enhancing the education for the accounting 
faculty in the country. In private sector accounting, the project exerted pressure on the 
Government to support and develop the infrastructure for the accountancy profession. 
With the support of the IAI (see e.g. The Asian Development Bank, 2003), perhaps 
the most significant indicator of the project‟s success in achieving its objective in the 
private sector was the revision of accounting and auditing standards. In 1994, the IAI 
set up Komite Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (Financial Accounting Standards 
Committee) to succeed KPAI (IAI Committee for Indonesian Accounting Principles) 
and Komite Standar Profesional Akuntan Publik (Public Accountancy Professional 
Standards Committee) to replace KNPA (IAI Committee for Auditing Norms)). 
Through the new committees, IAI decided to harmonize accounting and auditing 
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standards with international standards (IAI, 2008b). On 1 October 1994, following its 
national congress, the IAI officially published a new set of accounting and auditing 
standards. SAK, the abbreviation of Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (Financial 
Accounting Standards), replaced the 1984 Prinsip Akuntansi Indonesia (PAI: 
Indonesian Accounting Principles). SAK was largely set up based on International 
Accounting Standards. The 1994 SAK was a complete makeover of the 1984 model 
which was branded as incomplete and narrow by the ADB (The Asian Development 
Bank, 2003). In total, SAK 1994 codified 28 PSAK (Pernyataan Standard Akuntansi 
Keuangan or Statement of Financial Accounting Standards).  
 
Unlike the previous standards (1973 and 1984 PAI), SAK was revised twice in the 
space of just over three years. In April 1996, 2 more PSAKs for insurance industries 
were introduced and by December 1997, there were already 41 PSAKs. As for 
auditing standards, SPAP or Standar Profesional Akuntan Publik (Professional 
Standards of Public Accountants) was published on 1
 
August 1994 to replace the 
1984 NPA (Accountants Examination Norms) as the Indonesian auditing standards. It 
contained the complete set of auditing standards, standards for attestation services, 
accounting services and review on financial statements as well as the quality 
assurance standards. SPAP was a close copy of the US Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards with adaptation from the International Auditing Standards for matters that 
were in the US GAAS (The Asian Development Bank, 2003). 
5.4.3.3. Pressures for setting up a competent and accountable profession  
In addition to the new company law and a series of financial and capital market laws 
and regulations, changes to the regulation of the profession were also imminent. Steps 
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to strengthen the profession also took the form of providing legal frameworks through 
laws and regulations concerning the profession: 
“Enforcement of accounting and auditing standards is also achieved through 
provisions in company and commercial law and associated ministerial decrees. 
Hence, the project would support limited but important technical assistance to 
ensure effective coordination among the law and decree making, standard 
setting, capital market rule-making and professional accountants licensing and 
supervision activities.” (The World Bank, 1994b p. 9, italic added) 
In January 1997, the MoF issued KMK number 43/KMK.017/1997 regarding Public 
Accountant Services to replace decree number 763/KMK.011/1986 about Public 
Accountants. The new decree contained some important changes from its 
predecessor, including sections that concerned the licensing requirements, foreign 
accountants and accounting firms, and supervision on public accountants and public 
accounting firms. Changes in licensing requirements were perhaps the most 
significant. First, the decree required all public accountant licence applicants to pass 
Ujian Sertifikasi Akuntan Publik (Certified Public Accountant Examinations) held by 
IAI (Article 7 bullet a). This was a completely new requirement, which was in line 
with the terms of the World Bank‟s project. Secondly, the decree required all 
applicants to domicile in Indonesia (Article 7 bullet a) which lifted the citizenship 
requirement adopted in the previous decrees. In other words, foreigners could now 
apply for Indonesian public accountant licenses without reciprocity. Related to this, 
the decree also stated that “KAP can cooperate with foreign public accountants or 
accounting firms in the form of correspondence, technical cooperation or any other 
forms of affiliations so long as they are in accordance with any relevant governing 
regulations” (Article 5), thus clarifying the status of foreign cooperation. Other 
important changes concerned supervisory authority and mechanisms. In the preceding 
institutional arrangement, the MoF regulatory function was limited to licensing and 
keeping a register of accountants while the supervisory authority had been with BPKP 
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(see Section 5.4.2). In the 1997 decree, the MoF‟s duty and authority was “to help 
develop public accountants and KAPs by, among others, monitoring KAP‟s 
compliance with relevant governing regulations” (Article 13). Together with this, the 
MoF also had the power to issue sanctions towards noncompliance. Depending on its 
seriousness, these sanctions included admonition, licence suspension, or licence 
revocation (Article 24). These provisions meant that the regulatory power of the MoF 
had been increased as the MoF now had power in enforcing compliance with 
professional standards and codes of ethical conduct as the decree required all public 
accountants to adhere to them in rendering their services (Article 15).  
 
In summary, the Indonesian accountancy profession went through a period of revival 
during the last decade of the New Order. The drive towards a Western-style 
accountancy profession started in 1988 following the country‟s efforts to further 
integrate its economy into the global economy. During this period, various laws and 
regulations were enacted to support the functioning of its capital market and to 
strengthen the financial services sector. This statutory legislation also incorporated 
provisions that strengthened the legal foundations of the profession. All of these were 
with the support of the World Bank and the ADB. Parallel with these transformations, 
dramatic and unprecedented changes took place in the profession. New, 
internationally harmonized accounting and auditing standards were published. 
Professional qualification examinations were also introduced for the first time in this 
period. Enforcement of these standards and qualification mechanisms was also 
enhanced by increasing the Government‟s power over the profession.  
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5. 5. Summary and conclusion  
Understanding the nature and influence of the New Order is important in 
contextualizing the development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia during 
the period between 1967 until the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Unlike the 
previous period where Soekarno‟s administration created an ideological barrier 
against the capitalist system encroaching into country, Indonesia under the New 
Order was a Western-backed regime that experienced political stability and economic 
growth. At the beginning of the New Order, the process of Americanization of the 
profession was expected to be smooth considering the New Order‟s closeness with 
Western power and economic thinking in the early years of its rule. However, as 
narrated in this chapter, that was not the case because the New Order itself became 
the major obstacle to the development of the profession.  
 
Over time, the New Order had transformed into an oligarchic capitalist regime which 
was different from Western-model capitalism and consequently had different views 
on the role and function of the accountancy profession. The increased revenue from 
the oil boom and the strong sentiments against Western power, had granted the New 
Order the opportunity to adopt its own developmental ideology. On the ideological 
front, it was able to balance foreign-oriented and nationalist agendas and on the 
economic front, it was able to groom enormous domestic conglomerates. As a result, 
the ideology of free-market capitalism was constantly challenged throughout the 
Order‟s era. In the political sphere, the open economy idealism propagated by the 
Western-educated technocrats was always challenged by the nationalist agenda of the 
politico-business bureaucrats. On the other hand, foreign influence (channelled 
through financial and political supports) faced the interests of the politico-business 
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coalitions between domestic conglomerates and the bureaucrats. As a result, the 
regime‟s choice of economic policy had been coloured by various themes along the 
spectrum, with liberalism at one end and protectionism at the other end. From the 
outset, the New Order never officially closed its economy to the inflow of foreign 
money, and at the same time, it also introduced protective and interventionist 
measures under the argument of social justice (e.g. Rosser, 2002; Vatikiotis, 1998). 
Clearly, the fluctuations in economic policy had had direct impacts on the trajectory 
of the development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia. 
 
Given the above context, some conclusions could be drawn. First, the drive towards a 
Western-style arrangement ensued when the country leant towards the liberal system 
with the technocrats dominating the policy-making agenda. This was evident during 
the first and last decade of the New Order when professional infrastructure was 
developed and strengthened. However, there were important differences in how 
global capital interests imposed a Western-style accountancy profession during the 
New Order. The pressure no longer came from a single superpower country as 
evident in the previous period (the US). Rather, the major powers that exerted 
pressures were the multilateral institutions at international or regional level. During 
the early decade of the New Order, it was the IMF who exerted all the pressures 
whereas in the last decade, it was the World Bank and the ADB. During these times, 
structural adjustments, deregulation and de-bureaucratization were carried out, in an 
effort to integrate Indonesia into the global financial and economic order. 
Simultaneously, the two institutions also required steps towards a “strong” and 
“independent” accountancy profession (such as strengthening legal backing for the 
profession, setting up internationally compatible accounting auditing standards and 
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qualification mechanisms). In addition, there had also been a change in the method of 
imposing pressures. The role and influence of foreign debts in the time of the New 
Order was more decisive in imposing the economic liberalization agenda. In the early 
years of the New Order, the two important creditors were the IMF and the IGGI, a 
multi-government creditor forum for Indonesia. Through loan agreements, these 
creditors had successfully imposed their agenda for structural adjustments in the 
country in a rather dramatic fashion (e.g. the foreign investment Act 1/1967 and steps 
to set up capital markets during the early 1970s and especially after 1988). 
 
The Westernization of the profession was intermittent as the New Order effectively 
implemented a different type of capitalism i.e. crony/oligarchic capitalism (see e.g. 
Chua, 2008). Progress towards full adoption of a Western accountancy profession 
was compromised when the politico-bureaucrats were in power, especially from the 
second decade of the New Order era. With the growing power of domestic capitalist 
groups (i.e. Indonesian-Chinese and crony conglomerates), the need for an 
independent accounting profession was at its lowest point. During this time, the 
development of the profession depended heavily on the state‟s actions. In fact, the 
market for the profession had largely been a creation of state legislation. This was 
evident in the late 1970s when the country introduced tax incentive packages as well 
as in early 1990 through a series of capital markets and financial sector deregulation. 
The close relationship between the state and the profession was also evident on issues 
of market access for foreign accountants and accounting firms.  
 
The analysis in this chapter, thus, supports the contention that the development of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession was a function of both internal and external 
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factors. It confirms that the drive for professional accounting development in ex-
colony countries such as Indonesia follows the stages of globalization as a capitalist 
world-order. However, the success of such efforts is also a function of Indonesia‟s 
internal specificity in terms of its history and socio-political configurations. While in 
the first decade of its establishment the development of the profession had been 
compromised by ideological barriers, which emanated from the highest political ranks 
(see Chapter 4), the development of the profession from 1967 to 1997 faced the New 
Order as an alternative politico-economic structure. As a result, while a Western-style 
accountancy profession seemed to be the future model in the country in the early 
1970s, its adoption certainly has been far from smooth. Overall, the World Bank‟s 
continuous attempt to „upgrade‟ the profession to meet „international standards‟ only 
had little impact despite the significant financial and economic reform agenda from 
1988 until 1997. This was partly because the coalitions of the political power of the 
New Order‟s bureaucrats and the domestic conglomerates had reached their strongest 
point by the mid-1990s, causing the reforms to have rather partial and incomplete 
impact on the economy (Rosser, 2002). The limited impact of reforms was reflected 
in the profession. For example, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade still regarded Indonesia‟s professional infrastructure conditions in the late 
1990s as “not yet up to international norms and … enforced weakly” (The Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002 p. 93).  
 
Until early 1997, the profession seemed set to embark on a similar path of 
intermittent development as in the previous periods given the fact that the New Order 
still stood firmly as Indonesia‟s prevalent political power. However, in mid-1997, the 
New Order‟s politico-business coalitions faced their strongest challenge when the 
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value of the Rupiah plummeted. The next chapter will look in depth at why the 
Rupiah‟s depreciation has proven to be a vital factor in shaping the unprecedented 
development of the profession in the last decade.   
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Chapter 6 : The Indonesian Accountancy Profession after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
Chapter 6 
The Indonesian Accountancy Profession after the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis 
 
6. 1. Introduction 
The end of the oil boom in the mid-1980s had provided the opportunity for the World 
Bank, later joined by the ADB (Asian Development Bank), to “modernize” 
Indonesia‟s accountancy professional infrastructure in the mid-1980s. By the mid-
1990s, these efforts had brought about significant progress, most notably the adoption 
of International Accounting and Auditing Standards. The domination of the 
government and family-owned conglomerates in the economy hampered progress but 
things changed when the country was hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Indonesia 
was the hardest-hit by the crisis, prompting the country to seek aid from the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund). This had significantly accelerated efforts towards 
liberalizing the country and consequently, transforming the accountancy profession. 
The period after 1997 was marked by several major developments unprecedented in 
the history of the accountancy profession in the country. With the backing of the IMF, 
the World Bank and the ADB played crucial roles in making these changes, all of 
which were made under their terms of ‟financial aid„ programmes. Significant 
changes in the profession include, among others, a new route for becoming a 
registered accountant, a new CPA examination design, as well as new and revised 
accounting and auditing standards.. The biggest change of all, however, took place in 
the area of statutory regulation of the profession, especially of the auditing profession. 
The Government, through the MoF (Ministry of Finance), introduced radical changes 
to the ministerial decrees that governed public accountants and public accounting 
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firms. It also attempted to strengthen these changes by incorporating them into a new 
act replacing the 50-year-old Act 34/1954. The changes had sparked a tussle between 
the MoF and the Indonesian Institute of Accountants, especially the public accountant 
section.  
 
Figure 6-1 presents the structure of this chapter. As in the two previous chapters, the 
chapter starts by analysing the post-1997 Indonesia‟s politico-economic conditions. 
Section 6.2 briefly describes the 1997 Asian financial crisis and its political 
implications i.e. the fall of the New Order. Section 6.3 focuses on describing the role 
of the IMF in dictating Indonesia‟s economic policy following krismon. To enhance 
our understanding of the impacts of those major changes on the Indonesian 
accountancy profession, Section 6.4 elaborates the central role played by the World 
Bank and the ADB in driving the transformations of the profession post-crisis, viz. 
changes in professional infrastructure and the reappearance of foreign-local issues, as 
well as the Government‟s attempt, with the push from the ADB, to enhance auditors‟ 
liability in Indonesia by constantly revising the statutory regulations of the profession 
and initiating a new public accountant law. Section 6.5 describes how those two 
attempts i.e. by foreign institution and the government, sparked tension between the 
profession and the State. The Chapter ends with the summary and conclusion.  
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Figure ‎6-1: The structure of Chapter 6 
 
6.2. Krismon and the fall of the New Order 
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the economic crisis 
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6.4.5. The public accountant law initiative 
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6.3.2. The transitional period of President Habibie 
6.3.3. Political instability during Abdurrahman Wahid‟s era  
6.3.4. The accommodative era of Megawati Sukarnoputri 
6.3.5. The post-IMF period 
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6.5.2. The IAI‟s attempts to infiltrate the regulatory process.  
6.5.3. The mobilization of pressures from peer institutions.  
6.5.4. The impacts of the struggle.
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6. 2. Krismon and the fall of the New Order  
The 1997 Asian financial crisis, popularly known as krismon40 in Indonesia, was a 
decisive factor in the development of the Indonesian accountancy profession. It had 
fundamentally changed Indonesia‟s power configuration, favouring the global 
capitalist camp. While it is true that efforts to integrate Indonesia into the global 
economy had begun as early as the mid-1980s, these efforts were rather partial and 
had inadvertently benefited local capitalists as well as nurturing the coalitions 
between the local capitalists and the bureaucrats. However, the 1997 crisis had 
weakened both the economic power of the local capitalists and the political power of 
the politico-business bureaucrats. In other words, the crisis had seriously shaken the 
very foundation of the aforementioned business-politics coalitions. Since Indonesia‟s 
economy was in dire need of fresh funds, the international capitalists were able to 
exert pressure on Indonesia to integrate more quickly towards the global capitalist 
economy. These changes and reforms were imposed through structural adjustment 
programmes under the IMF‟s financial “aid”.  
6. 2. 1. The Rupiah depreciation and the economic crisis  
The 1997 Asian financial crisis, triggered by currency fluctuation that hit several East 
and South East Asian countries, left the longest impact on Indonesia. The crisis began 
when the value of the Rupiah started to fall on 17 July 1997 from Rp 2,466, to 
Rp18,000 per US$ during mid-1998, stabilizing at Rp 8,000 per US Dollar by the end 
of 1998, only 30% of its value as of January 1997 (The World Bank, 2008).  The 
enormous decline in the Rupiah‟s value in such a short period was fatal as it 
                                                 
40
 Krismon (short for krisis moneter, literally monetary crisis) was a popular term used by Indonesians 
to refer to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It owed its name to the fact that the crisis was started by 
monetary crisis triggered by the plunge of the Rupiah‟s value. 
   
228  
 
significantly increased the amount of debt payable by the Government to foreign 
creditors, which had already been at a high level in its foreign currency value.  
 
Table 6-1 presents the amount of Indonesia‟s foreign debt for the period between 
1996 and 2007.  It can be seen from Table 6-1 that in 1996, Indonesia‟s foreign debts 
were US$130 billion or Rp304.6 trillion
41
. By the end of 1997, the value of the debt 
in Rupiah soared by 167% to Rp815.6 trillion despite the fact that the increase in US 
Dollar value was only 5.7% (to US$136.3 billion). In some cases, since the value of 
the Rupiah never recovered to its pre-crisis value, the debt amount in Rupiah 
increased even though the US$ amount actually decreased (as in 1999/2000 and 
2000/01, see Table 6-1). In effect, Indonesia‟s post-crisis total foreign debts escalated 
to four times its pre-crisis nominal value.  
Table ‎6-1: Indonesia’s foreign debt statistics 1996–2007 
Year 
External 
debt % 
Change 
Inflated 
Change 
External 
Debt 
(Rp trillion) 
% 
Change 
Inflated 
Change 
(US$ billions) (1996 =1) (1996 =1) 
1996 128.94   1 304.65 1 1 
97 136.27 5.69 1.06 815.59 167.71 2.68 
98 151.35 11.06 1.17 1,187.93 45.65 3.9 
99 151.33 -0.01 1.17 1,065.06 -10.34 3.5 
2000 144.16 -4.74 1.12 1,369.74 28.61 4.5 
1 133.83 -7.17 1.04 1,397.67 2.04 4.59 
2 132.84 -0.74 1.03 1,181.81 -15.44 3.88 
3 136.65 2.87 1.06 1,152.19 -2.51 3.78 
4 139.40 2.01 1.08 1,293.91 12.3 4.25 
5 130.71 -6.24 1.01 1,270.95 -1.77 4.17 
6 130.96 0.19 1.02 1,173.47 -7.67 3.85 
7 136.64 4.34 1.06 1,279.65 9.05 4.2 
Adapted from The World Bank, 2008 
 
                                                 
41
  Valued at Rp 2,362 per US$ as of 2 January 1997. 
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The devastating effect of the plunge in the Rupiah‟s value was more apparent when 
considering the amount of short-term debt. Figure 6-2 presents the amount of short-
term debt and foreign reserves from 1996 to 2007. It can be seen that before the 
currency depreciation in July 1997, Indonesia‟s short-term debts (US$32 million) 
already exceeded its foreign currency reserves at the time (US$19,125 million). The 
1996 short-term debt figures represented over 14% of Indonesia‟s 1996 GDP but the 
figure jumped to 15% and 21% during the peak of the crisis (1997/98) because of the 
shrinking of the country‟s GDP (The World Bank, 2008).  
Figure ‎6-2: Indonesia’s short-term debt and foreign reserve (1996–2007) 
 
Year  1996  97  98  99  
 GDP (current US$ billions)  227.37  215.75  95.45  140.00  
 Short-term debt - (US$ billions)  32.23   32.87  20.11  20.03  
 Short-term debt - (% of GDP)  14.18  15.23   21.07  14.31  
Adapted from The World Bank, 2008 
Furthermore, the large deficit in foreign reserve in 1997 made it difficult for the 
Government to intervene in the currency market to manage the Rupiah‟s exchange 
rate. On 14 August 1997, the Government had to abandon the managed floating 
currency exchange system and adopted the free floating system, making Indonesia 
one of the most liberal countries in terms of its currency exchange system (see e.g. 
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Toussaint). Other policies being implemented to restore confidence in the Rupiah and 
the Indonesian economy include, among others, increasing interest rates, cutting 
government spending, increasing tax on luxury items, cutting import and export 
tariffs, and abandoning the 49% ceiling of foreign ownership in publicly listed 
companies (Djiwandono, 1998; Santoso and Iskandar, 1999). However, the measures 
still failed to stop scepticism about Indonesia‟s economy. The Government attempt to 
ask for the IMF‟s help in the form of a stand-by loan of up to US$10.14 billion (The 
International Monetary Fund, 1997) did not improve the situation. The IMF‟s way of 
handling the crisis, especially its recommendations to liquidate 16 banks on 1 
November 1997, was inappropriate for Indonesian circumstances (see e.g. Toussaint, 
2004) as it triggered a crisis of confidence in the Indonesian economy in general and 
the banking system in particular.  
 
The consequences of the Rupiah depreciation and the crisis of confidence in the 
Government had finally brought Indonesia‟s economy into crisis. The prolonged 
depreciation and instability of the Rupiah‟s value created uncertainty and a huge 
burden on the economy as the Government, banks and other companies with foreign 
debts experienced chronic liquidity and solvency problems (Ramli, 2008). Figure 6-3 
shows Indonesia‟s major economic indicators during the last decade following the 
1997 crisis. It can be seen that GDP and GNI started to fall in 1997 while inflation 
started to soar, with the worst occurring in 1998 when GDP fell by around 13% while 
inflation reached 75%, resulting in a fall in income per capita of around 15% (The 
World Bank, 2008).  
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Figure ‎6-3: Indonesia’s major economic indicators 1997–2007 
 
Adapted from The World Bank, 2008 
6. 2. 2. The fall of the New Order  
Over the course of the following months, krismon became kristal (krisis total; 
Indonesian for total crisis). Social unrest started to surface as sembako (nine basic-
need products i.e. rice/cassava, palm oil/margarine, sugar, meat, egg, corn, salt, 
kerosene/LNG) became increasingly scarce and expensive. The difficulty experienced 
by ordinary people escalated the socio-political crisis to its peak during 13 to 15 May 
1998 when a massive riot broke out in Jakarta following the shootings of several 
students who protested against the Government‟s way of handling the crisis on 12 
May 1998 (Kompas, 2008). The incident triggered colossal protests led by students 
and public figures
42
 and was followed by a call for Soeharto‟s resignation from the 
board of chairs of MPR/DPR
43
, most of whose members were either appointed by 
Soeharto or elected from Soeharto‟s Golkar party. Other political manoeuvres that 
                                                 
42
 These include among others Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur) and 
Megawati Soekarnoputri. 
43
 MPR is short for Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or the People‟s Consultative Assembly, the 
highest legislative state institution in Indonesian politics and DPR is short for Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat (the People‟s Representative Council, Indonesia‟s parliament).  
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were a massive blow to Soeharto was the resignation of  Soeharto-chosen members of 
cabinets and the refusal by many public figures to be included in Soeharto‟s new 
cabinet and Komite Reformasi (Committee for Reformation), a committee he set up to 
accommodate public demands for reforms (Kompas, 1998, 2009; Penerbit Buku 
Kompas, 2008). Faced by public pressure and deserted by even his closest allies,
44
 
Soeharto announced his resignation as President on 21 May 1998 and handed over his 
power to Baharrudin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie,
45
 the then Vice President (detikNews, 
2007; Habibie, 2006). 
 
The fall of the New Order is of crucial importance to this study as it epitomized the 
change within Indonesia‟s power structure. Three major events during the crisis 
damaged the coalitions between the conglomerates and the politico-business 
bureaucrats. First, the currency crisis put enormous pressure on the wealth of the 
conglomerates as they found their foreign debt multiplied by at least four overnight. 
Secondly, the decision of the Government to submit to the IMF recovery programmes 
was deemed unfavourable to their interests and was strongly opposed. The last and 
final blow to the coalition was the stepping down of Soeharto as President. Although 
the local conglomerate–bureaucrat coalitions were not totally destroyed, the fall of 
Soeharto had seriously undermined their solidarity and influence. More importantly, 
                                                 
44
 It must be remembered that many of the then MPR/DPR members were appointed by Soeharto 
and/or came from Soeharto‟s Golkar party. The Chairman of MPR at the time (Harmoko) and many 
of the  resigning ministers (such as Akbar Tandjung and Ginandjar Kartasasmita) were Soeharto‟s 
closest and trusted bureaucrats (Kompas, 2009; Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2008). 
45
 Habibie‟s ascendancy to presidency was actually a result of his “naivety in interpreting a question of 
a Javanese king”(Witoelar, 2006). According to this account, Soeharto told Habibie on 20 May that 
he would step down the next day and Habibie was supposed to step down together with him in order 
to pave the way for General Wiranto (the then Armed Forces Higher Commander, Soeharto‟s loyal 
man) to take leadership. Because he “was not well-versed in Javanese culture”, Habibie was unable 
to read the implicit gestures and took the presidency instead, ruining Soeharto‟s plan for his 
succession (Bayuni, 2006). 
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the fall of the New Order had meant the destruction of the biggest hindrance to 
globalization. In the next two sections, the sheer influence of the IMF in shaping 
Indonesian economy during and after the crisis will be described.  
6. 3. The IMF and the liberalization of the Indonesian economy during and 
after Krismon 
The critical economic situation had caused the Government to sign the LoI on 30 
October 1997. It was the first time that Indonesia had to request fundamental and 
long-term support from the IMF (see e.g. Kuntjoro-Jakti, 2001). Following the initial 
agreement in 1997, no fewer than 21 subsequent agreements in the form of LoIs and 
Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies were signed between the 
Government and the IMF over the course of six years (1997-2003). When Indonesia 
finally decided to terminate the agreement at the end of 2003, the country had utilized 
US$15.55 billion of the credit line with the largest amount being used in 1997 and 
1998. Indonesia was only able to repay the full amount in 2006. Table 6-2 presents a 
summary of Indonesian debts received from, and repayments to, the IMF. 
Table ‎6-2: Indonesia’s debts to the IMF, 1997-2006 
Year 
Purchases and Loans (US$) Charges and 
Interest Paid Disbursements Repayments 
2006                                  -         7,647,080,005.60         277,921,970.20  
2005                                  -         1,084,731,664.80         296,549,762.60  
2004                                  -             949,304,997.20         241,153,085.60  
2003    1,926,736,000.00       1,370,959,332.40         208,089,140.00  
2002    1,541,344,000.00       2,568,384,000.00         284,010,218.80  
2001        433,510,000.00       1,926,288,000.00         517,298,397.00  
2000    1,191,610,000.00                                     -           558,385,240.00  
1999    1,415,400,000.00                                     -           374,555,223.00  
1998    5,956,087,200.00                                     -           187,549,087.60  
1997    3,082,060,800.00                                     -                                     -    
Adapted from The IMF (2009) assuming 1SDR (Special Drawing Rights) = 1.4 US$ 
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With its much-needed money, the IMF held a significant power over Indonesia‟s 
choice of economic policies. The IMF dictated its agenda of “economic reforms” by 
disbursing its “help” incrementally and on the condition that Indonesia satisfactorily 
implemented its recommendations, most of which were no different from an agenda 
of economic liberalization.  
6. 3. 1. The New Order’s final resistance (October 1997- May 1998) 
Without doubt, the IMF was the central agent in liberalizing Indonesia‟s economy 
following the crisis. The various LoIs were the instruments by which it imposed 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms directed towards achieving a liberal 
market capitalist economy by reducing government intervention in the economy as 
stated in the first LoI on 30 October 1997:  
“… a strong macroeconomic framework designed to achieve an orderly 
adjustment in the external current account, and incorporating substantial fiscal 
adjustment as well as a tight monetary stance; second, a comprehensive 
strategy to restructure the financial sector, including early closing of insolvent 
institutions; and third, a broad range of structural measures which also improve 
governance” (Letter of Intent between the Government of Indonesia and the 
IMF dated 30 October 1997). 
In the LoI, the economic liberalization agenda was translated into detailed policy 
plans with performance measures and targets established as well as monitored. 
Quantitative target measures were set
46
 in the first LoI aimed at stabilizing the 
currency, maintaining foreign exchange reserves and limiting inflation. Typical 
policy actions set to achieve those targets included cutting Government spending and 
increasing revenues, managing interest rates, restructuring and privatizing State-
Owned Enterprises; and restructuring and reforming the financial sector (especially 
                                                 
46
 For example, a 1% budget surplus was allowed in 1997 and 1998; targeted inflation rates were 10% 
in 1997/1998 and 5% thereafter; and the percentage allowed for current account deficit was 3% 
(Letter of Intent between the Government of Indonesia and the IMF dated 30 October 1997). 
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the banking system). Clearly, these programmes were intended to prepare and 
upgrade Indonesia‟s institutional and legal framework to enable full integration into 
the global capital market.  Following the first LoI, and as the value of Rupiah plunged 
below Rp 8,000 per US$ in mid-January 1998, Soeharto had no other option but to 
continue the agreement with the IMF. Two further LoIs were signed in the space of 
four months (signed on 15 January and 10 April 1998 respectively) with stronger 
performance measures than the previous.  
 
Despite the signings of three letters of intent, the IMF was not able to fully turn 
Indonesia‟s dependence on its loan into political victory mostly because Soeharto‟s 
regime was still very much in control.
47
 Resistance towards the liberalization agenda 
continued for several reasons. Firstly, the IMF‟s pressure to reduce monopoly and 
domestic trade arrangements would undermine the conglomerates‟ business 
interests.
48
 The second major reason was related to the socio-political consequences 
of the IMF‟s recommendations. The New Order political elites knew very well that 
reducing subsidies on basic food commodities, fuel, kerosene and electricity would 
ignite social and political unrest because it would directly affect grass-root citizens, 
the majority of whom still depended on kerosene for household fuel.
49
 In other words, 
                                                 
47
 The 1997 general elections had put Soeharto‟s political party as the overwhelming winner with 
74.5% votes (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2009), which meant that the politico-business bureaucrats 
were still in charge of making crucial political decisions.  
48
 For example, the liberalization of the clove trade would undermine one of Tommy Soeharto‟s 
businesses while the elimination of the BULOG‟s48 (the National Food Logistic Agency) monopoly 
of several basic food commodities would affect the source of finance for the bureaucrats‟ political 
activities. Thus, various devices such as the imposition of an uncompetitive export procedure for 
plywood, the restoration of tax incentives for the Timor mobnas manufacturer, and the attempt to 
restore the clove monopoly using a different name and scheme (Rosser, 2002) were constructed to 
impede the liberalization attempt. 
49
 It would also have had indirect and multiplying effects because reducing subsidies on petrol and 
diesel would increase transportation costs and eventually cause the prices of other basic 
commodities to increase. 
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the issue of subsidies was not merely an economic choice but also a politically 
sensitive issue as it could be used against the Soeharto regime.  
 
The New Order‟s reluctance to implement the IMF‟s recommendations was evident 
once the first LoI was signed.
50
 However, the resistance took its strongest form during 
the first half of 1998. The first effort was Soeharto‟s insistence on adopting the 
currency board system,
51
 a system that would fix the value of the Rupiah at around 
Rp5,000 per US$. Soeharto‟s strong intention was expressed in a meeting with the 
Advisory Council for National Economic Security (Xpos edition 18/01 (27 February 
1998) as quoted in Djiwandono, 2000). He also instructed Parliament to prepare 
temporary legislation as the legal basis for CBS; invited Steve Hanke, an economist 
from John Hopkins University and an avid supporter of CBS, to meet him in 
Jakarta;
52
 and sacked the then governor of the central bank, Sudrajad Djiwandono, on 
12 February 1998 allegedly because he opposed the CBS. The second important sign 
of rebellion was shown in his choice of cabinet members, particularly the economic 
ministries when the MPR elected him as President for the seventh consecutive period. 
He appointed his closest circle of friends and families to strategic positions in his 
                                                 
50
 The Government did not fully commit to cutting expenditure but instead continued spending on 
costly projects (e.g. IPTN‟s national aero-plane project) and on food and fuels subsidies, protecting 
uncompetitive tata niagas (trade arrangements) such as the rice and clove monopoly, as well as 
retaining tax leniency for Timor (mobnas, the national car manufacturer). 
51 
According to Djiwandono (2000), the reason Soeharto insisted on the CBS was because he needed to 
quickly stabilize the economy and concentrate on the upcoming General Meeting of the MPR 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People‟s Consultative Assembly, the highest legislative state 
institution in Indonesian politics) in March 1998, and one of the important items was the election of 
the president. The Rupiah‟s stability at a lower rate (between February and April 1998, the Rupiah 
was valued between Rp8,000 and Rp10,000 per US$) would give a boost to the conglomerates and 
his crony in regaining and consolidating their businesses. 
52
 It was believed that Mr. Hanke was invited by Peter Gontha, a close friend of Tommy Soeharto (see 
e.g. Antara News, 2008). 
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cabinet.
53
 His choice of ministers was considered as a sign of rebellion against the 
IMF as these figures‟ vision was incompatible with the IMF‟s reform agenda (see e.g. 
Shiner, 1998). 
 
In the end, Soeharto‟s resistance was fruitless. Soeharto‟s determination to adopt CBS 
invited reactions from the creditors. Pressure from the IMF, the World Bank, the 
ADB and other Western Governments
54
 mounted as they threatened to freeze their 
loan if Indonesia continued to implement the CBS. Without the support of the IMF, 
the World Bank and other Western creditors, the Government would not have enough 
reserves to back all circulating currency plus bank deposits (as previously shown in 
Figure 6-2). Secondly and more importantly, the backing of these creditors was 
crucial in building and restoring confidence in the Government and the Indonesian 
economy. Another contributory factor to Soeharto‟s weak position was the 
progression of the economic crisis into social and political crisis (see Section 6.2.2). 
Due to increasing threats to his position, Soeharto had no option but to negotiate with 
the IMF and signed the third LoI on 12 April 1998. This round of negotiation was 
considered a major victory for the IMF (Rosser, 2002)
55
 as it succeeded in forcing 
Soeharto to abandon his plan of adopting CBS in March 1998 (Berfield and Tesoro, 
                                                 
53
 These include: B.J. Habibie (Soeharto‟s protégé) as Vice President, Fuad Bawazier (a business ally 
of Tommy Soeharto) as Finance Minister, Tanri Abeng (a close friend of Habibie) as State Minister 
for the Empowerment of State-Owned Enterprises, Muhammad “Bob” Hasan (one of Soeharto‟s 
cronies) as Minister for Trade and Industry and Siti Hardianti Rukmana (Soeharto‟s eldest daughter) 
as Minister for Social Affairs (Kepustakaan Presiden-presiden Indonesia (Library of the Indonesian 
Presidents), 2009b; Tempo, 1998c, d, e). 
54
 Bill Clinton, for example, directly phoned Soeharto about the matter, to whom Soeharto was 
reported to have “retorted” that “the current IMF programme hasn't been a roaring success”(Blustein 
and Richburg, 1998). 
55
 According to Rosser (2002), the IMF made some compromises in this round of negotiation such as 
increasing the budget deficit target from 1% to around 3.2%. However, it achieved more results in 
return such as forcing the Government to eliminate many trade restrictions e.g. the clove monopoly 
by Tommy Soeharto‟s BPPC (Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran Cengkeh; literally Clove Support 
and Marketing Agency) and the ban on palm oil exports.  
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1998). The IMF‟s position was further strengthened when Soeharto stepped down on 
21 May 1998 and handed over presidency to Habibie (the then vice president), 
marking the end of the New Order reign.  
6. 3. 2. The transition period of President Habibie (1998-1999) 
The coalition between the conglomerates and the politico-business bureaucrats was in 
serious jeopardy when Soeharto stepped down from the presidency. Faced with 
economic, politic and social disarray, Habibie had little choice but to continue 
seeking support from the IMF and follow their recommendations.
56
 Habibie‟s 
administration also had to react to demand for cleaner and more effective public 
money administration. A major step undertaken by the Government to eradicate KKN 
(a very popular Indonesian abbreviation for kolusi, korupsi dan nepotisme, i.e. 
collusion, corruption and nepotism respectively) was by terminating various projects, 
agreements and cooperation with the Government and/or state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) which were founded without due diligence. Habibie‟s administration was also 
willing to consider the possibility of prosecuting Soeharto and his family as reaction 
to public opinion about their KKN and abuse of power (e.g. Tempo, 1998a, b)
57
. 
 
                                                 
56
 Several recommendations that he implemented include deregulating investment procedures and 
introducing a new bankruptcy law (July 1999). He also gave Bank Indonesia greater autonomy and 
independence through the new central bank law (May 1999) and revised the 1992 Banking Act 
(which among others lifted the restriction on foreign investors directly owning shares in Indonesian 
banks) in late 1999. Finally, he extended the life of and gave greater power to BPPN (Badan 
Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional), an agency set up for the purpose of managing and restructuring 
troubled banks under the government‟s liquidation aids (Sjahrir (2004). Transisi menuju Indonesia 
baru. Jakarta, Yayasan Obor. 
 Sjahrir (2004). Transisi menuju Indonesia baru. Jakarta, Yayasan Obor. 
 Tempo Interaktif, 4 May 2004). 
57
 The handling of Soeharto corruption cases had never shown any real significant progress despite the 
fact that it was clearly mandated by MPR Resolution number XI/MPR/1998 (e.g. Konsorsium 
Reformasi Hukum Nasional (National Consortium of Law Reform), 2006 and Muslih, 2006). He 
had never stood trial for his crime by the time of his death on 27 January 2008 (e.g. Yamin, 2008). 
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However, resistance still existed, albeit sporadic in nature and generally unsuccessful, 
due to a number of factors. First, although Soeharto had stepped down, there was no 
complete change in the political elites including Habibie himself.
58
 Thus, despite the 
change of presidency, considerable elements of the New Order still existed in the very 
highest level of Indonesia‟s post-Soeharto political regime. Both the cabinet and the 
people‟s representative houses were filled with figures previously associated with 
Soeharto and Golkar (Soeharto‟s vehicle for dominating the country) was still a very 
powerful political party. Secondly, the enormous economic wealth of the 
conglomerates (including Soeharto‟s family) granted them the power to create social 
and political intimidation should they wish to.   
 
Despite complying with many of the IMF‟s recommendations (a total of 8 LoIs were 
signed over the 15-month period), there still existed interference in the number of 
negotiations between the IMF and Habibie‟s Government. In some areas, for example 
in the banking sector, the progress of reforms and the work of BPPN were hampered 
by the lack of cooperation, especially from banks owned by powerful 
conglomerates.
59
 Similarly, despite the pressure by the IMF-World Bank-ADB trio 
for privatization of SOEs to improve efficiency, it proved to be a tricky agenda not 
only politically but also socially. Firstly, there was resistance coming from within the 
SOEs because many of the SOEs‟ directors, managers as well as commissioners, were 
ex-officio-bureaucrats (Bali Post daily, 2002). In addition, privatization was never 
popular amongst the general public as it was seen as an attempt to sell the country‟s 
assets to foreign power (e.g. Gatra, 2001; Rosser, 2002). The fact that the agenda was 
                                                 
58
 Habibie admitted in his memoir that he was very close to Soeharto (Habibie, 2006). 
59
 For instance, the failure to close down the troubled Bank Nusa Nasional of Bakrie Group, a 
conglomerate group allegedly close to Habibie, was attributed to political interference. 
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recommended by the IMF during a time of crisis certainly made the sentiment worse 
(see e.g. Baswir, 2001; Muttaqin, 2008b; Santosa, 1998; Suara Merdeka, 2003).
60
 
Opposition was also strong in the utility sector or SOEs where public stakes were 
high and as a result, “the sale of SOEs has been very slow and is surrounded by 
political controversy” (Smith, 2001 p. 8 see also McLeod, 2002). Finally, much to the 
foreign creditors‟ annoyance, structural reforms were also hindered by problems 
related to the KKN cases, particularly the Bank Bali case where funds were illegally 
transferred from the bank‟s record (Tempo Interaktif, 2004a). This case invited strong 
reaction from the IMF, the World Bank and ADB who threatened to withhold the 
cash disbursement of their credit commitments (Republika, 1999; Sadli, 1999). 
 
Habibie was not in power for long. He was forced to hold an early election in June 
1999 and was replaced by Abdurrahman Wahid (more popularly known as „Gus 
Dur‟) the following October.   
6. 3. 3. Political instability during Abdurrahman Wahid’s era (1999-2001) 
Similar to the Habibie era, the IMF‟s liberalization agenda moved rather slowly 
during Gus Dur‟s presidency, for several reasons. First, the election result showed 
that many of the politicians from the New Order era were able to retain their positions 
and adapt to the situation despite political freedom and democratic elections.
61
 
                                                 
60
 A vivid example of the sentiment was the fact that protests against the selling of Government shares 
in Indosat (an SOE in the telecommunication business) to Singapore‟s Temasek Holding was still 
ongoing in 2008 (e.g. Dinata, 2008). 
61
 Out of 48 parties participating in the election, the three biggest-winning parties with around 60% 
votes or 330 of 462 parliamentary seats (Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Indonesian Election 
Committee), 1999) were old parties born during the New Order. PDI Perjuangan (the Indonesian 
Democratic Party – Struggle) gained 34% votes (153 seats); PPP (the United Development Party) 
took 58 seats and the New Order‟s Golkar got 22% vote (120 seats). New parties, supposedly 
representing the reform aspirations, failed to gain significant votes with only three of them (PKB 
(the National Awakening Party), PAN (the National Mandate Party) and PBB (the Moon Crescent 
Party) only managed to gather 99 seats.   
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Furthermore, the new political parties did not have any clearly identifiable “economic 
and social policy agenda, let alone a clear commitment to liberal economic and 
political values” (Rosser, 2002 p. 194). Another problem was that democratization 
had led to political instability and fragmentation of political powers amongst various 
different political and ideological factions
62
 (e.g. Azra, 2006). Fragmentation of 
political power posed a big problem to the IMF because political commitment and 
stability was essential for smooth implementation of its „reform‟ programmes. The 
fact that Gus Dur‟s party was not strong in the parliament63 forced him to share power 
in the Government and eventually led him to choose cabinet ministers from parties 
not popularly known for their liberal economic agenda
64
. As the result, his choice of 
ministers received a negative response from the market (Sadli, 1999) and brought 
Indonesia‟s relationship with the IMF to its lowest ebb because the ministers were 
“essentially against IMF‟s involvement” and “had no intention of implementing the 
programmes, especially not under the strict timetables and continued scrutiny on 
matters of detail” (Soesastro et al., 2003 p. 7).  
 
Fragmentation of powers also hindered reforms as it led to stiff competition for 
control over state resources and strategic posts, which in turn created political 
instability. This is evident in the sacking of two ministers from Golkar and PDI-P in 
                                                 
62
 Both Golkar and PDI-P were nationalist parties (despite being perceived as different in their 
approach to nation building), PPP and PKB were closer to traditionalist Islam, while PAN and PBB 
were regarded as modernist Islam representatives. 
63
 Gus Dur‟s PKB party only received 13% of the vote which meant he had to share power with other 
political factions that supported his election and this distracted him from other agendas.   
64
 These include, among others, Kwik Kian Gie as Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial and 
Industrial Affairs and Laksamana Sukardi as Minister for Investment and SOEs (both from PDI-P); 
Jusuf Kalla as Minister for Trade and Industry (Golkar) and Bambang Sudibyo as Finance Minister 
(PAN). With its enormous power, Gus Dur‟s choice of Finance Minister raised most questions 
especially as Bambang Sudibyo, an accountant, was not known for his macro-economic expertise 
(e.g. Sadli, 1999). 
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April 2000
65
, a move that triggered a political movement to destabilize Gus Dur‟s 
position. Although Gus Dur attempted to stamp his authority on August 2000‟s 
cabinet reshuffle, his choice was still deemed not favourable to the IMF‟s interest as 
the new ministers were mainly from his party and the technocrats were not holding 
critical decision-making posts
66
. Last but not least, the IMF also faced the long-
standing KKN culture that included high profile cases involving Gus Dur himself.
67
  
 
Despite the problems of political instability and KKN, the IMF‟s position during Gus 
Dur‟s era was already strong given the fact that Indonesia‟s economy would only 
survive with its support.
68
 The Government simply did not have a choice other than to 
continue the cooperation with the IMF. The political instability and KKN cases were 
only causing minor/temporary problems in the form of delays in the implementation 
of the IMF liberalization programmes. As in Soeharto‟s and Habibie‟s period, the 
IMF‟s discontent with the progress of the implementation of the agreement 
manifested in its threats to delay the much-needed loan disbursement.
69
 After the 
                                                 
65
 On 24 April 2000, Gus Dur stripped Laksamana Sukardi and Jusuf Kalla of their positions (see 
footnote 20) and replaced them with Rozy Munir and Luhut Pandjaitan respectively without 
consulting either Golkar or PDI-P (Liddle, 2001), a move that sparked strong reactions from Golkar 
and PDI-P and caused instability in the cabinet in the following months (Kompas, 2000c). 
66
 Some names such as Prijadi Praptosuhardjo (Finance Minister) and Rizal Ramli (Coordinating 
Minister for Economic Affairs) had caused negative reaction from the capital market (Basri, 2000; 
Kompas, 2000c), despite the IMF stating their support for Gus Dur‟s choices (Media Indonesia, 
2000). 
67
 One particularly controversial case was the appointment of his younger brother as head of BPPN. 
Smith (2001) stated that the appointment was made secretly (p. 12). Gus Im, the brother in question, 
was also reported to have said that he wanted to be a mob-style arm that collected money for Gus 
Dur‟s political activities. 
68
 By the end of 1999, the economy had not fully recovered and the country‟s budget was increasingly 
strained by both foreign and domestic debts. In addition to the maturing debts from prior periods, 
the programme of rescuing several banks throughout 1998-1999 had also forced the Government to 
issue new debts in form of short- and medium-term bonds. 
69
 In March-April 2000, for example, the IMF delayed the disbursement of the loan, stating that the 
progress of various bank restructuring agendas as agreed in the LoIs was too slow (Wibowo, 2000 
and Kompas, 2000a). 
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signing of the fourth LoI in September 2000, the Government of Indonesia-IMF 
negotiations halted for quite a long time as the IMF was reluctant to continue with the 
programme. As late as mid-July 2001, Stanley Fischer, the then IMF Executive 
Deputy Director, stated that the IMF could not guarantee that Indonesia would 
receive the promised loan of US$400 million, citing political instability as the 
obstructing factor (Sinar Harapan, 2001). The IMF also questioned the commitment 
of Gus Dur‟s administration to the prosecution of several KKN cases, most notably 
the Bank Bali case (Kompas, 2000d). 
 
Similar to Habibie, Gus Dur was also not long in power. The sacking of the two 
ministers in April 2000 and two KKN cases involving Gus Dur (Buloggate and 
Bruneigate)
70
 led to his impeachment by the MPR/DPR. On 23 July 2001, the MPR 
terminated Gus Dur‟s presidency after only 20 months in power. He was replaced by 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, his Vice President. 
6. 3. 4. The accommodative era of Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004) 
Perhaps the smoothest progress of the IMF‟s programmes took place during the 
Megawati Sukarnoputri era of presidency. Megawati‟s economic team was 
considered not only cooperative with the IMF but also having a level of 
understanding of the actions needed to solve Indonesia‟s economic problems that 
“accords with the basic framework of the IMF” (Soesastro et al., 2003 p.7). For 
whatever reason, their support of the IMF‟s programmes was even evident before 
they assumed power (The Wall Street Journal, 1999). Unsurprisingly, many IMF 
                                                 
70
 In Buloggate, a total of Rp 35 billion of BULOG‟s money was missing, allegedly transferred to 
people close to Gus Dur (see e.g. Kompas, 2000b) . In the Bruneigate case, he was accused of not 
being transparent in the receipt and disbursement of a US$2 million grant from the Sultan of Brunei 
Darussalam (e.g. The Jakarta Post, 2000). 
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programmes went through rather smoothly over the three years of her Presidency. 
Many SOEs were privatized during her time, including profitable and strategic SOEs 
such as Bank Central Asia (Indonesia‟s biggest retail bank formerly belonging to the 
Salim Group) and Indosat (Indonesia‟s second largest telecommunication company) 
which were sold mainly to foreign buyers. Relying on its perceived strong public 
support (see e.g. The Jakarta Post, 2001) as “partainya wong cilik” or grassroots 
people‟s party, the Megawati administration also implemented the IMF‟s 
recommendation to cut many forms of subsidies in fuel, electricity and even in health 
and education services (Koran Tempo, 2002). The smooth progress was shown by the 
fact that as many as eight LoIs were signed during Megawati‟s presidency, all without 
too much controversy or power struggle between the IMF and the Government.  
 
Negative reactions, however, came from the general public, especially towards 
privatization and subsidy reduction. While they were in accordance with the IMF‟s 
recommendations, these measures had never been popular options amongst many 
elements of the public, which was not peculiar given Indonesia‟s socio-historical 
context (Rosser, 2002, see also Chapter 4). The sentiment was finally manifested 
through Ketetapan MPR or MPR Resolution number VI/MPR/2002 dated 11 August 
2002: the MPR mandated the President to carry out the privatization of SOEs 
“selectively, transparently, and with due care after consulting DPR” (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (People's Consultative Assembly of 
Republik Indonesia), 2002 p. 64). More importantly, the MPR also recommended the 
President “not to extend” cooperation with the IMF (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat Republik Indonesia (People's Consultative Assembly of Republik Indonesia), 
2002 p. 65). While there were signs of hesitation from the Megawati administration 
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(see e.g. Sinar Harapan, 2003), Indonesia eventually abandoned cooperation with the 
IMF in December 2003. The country nevertheless had to commit to certain post-
cooperation monitoring programmes (popularly known as “The Exit Strategy”) which 
were compiled under the Presidential Instruction number 5 year 2003, dated 5 
September 2003.  
6. 3. 5. The post-IMF period (2004-present)  
The post-IMF period was marked by a number of political events, starting with the 
2004 parliamentary and first-ever direct presidential election. The result showed yet 
again changes in Indonesia‟s political landscape. While the old political powers 
(particularly Golkar and PDI-P) were still able to scoop significant votes in the 
parliamentary election on 5 April 2004, a new figure, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
emerged as the new President in the presidential election on 5 July 2004. He was 
nominated by Partai Demokrat
71
 (Democratic Party) which, together with other 
political parties, such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) and 
PAN, were thought to epitomize the political aspirations of, mostly, young, educated 
and middle-class constituents. More importantly, the results of the elections meant 
further political fragmentation which made it difficult for the return of politico-
business coalitions. Despite attempts to form such coalitions having been evident in 
Habibie‟s, Gus Dur‟s and Megawati‟s administrations, they were neither as 
significant nor pervasive as the New Order politico-business coalitions (Chua, 2008).  
 
                                                 
71
 In the 2004 election, a presidential candidate had to be nominated by a political party or by a 
coalition of political parties with 5% of the total national vote or 3% of the total parliamentary 
(DPR) seats. 
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However, attempts by domestic business groups to capture political decision-making 
did not completely vanish. In fact, Chua (2008) reported that these business groups 
(mostly Chinese conglomerates) were able to survive and regain their economic 
power. Not only were these groups able to adapt to fundamental changes in post-New 
Order political and economic system, they also managed to take advantage of such 
changes. However, there are important differences. First, while on the surface the 
conglomerates seemed to be disadvantaged by the wave of democratization, 
decentralization, and liberalization accompanying the reformasi, in reality they 
embraced and successfully benefited from it. For the conglomerates, democratization 
and decentralization only meant that the decision-making power had shifted from 
central to local government. This meant that, as opposed to forming coalitions with 
one strong central government regime (as in the New Order era), they could now 
approach and lobby coalitions with local bureaucrats as and when necessary. The 
conglomerates did not fear liberalization either, as they believed that their 
organizational and cultural experience and knowledge would give them a strong 
foundation to compete in Indonesia.  
6. 4. The Indonesian accountancy profession after krismon 
The previous sections explained that the demise of the New Order as a fundamental 
change in Indonesia‟s power configurations had given the IMF the opportunity to 
implement its economic policy regime, which was in essence a recipe for economic 
liberalization. As argued in the theoretical framework, the politico dynamics had 
crucial effects on the profession as the economic liberalization agenda necessitated 
structural adjustments in the wider area, including in the accountancy profession. As a 
result, the Indonesian accountancy profession after 1997 went through the most 
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dynamic and tumultuous period in its history. In this period, three major themes 
emerged. First, there was fundamental restructuring of the professional infrastructure, 
especially in the development of professional standards and certification. Secondly, 
the issues of foreign and local accounting also re-emerged because of the IMF‟s 
pressure to use internationally recognized accounting firms in many of its 
requirements. Lastly, deregulation in the statutory legislation of the profession was 
one area in which change was most notable; causing an unprecedented power struggle 
between the profession and the State. Figure 6-4 provides a simplified timeline 
depicting both fundamental changes in Indonesia‟s socio-political context and major 
developments in the accountancy profession during the last decade. Most of the 
changes during this period were the extension of changes advocated by the World 
Bank and the ADB since mid-1980s, which were significantly boosted by the 
presence of the IMF. The next section starts with a discussion of the role of the two 
institutions.  
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Figure ‎6-4: The timeline of post-krismon Indonesia and major events in the 
accountancy profession 
Socio-political and economic 
changes 
Year Events in the accountancy profession 
 The beginning of the Asian 
financial crisis 
 Indonesia asked for IMF's 
financial aid and signed letters of 
intent. 
1997  Continuing agenda from the World Bank & the 
ADB‟s accountancy development projects e.g. the 
re-design of CPA examinations. 
 The MoF revised the decree regulating public 
accountants, mostly strengthening the requirements 
for becoming public accountants. 
 
 Despite the IMF‟s aid programme, 
the Rupiah depreciation led to the 
more serious economic problems. 
 Economic crisis worsened, 
eventually caused social & 
political crisis and the fall of 
Soeharto and the New Order, a 
favourable change for the IMF.  
1998  The third IMF‟s Letter of Intent required the 
Government to review accounting and auditing 
standards. 
 The ADB granted Loan INO-1618, which among 
others required the Government to strengthen 
regulations on accounting and auditing. 
 The Government issued a decree regulating 
companies' annual financial information. 
 
 
 The early election in 1999 elected 
Gus Dur into presidency in 
October. 
 Cooperation with the IMF 
continued but plagued by political 
instability and corruption issues of 
the Gus Dur administration. 
1999 The MoF: 
 revised the ministerial decree regulating public 
accountant services. Some of the new provisions 
indicate a setback from the 1997 revision, 
especially concerning foreign nationals and USAP 
exemptions for ex-bureaucrats.   
 started the efforts of enacting a new public 
accountant law  
 
 Gus Dur was impeached, 
Megawati took power, her cabinet 
was deemed to be the most 
cooperative to the IMF. 
2001  The IAI issued the codified accounting and 
auditing standards. 
 The MoF issued a new decree which, among others 
aspects, enacted audit rotation that initiated tension 
between the MoF and the profession 
 Dissemination of the concepts of the Public 
Accountant Law (PAL), which contained audit 
rotation and penal codes for audit negligence 
provisions, prolonged the MoF-accountancy-
profession friction. 
 
 
 The IMF cooperation is 
terminated, but Indonesia had to 
fulfil some final monitoring 
program or „exit strategy‟. 
2004  The MoF submitted the PAL draft to the State 
Secretary as part of the IMF‟s „exit strategy‟. 
Shortly after this, the IAI sent a letter to the State 
Secretary and asked for the draft.   
 The State Secretary sent back the PAL draft to the 
MoF, asking if the MoF needed to rethink it. 
 Continued struggle between the MoF and the 
profession. 
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6. 4. 1. The influence of the World Bank and the ADB  
The IMF had both direct and indirect effects on the Indonesian accountancy 
profession after the krismon. An example of how the IMF was able to directly affect 
the profession was its requirement to the Government to “immediately engage 
internationally-recognized firms to conduct portfolio reviews and to audit the banks 
annually” (Letter of Intent between the Government of Indonesia and the IMF dated 
30 October 1997, point 29). Indirectly, the IMF channelled its influence on the 
profession by requiring the Government to comply and cooperate with the World 
Bank and/or the ADB‟s support programmes of enhancing governance and 
accountability.
72
 The increasingly influential role of the ADB and the World Bank
73
 
for the accountancy profession after krismon was also apparent in their renewed 
priorities. While in previous periods a large proportion of the ADB‟s and the World 
Bank‟s loans went into social and development areas such as education and poverty 
reduction, following the 1997 krismon, the two institutions seemed to increase their 
attention to the more economic-related areas. The ADB admitted that:  
“From 1998 to 2007, after the Asian financial crisis, physical infrastructure 
accounted for just 4.67% of loans; agriculture and natural resources fell to 
3.39%; energy fell to 13.43%; and education dropped to 3.94%. The others 
                                                 
72
 For example, the Letter of Intent on 30 October 1997 detailed the involvement of the ADB and the 
World Bank in financial reform programme such as: providing technical assistance in designing the 
overall financial sector restructuring strategies (part 2 point 25); assisting Bank Indonesia in 
assessing rehabilitation plans for troubled banks under supervision/conservatorship as well as 
monitoring their implementation (point 25). The ADB, on the other hand, was to provide assistance 
in the Government‟s efforts to strengthen the regulatory framework of the domestic bond market to 
meet international standards (point 31). In terms of structural reforms, the World Bank was also to 
provide assistance in reviewing public sector expenditure and investment (part 3 point 41).  
73
 As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the influence of both the World Bank and the ADB on the country 
was not new. The World Bank had been present in Indonesia since 1967 and by the early 2000s had 
become its second largest creditors (see e.g. INFID, 2000) with total disbursed loans of US$30 
billion (Pilger, 2003 p. 22). By 2009, the amount reached more than US$40 billion with an 
outstanding balance of US$8.9 billion (The World Bank, 2009a). Indonesia had also been a member 
of the ADB since 1966 and has became its largest debtor by 2007 with 291 programmes and 
technical assistance projects worth US$22.56 billion and US$253.66 million respectively (The 
Asian Development Bank, 2008). 
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rose sharply to 74.58%, led by big gains in loans to the finance, and law, 
economic management, and public policy sectors.” (The Asian Development 
Bank, 2008 p. 1 underline added) 
  
Two important projects were closely related to the IMF‟s financial sector reform 
particularly in the field of governance and accountability: the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme (FSAP) and the Financial Governance Reforms: Sector 
Development Programme (FGRSDP). FSAP was a “joint effort exercise” initiated in 
1999 by the IMF and the World Bank containing “summary assessments of the 
observance of selected standards relevant to private and financial sector development 
and stability” in numerous countries (The World Bank, 2009b). In particular, the 
World Bank was in charge in the areas of corporate governance, auditing and 
accounting, and insolvency regimes and creditor rights. FGRSDP, on the other hand, 
was in charge of the loan project (Loan number INO-1618) worth US$1.4 billion 
approved by the ADB in July 1998. Under FSAP and FGRSDP, both the World Bank 
and the ADB assessed the conditions of the structures and systems of governance and 
accountability, including practices of accounting and auditing as well as the state of 
the accountancy profession, in numerous countries. The two institutions then drew 
conclusions and made comments and/or policy recommendations based on their 
assessments. Some of the changes recommended by the ADB and the World Bank are 
discussed below.  
6. 4. 2. Changes in professional infrastructure 
The impact of the ADB and the World Bank in terms of changes in the professional 
infrastructure was immediately obvious in the development and the adoption of 
professional standards and professional certification. In these two areas, both 
institutions put pressure on the Government and the profession to aim for 
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internationally recognized accounting and auditing standards and professional 
qualification mechanisms.  
6.4.2.1. Commitments to adhere to IAS and IFRS  
As described in Chapter 5, efforts to reconstruct the infrastructure of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession had been ongoing since 1988 under two accountancy 
development projects. The most significant outcome from the first project was the 
issuance of the 1994 Indonesian accounting and auditing Standards and the 
commitment made by the IAI to use International Accounting Standards as the basis 
for developing Indonesian standards (IAI, 2008a; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2007; 
and O'Regan, 2003 p. 153).  Following krismon, the ADB immediately required the 
1994 standards to be reviewed. In July 1998, Article 18.2 of the ADB‟s Loan 1618-
INO required the Indonesian Government to “review and amend 
legislations/regulations to make financial disclosure, regulation and enforcement 
consistent with international best practices” (The Asian Development Bank, 2000 
p.12). While the Article required a review on legislation and regulations, in practice, 
it was referring to the revision to the accounting and auditing standards. This was also 
emphasized by the IMF, which in September 1998, required the Government to 
“complete a review of accounting and auditing standards for the purposes of making 
them consistent with international standards” (Letter of Intent between the 
Government of Indonesia and the IMF dated 11 September 1998). The initial 
completion date was set as 31 December 1998. However, by February 2000, the 
target was not met due to “some administrative problems” (The Asian Development 
Bank, 2000 p.12). Nevertheless, the assessment of the status of compliance with 
Article 18.2 showed that there was already significant progress as stated by the ADB: 
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“1. …. Since 1993, the Indonesian Accounting Institute has issued 55 
accounting standards and 72 auditing standards. Of these, more than 60% 
of the accounting standards and nearly 100% of the auditing standards have 
been adjusted to be consistent with international references, such as the US 
Financial Standards Board, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee and others. 
 
2. To meet financial reporting needs by March 2000, IAI is planning to adopt 
10 international accounting standards and to continue reviewing the quality 
of the existing standards that were issued during 1990-1994….” (The 
Asian Development Bank, 2000 p.12) 
 
The situation changed slightly by November 2000 when the ADB reconfirmed the 
progress made (Facsimile from the ADB to the MoF dated 14 November 2000). By 
then, “there [were] 58 financial accounting standards and 84 auditing standards which 
[were] already harmonized with international standards” (Letter from the MoF to the 
ADB dated 23 November 2000). The IAI finally issued a codified Standar Akuntansi 
Keuangan (Financial Accounting Standards) and Standar Professional Akuntan 
Publik (Professional Standards for Public Accountants i.e. the Indonesian auditing 
standards). Following the 2001 codifications of standards, both new and revised 
standards were continuously issued using the international accounting and auditing 
standards as the main reference. By 2006, DSPAP (Dewan Standar Profesional 
Akuntan Publik, the Indonesian auditing standard-setting body) decided to fully adopt 
the International Standards on Auditing whereas DSAK (Dewan Standar Akuntansi 
Keuangan, the Indonesian accounting standards body) announced their plan to have 
the Indonesian accounting standards fully converged with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards by 1 January 2012 (IAI, 2008a).  
6.4.2.2. Professional certification 
Another important change was in the field of professional certification. According to 
Act 34/1954, to become a registered accountant, a person needs to hold an accounting 
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degree from certain public universities, or hold an accounting degree from a private 
university and pass the national accounting examination. In 1993, PPAk (short for 
Pendidikan Profesi Akuntan or Professional Accountant Education) was introduced as 
a new route to becoming a registered accountant, through the Minister for Education 
and Culture‟s Decree number 036/U/1993. Several revisions, especially to the 
syllabus of PPAk, were introduced in 1999, 2001, and 2002 (Benny and Yuskar, 
2006). As of August 2004, all accounting degree holders, including graduates from 
public universities, had to pass PPAk before being allowed to be registered as 
accountants (Bawono et al., 2006).  
 
Concurrent with changes in PPAk, the IAI, with the support of the World Bank, 
designed Ujian Sertifikasi Akuntan Publik (USAP, Indonesia for CPA examinations) 
targeted at those who wished to become public accountants (The Asian Development 
Bank, 2003). In February 2008, USAP was transferred from the IAI to IAPI (short for 
Institut Akuntan Publik Indonesia or the Indonesian Institute of Public Accountants). 
IAPI was the new name of IAI–KAP, adopted in May 2007 following the IAI 
national congress in November 2006 in which the IAI extended its membership to 
include not only individuals but also organizations (IAPI, 2009b).
74
 The 
transformation of IAI-KAP into IAPI was the latest major change in the professional 
infrastructure. As will be described later, this move was perhaps part of the IAI‟s 
reaction to the Government‟s initiative to enact a new public accountant law. 
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 As a reminder, the IAI was formed in 1957 and was the umbrella organization for all Indonesian 
accountants. IAI–KAP was formed in 1977 and until 2007 was originally the compartment or 
section of IAI for public accountants. Other than IAI-KAP, there were also IAI-KAM (for 
management accountants), IAI-KAPd (for academic accountants) and IAI-KASP (for public sector 
accountants). 
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6. 4. 3. The issues of local and foreign accountants  
The IMF programme that directly contributed to the dynamics of the profession was 
the audit of SOEs as part of the privatization of the Government sector. In the first 
and second LoIs, the IMF required the audit of all state-owned banks by the end of 
March 1998. In the third LoI, the IMF extended this requirement to include all 
“portfolios, systems and financial reviews” of troubled banks under government 
supervision, all major non-supervised banks and all other domestic banks. All these 
reviews had to be conducted by “internationally recognized audit firms”. The third 
LoI also required the Government to arrange “audits of non-viable public enterprises” 
(Letter of Intent between the Government of Indonesia and the IMF dated 10 April 
1998). The latter were more popularly known as “SOEs performance audits”. During 
the seven years of the IMF‟s presence in Indonesia, there were four rounds of 
performance audits on nineteen SOEs, mostly big and potentially profitable SOEs.
75
 
While the IMF argued that the audits were aimed at boosting efficiency and 
transparency in public money administration, it was hard not to associate these 
projects with the IMF‟s privatization programme. Many of these SOEs were in fact 
subsequently privatized during the period of the IMF cooperation between 1998 and 
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 The nineteen SOEs were:  (a) Round I (1998-2000): Pertamina (Indonesia‟s only oil mining 
company), PLN (Indonesia‟s national electricity provider holding the monopoly of providing 
electricity to the public), BULOG (a quasi-governmental agency operating as the biggest player and 
regulator in rice trade), the Reforestation Fund (a large extra-budgetary fund set up for restoring 
forests across Indonesia); (b) Round 2 (2000-01): PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II (one of Indonesia‟s 
seaport operator companies), PT Jasa Marga (the operator of paid highways), PT Garuda Indonesia 
(Indonesia‟s flagship airline, operating both long haul and domestic flights), PTPN IV (one of 
Indonesia‟s many plantation administration companies), PT Telkom Indonesia (Indonesia‟s biggest 
fixed and mobile telephone service provider); (c) Round III (2002-03): PT Dirgantara Indonesi 
(Indonesia‟s airplane manufacturing company), PT Kereta Api Indonesia (the biggest and only train 
service operator), PT Pupuk Sriwijaya (a fertilizer manufacturer), PT Taspen (the state pension fund 
management company), PT Semen Gresik (a cement manufacturer, arguably the biggest); and (d) 
Round IV (2003-04): PT BNI Tbk (one of Indonesia‟s biggest and most profitable banks), PT 
Krakatau Steel (steel manufacturer), PT Angkasa Pura II (one of airports operating company), PT 
PAL (Indonesia‟s sea ship manufacturing company), and PT Pelni (Indonesia‟s largest sea 
passenger transport company). 
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2003, in which between three and four SOEs were privatized as opposed to only one 
SOE privatization per year during 1991-1997 (The Ministry of State-Owned 
Enterprises, 2006 and Muttaqin, 2008a). 
 
The IMF‟s insistence on requiring the Government to use internationally recognized 
auditing/accounting firms had caused the issues of foreign versus local accountants to 
resurface. By the end of January 1998, the Government allowed 120 foreign 
accountants to conduct reviews on the troubled banks whereas the performance audits 
on SOEs were conducted by KAPs (short for kantor akuntan publik, Indonesian for 
public accountant firm) who had affiliations with the then Big Five accounting firms. 
Bearing in mind that foreign accountants had historically been prohibited from 
directly practicing in Indonesia, this decision had caused uneasiness within the 
profession as local accountants showed resentment towards the decision. The general 
view was that “the appointment of foreign accountants to audit a number of troubled 
banks under IBRA‟s supervision is a reflection of distrust towards local accountants” 
(Banjarmasin Post, 1998). Indonesia‟s main professional accountant magazine 
commented that foreign accountants entered Indonesia in “an unanticipated” way 
whereas the chair of IAI-KAP openly branded the appointment as disappointing (as 
cited in Bachtiar, 2001). The relationship between the local and foreign accountants 
was not a new issue given the resentment against the presence of foreign accountants 
during the 1970s (detailed in Chapter 5). It subsided for quite a long time, especially 
during the New Order era but, finally, the magnitude and openness of such uneasiness 
could no longer be contained especially after 1997.  
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The resentment of local accountants was directed towards the Government for its 
decision to use and allow foreign accountants into Indonesia. However, the 
resentment did not last long for a number of reasons. First, the Government insisted 
that the decisions were part of the IMF‟s loan requirement and that the requirements 
were only applicable to troubled banks but not to other companies under BPPN‟s 
supervision. Secondly, a growing uneasiness developed between the Government and 
the profession over the issue of regulation of accountants, particularly public 
accountants. The next section discusses how and why the Government constantly 
revised the regulations on accountants following the krismon.  
6. 4. 4. Changes in the statutory regulations of the profession  
Professional regulation was the area that rendered the period after 1997 as the most 
tumultuous period in the profession‟s history. In this period, major and unprecedented 
disharmony developed between the profession and the Government. An experienced 
Indonesian public accountant and academic termed the first period (1954–1972) and 
the second period (1972-1996) as the “blooming” and “growing” periods respectively 
whereas the post-1997 period is branded as the period of “changes and full of 
challenges” (Kartikahadi (2007) p. 59). Major changes in statutory regulation took the 
form of changes in the ministerial decrees regulating the profession and the 
Government‟s initiative to enact a new Public Accountant Law to replace Act 
34/1954.   
 
The Government started to review and revise the regulations governing the 
accountancy profession concurrent with the regulatory reforms campaigned for by the 
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World Bank and the ADB in the early 1990s.
76
 On 27
 
January 1997, shortly before 
the crisis, the Government issued KMK number 43/KMK.06/1997 regarding Public 
Accountant Services (the 1997 decree). In the space of just two years, the decree was 
revised by KMK number 470/KMK.017/1999 (the 1999 decree). Table 6-3 compares 
the two decrees‟ with respect to their most important issue: foreign accountants. 
Table ‎6-3: Crucial provisions in the 1997 and 1999 Finance Minister decrees 
concerning public accountants 
Issues The 1997 decree The 1999 decree 
Licence 
requirements 
A licence is needed for:  
a) a person who wishes to practise 
as a public accountant,  
b) an entity who wishes to operate 
as a public accounting firm. 
Similar to the 1997 decree 
To obtain the public accountant 
licence, an applicant has to  
a) reside in Indonesia;  
b) pass USAP;  
c) be a member of the IAI; and  
d) have a minimum of 3 years‟ 
audit experience with good 
reputation. 
Additional licence requirement:  
a) Only accountants who are 
registered with the MoF could 
apply for a public accountant 
licence. 
b) Ex-officers of the BPKP who 
wished to practise as a public 
accountant were exempted from 
USAP requirements.  
Role of the 
Finance 
Minister 
The Ministry (of Finance): 
a) supports the development of the 
profession, and 
b) monitors public accountants‟ 
and KAPs‟ compliance with 
relevant statutory regulations. 
Similar to the 1997 decree 
Adapted KMK number 43/KMK.06/1997 and KMK number 470/KMK.017/1999. 
There are two important differences between the 1997 and 1999 decrees. The first 
difference was regarding foreign nationals. Neither decree explicitly required 
Indonesian citizenship to obtain the licence. In other words, both decrees implicitly 
permitted foreign accountants to practise and manage an accounting firm in 
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 Several statutory legislations such as the Capital Market Act of 1995, the Companies Act of 1995, 
the Insurance Act of 1992, and the Pension Fund Act of 1992 had significant impact on the 
accountancy profession. 
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Indonesia.
77
 First, the 1999 decree ruled that only accountants who are registered with 
the MoF could apply for a public accountant licence. While the addition may seem 
minor, in practice this requirement made it much more difficult for foreign nationals 
to obtain a public accountant licence. This is because, according to Act 34/1954, 
obtaining the status of a registered accountant back in 1999 would require foreign 
nationals who wished to be a registered accountant to either (1) hold an accounting 
degree from one of the Indonesian public universities; or (2) hold an accounting 
degree from any Indonesian university and pass UNA (National Accounting 
Examination). In other words, while neither the 1997 nor the 1999 decree prohibited 
foreign nationals from becoming public accountants, the 1999 decree had certainly 
made the process much more expensive and time-consuming. The second difference 
in the 1999 decree was the exemption from passing USAP for applicants who were 
ex-officers of the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (Article 7 point 2). 
A former officer in the MoF‟s Accountant Supervisory Agency confirmed that the 
last revision was clearly a compromise to accommodate former bureaucrat-
accountants who wished to switch career to public accountant practice. Finally, the 
decrees granted the MoF the authority to monitor and supervise public accountants 
and accounting firms, a role previously held by BPKP (see Chapter 4).  
 
The two differences in the 1999 decree may be considered a setback from the 
liberalization perspective, which was rather interesting given that the ADB approved 
a US$1.4 billion loan dedicated for Financial Governance Reform: Sector 
                                                 
77
 Such radical changes to the regulation were coincidental with, or perhaps a consequence of, 
Indonesia‟s participation in the global and regional agreement on trade and services i.e. 
GATS/WTO, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN Frame Agreement in 
Service or AFAS (Syahelmi, 2004) in the mid-1990s. The decrees also seemed a necessary 
enforcement of USAP, the World Bank‟s project of improving Indonesian accountancy to meet 
„international standards‟. 
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Development Programme (Loan INO-1618)
78
 on 2 July 1998. As part of the loans‟ 
agreement, reviews and reforms of regulations governing financial reporting (Article 
18.2) and auditor liability (18.1) were amongst the required policy commitments. 
However, the confusing decision by the Government might not seem surprising given 
the fact that the period between 1997 and 1999 was a transitional period in which the 
Government was still prone to political interferences. The ADB‟s influence started to 
materialize during the years of the Megawati presidency from 2001. In 2002, the loan 
was revived under the new name of Financial Governance and Social Security 
Reform (FGSSR) programme, which continued many of Loan INO-1618‟s policy 
requirements under its „Policy Matrix‟ for the Government to comply with.  
 
In the matrix, some reform objectives for restructuring the accountancy profession 
were clearly defined.
79
 Point A32 required the MoF to issue a decree imposing 
liability on auditors for negligence. The 1999 decree was thus revised yet again on 30 
September 2002 by KMK number 423/KMK.06/2002 (hereafter “the 2002 decree”). 
In many respects, the decree was far more detailed than any previous decrees both in 
terms of administrative and professional rulings. As the table shows, the decree 
provided stronger legal foundations to the profession. First, the decree firmly stated 
that the audit service is the exclusive domain of public accountants. Many 
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 The loan was accompanied by the loans for governance reform support (INO-1619) and for a 
capacity building programme (Loan INO-1620). 
79
 In addition to the ADB‟s requirement that had a direct effect on the profession, other requirements 
that indirectly affected the profession include Article 18.2 of the policy matrix, which required the 
Government-issued Decree number 24/1998 on Company Annual Financial Information in addition 
to the newly issued accounting standards. In addition, Point A7 required Bapepam to “issue rule on 
independence of accountants providing audit services in the capital market”. This was fulfilled by 
Bapepam on 12 November 2002 by the issuance of Keputusan Ketua Badan Pengawas Pasar 
Modal (Decree of Chair of the Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Agency) number KEP-
20/PM/2002, which contained Rule number VIII.A.2: the independence of accountants offering 
audit services in the Indonesian security exchange market. 
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administrative provisions such as the definition of terms, licensing requirements and 
licence holders‟ administrative obligations were meticulously elaborated. However, 
the decree contains many other provisions that were deemed unprecedented and 
controversial. Table 6-4 summarizes the most crucial provisions in the 2002 decree.  
Table ‎6-4: Crucial provisions in the 2002 decree 
Issue Crucial provisions 
Professional 
services  
 Attestation services, which include general audit and review of financial 
statements, were exclusive to public accountants;  
 Public accountants could also give performance audit and “special audit” 
(Article 6 Point 1) and non-attestation services (Article 6 point 2 and 3). 
Professional 
regulator 
 The Ministry of Finance supported the development of the profession and 
assumed an oversight role on public accountants and KAPs (Article 18).  
 The Ministry had the right to conduct regular as well as investigative 
review on public accountants and KAPs.  
 The Ministry may delegate some of its authority to a professional 
association. 
Audit 
rotation 
 A public accounting firm could only audit the financial statements of a 
company for 5 (five) years consecutively  
 Public accountants could only audit a company for a maximum of 3 (three) 
consecutive years. According to Article 6 point 4,  
Penalties   Reprimand, attributable to light violations i.e.: 
(a) most licensing/administrative violations; or 
(b) violations on technical and/or ethical standards or any relevant 
regulations in a professional engagement that do not have any impacts 
on audit reports and/or any other reports from that engagement.  
 Suspension of licence, attributable to serious violations, i.e.:  
(a) violations of technical and/or ethical standards or any relevant 
regulations in a professional engagement that have significant impacts 
on audit reports and/or any other outcomes from the engagement; or 
(b) violations on the mandatory audit rotation provision; or  
(c) receiving a second reprimand.  
 Revocation of licence, attributable very serious violations i.e.:  
(a) violations of technical or ethical standards or any relevant regulations 
in a professional engagement which have very significant impacts on 
audit reports and or any other outcomes of that engagement; or 
(b) receiving a second suspension of licence; or  
(c) failing to maintain conditions required when obtaining the licence such 
as failing to set up or join a KAP, not residing in Indonesia, and/or no 
longer a member of the IAI or IAI-KAP. 
Adapted from KMK number 423/KMK.06/2002, underline is added. 
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However, the decree was popular for several new and much tougher disciplinary and 
administrative provisions intended to enhance auditor liability. First, the decree 
clarified and re-emphasized that the MoF was the only regulator and supervisor of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession. More importantly, the decree granted the MoF 
the power to conduct regular peer and investigative reviews o public accountants and 
public accounting firms. Secondly, the 2002 decree was the first piece of legislation 
to impose mandatory audit rotation applicable both to public accountants (maximum 
three years audit tenure) and accounting firms (maximum five years audit tenure), a 
provision that made the 2002 decree the most important and controversial piece of 
regulation of the profession. Finally, the 2002 decree also introduced administrative 
penalties for professional misconduct by public accountants and/or accounting 
firms.
80
 It was the first legislation that attempted to define and classify different levels 
of violations ranging from administrative noncompliance to professional misconduct 
and clearly stated the penalty attributable to each type of violation (see Table 6-4).  
 
Despite its approach to detail, KMK 423/2002 was revised less than a year later by 
KMK number 359/KMK.06/2003, issued on 2 August 2003. The new decree was an 
anticipation of the latest development in the profession following the imposition of 
mandatory audit rotation, which caused a wave of KAPs that changed name and/or 
partner composition between 2002 and 2003. Apparently, these changes were the 
strategy for getting around mandatory audit rotation. KMK number 359/2003 
specifically addressed these moves by extending Article 6 of KMK number 423/2002 
by three more points. These additional points essentially ruled that mandatory audit 
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 Previous decrees had introduced sanctions and penalties on public accountants and/or KAPs but such 
sanctions were largely attributable to violations of their administrative obligations. 
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rotation is still applicable to a KAP even if it had changed the proportional 
composition of its public accountant partners (Point 5). Point 6 ruled that:  
“In the case of a KAP that changed its partner composition so that 50% or 
more of its partners come from a KAP that has had an audit engagement (with 
an entity), the former KAP is treated as the continuity of the KAP from which 
the public accountant/auditor originates and thus mandatory audit rotation is 
applicable to it.”(KMK number 359/KMK.06/2003) 
 
Finally, the 2003 decree ruled that audit rotation would be applicable to a new KAP 
(either newly founded or re-named KAPs) whereby 50% or more of its public 
accountant partners come from a KAP that had the audit engagement. In short, the 
main intention of the 2003 decree was to anticipate and prevent public 
accountants/KAPs from avoiding audit rotation.  
 
Following the krismon, therefore, the ADB had generally been able to pursue its 
agenda without significant political resistance and interference. The 1999 decree may 
be considered a setback but it was not a major obstacle to the overall agenda. 
Furthermore, the 2002 and 2003 decrees were clearly compiled to fulfil the ADB‟s 
concerns of enhancing regulations on auditor liability in Indonesia. In fact, some 
provisions such as the mandatory audit rotation seemed to be tougher than the ADB‟s 
requirements. As a result, the new changes had sparked uneasiness between the 
Government (the MoF) and the profession, an unprecedented dynamic within the 
profession‟s history. However, the 2002/2003 decrees were only an interim measure 
to fulfil the ADB‟s policy matrix (The Asian Development Bank, 2002c p.16). Under 
the ADB‟s pressure, the Government started an initiative to compile a new public 
accountant act to replace the Act 34/1054.  
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6. 4. 5. The Public Accountant Law initiative 
Changes in the ministerial decree seemed inadequate as the Government started the 
initiative of revising Act number 34/1954 in 1999 with the establishment of the Tim 
Penyusunan rancangan Undang-undang tentang Akuntan Publik (the MoF„s Team 
for the Drafting of Public Accountant Law, hereafter „the MoF Team‟). One of the 
Government‟s stated reasons for the PAL initiative was the argument that a new 
legislation regulating the profession was long overdue. By 1997, Act number 34/1954 
had been referred to as the foundation of the profession for more than 40 years. There 
had been discussion of a new act in 1997 (e.g. Manan, 1993) but this failed to 
materialize. Another reason was that ministerial decrees were not deemed appropriate 
for providing a strong legal foundation for governing the profession. This was 
admitted by the MoF Team:  
“Until today, public accountants were only regulated with KMK number 
43/KMK.017/1997 regarding Public Accountant Services (revised by 
KMK number 470/KMK.017/1999)…… hence [these decrees] do not 
provide an adequate and strong legal basis [for the profession] (The MoF 
Team, 2000 p.2.).
81
  
Finally, the Government also argued that all the governing provisions in the 
ministerial decrees were already materials appropriate for an Act, as argued by 
Panitia Antar Departemen Penyusunan Rancangan Undang-undang Akuntan Publik 
(the Inter-Ministry Team for the drafting of Public Accountant Law`, hereafter 'the 
Inter-ministry Team') in an academic paper prepared for the purpose of drafting the 
new law (The Inter-ministry Team, 2001). Despite these stated reasons, direct and 
indirect pressures from international interests were also undeniable. The MoF 
acknowledged this, for example, in its letter proposing the law to the President: 
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 A similar tone was also found in an academic paper prepared by the Inter-ministry Team (The Inter-
ministry Team, 2001). 
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“More sophisticated business affairs as fuelled by rapid development in 
information technology and the globalization of public accounting 
professional services have rendered the existing regulations of the 
profession insufficient to protect both the public and the profession…  
In entering the free trade era, it is necessary to have clear regulations 
regarding foreign accountants who wish to practice in Indonesia without 
violating the principles of service sector liberalization as agreed in the 
negotiations round at WTO or ASEAN level.” (Finance Minister's Letter to 
President of Republik Indonesia  p.2) 
A similar tone was also found in another statement from the compiling team: 
“… [the public] demand for high professionalism is congruent with the free 
trade era which requires all WTO member countries to open their domestic 
market. As a preparation to enter this era, Indonesian accountants have to 
improve themselves to be able to compete with foreign accountants” (The 
Inter-ministry Team, 2001 p. 5).     
 
In reality, such pressure was channelled directly through the ADB and the World 
Bank with their reform and restructuring programmes. In the 1998‟s FGRSDP loan 
agreement, the ADB required the Indonesian Government in Article 18.1 to “enact 
legislation/regulations making: (i) auditors liable for negligence in performing audits 
…” (The Asian Development Bank, 2000). Initially, the Government attempted to 
negotiate the requirement by stating that “… the above requirement has already been 
regulated. Therefore, it is not necessary to enact a new regulation concerning the 
above matters” (Letter from the MoF's Director General of Financial Institutions to 
the Asian Development Bank dated 4 February 1999 p.1). The ADB was not 
appreciative of the response and cited “… the complexities of implementing the 
outstanding agenda and associated institutional and administrative changes”. This 
perhaps caused delay in the disbursement of the third tranche of the loan from the 
original scheduled date of March 1999 (The Asian Development Bank, 2002a p.1). In 
the end, the Government had no choice other than follow the ADB‟s pressure. The 
need to fulfill the ADB‟s requirements was often quoted by the Government in 
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communicating the law initiative. A letter from Director General of Financial 
Institutions to Big 5 KAPs dated 24 June 1999, for example, quoted that the new law 
initiative was “a follow-up action to the ADB memorandum point 18.1 which 
requires the Government to enact statutory legislations that regulate the 
responsibilities of and sanctions for public accountants in offering their services” 
(p.1).  
 
Undeniably, the initiative was part of the Government‟s effort to fulfill the ADB‟s 
Article 18.1 of Loan 1618 (FGRSDP) Policy Matrix. In early 2000, the MoF Team 
finished the first draft of PAL which contained some new provisions (see Table 6-5). 
Unsurprisingly, the proposed PAL accommodated the ADB‟s demand for provisions 
imposing greater auditors‟ liability. The most attention-grabbing proposals were 
mandatory audit rotation for public accountants (Article 30.g) and penal code 
provisions (Articles 36 – 38). It needs to be noted that the draft was the first piece of 
regulation proposing audit rotation, before it was actually enacted in the 2002 decree. 
Table 6-5 summarizes important provisions in the MoF draft of PAL. 
Table ‎6-5: New provisions in the MoF Team draft of PAL (March 2000) 
Article Provisions (Article referred) 
Article 3.1 The categorization of public accountants as junior and senior public 
accountants. 
Article 4.1 The conditional recognition of foreign accountant qualifications 
Article 4.2 The recognition of foreign accountants, subject to reciprocity treatment 
Article 26 The transfer of supervisory authority to the MoF 
Article 30g A public accountant is prohibited from auditing the financial statements 
of the same company for 5 (five) or more consecutive years. 
Art. 36 (1) Max. 5 
years and or 
max. Rp2.5 
billions
1
 
(a) whoever practices as public accountant without licence (Article 8 
(1)); 
(b) merging and separating KAP without permission (Article 18(1));  
(c) public accountants who do not report to the (Finance) Minister any 
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Article Provisions (Article referred) 
information of any fraud and or violations of laws he/she learned 
during his/her engagement (Article 21(4)); and  
(d) issuing audit opinion that is not true to the actual conditions 
(Article 30.b). 
Art. 36 (2) Max. 3 
years and or 
max. Rp1 billion 
public accountants who  
(a) work for two or more KAPs (Article 30.a); 
(b) disseminate confidential information obtained during engagement, 
except as required by statutory legislation (Article 30.d); and  
(c) offer services during suspension of licence (Article 30.e).  
Art. 36 (3) Max. 1 
years and or 
max. Rp500 
millions 
Public accountants who make or try to make a deal or ask for monetary 
or any other compensation that could compromise his/her independence 
and or objectivity (Article 30.c) 
Art. 37 (1) Max. 5 
years and or 
max. Rp2.5 
billions 
The penalty is imposed to the owners or users of a KAP  
(a) that operates and employs public accountants without  permission or 
acknowledgement from the Finance Minister (Article 10(1) and 10 
(2);  
(b) that fail to publish their permission to operate on state gazette 
(Article 10(3)); and 
(c) which its assets is not separated from the owners‟ assets (Article 
10(4)). 
Art. 37 (2) Max. 5 
years and or 
max. Rp2.5 
billions 
Owners of KAP that do not provide reserve fund to (1) cover them from 
any loss occurring from third parties‟ allegation related to KAPs 
service engagements and (2) to develop its human resources (Article 23 
(1)) 
Article 38  All violations mentioned in Article 36 and 37 are criminal violations 
Source: The final report by The MoF Team (2000) 
Note:  
1. Time length (e.g. max. 5 years) represents imprisonment penalty while monetary value 
(e.g. max Rp2.5 billions) represents fine penalty. 
 
 
Clearly, all those provisions – especially mandatory audit rotation and penal code 
provisions – demanded higher responsibility from public accountants and KAPs in 
offering their services. In other words, those provisions were in line with the ADB‟s 
requirements for the Government to increase Indonesian auditors‟ liability for their 
negligence. Later development showed that some of the provisions in the first draft of 
PAL were actually enacted as governing regulations under the controversial 
2002/2003 MoF decrees. In fact, as described in the previous section, the 2002/2003 
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decrees included tougher provisions which supposedly built upon the same spirit as 
the provisions in the PAL draft. The decree introduced tougher mandatory audit 
rotation requirement by cutting the time requirement for auditor rotation (from five to 
three consecutive years) and imposing audit rotation to KAPs.  
 
Following the first draft, the MoF continued the efforts to enact the new PAL law in 
2003 as a continuation of the ADB programme Loan number INO-1618 and the new 
proposed loan totalling US$250 million under the Financial Governance and Social 
Security Reform (FGSSR). In its policy matrix for releasing the new loan, the ADB 
clearly required the MoF to “prepare draft of Public Accountants Law, including 
provisions imposing liability on auditors for negligence.” (The Asian Development 
Bank, 2002b p.43). On 22 May 2001, the Finance Minister proposed the law to the 
President stating that “… there is currently no specific law that regulates the 
qualifications, responsibility and legal sanctions of the public accountant profession” 
(Letter from the Finance Minister to the President dated 22 May 2001). Following the 
President‟s approval of the proposal, the MoF set up the Inter-ministry Team on 8 
January 2003 through the KMK number 16/KMK.06/2003. Included in the team were 
cross-governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 
Bapepam (the capital market authority), the State Secretariat Office, and the 
Government Accounting Agency.  
 
By mid-2004, the Inter-ministry Team had completed the second draft of PAL, which 
consisted of 13 Chapters and 47 Articles. The Finance Minister submitted the draft to 
the President via a letter dated 2 June 2004. In many respects, the draft resembled the 
provisions included in both the first draft of PAL and the 2002/2003 decrees. For 
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example, the MoF became the sole regulatory and supervisory authority of the public 
accountant profession. As in the 2002/2003 decrees, mandatory audit rotation was 
applied to both public accountants and KAPs. Overall, the Inter-ministry Team draft 
was a tougher regulatory regime. Some new proposals include the requirement for 
public accountants to renew their licence every five years (Article 3.2); for a 
professional association to be endorsed by the Finance Minister (Article 23.1, while 
in another provision (Article 23.2) it also ruled that the Minister would only recognize 
one professional association); and the restatement that the MoF holds the ultimate 
authority over the profession (Article 25). On the other hand, the draft also reiterated 
and affirmed public accountant professional status by stating that public accountants 
held exclusive rights over attestation services (Article 2.2) and, therefore, no other 
parties were allowed to offer such services (Article 40). The draft also ruled that 
public accountants reserved the right to receive fees for their services (Article 29) and 
were only liable for their service for a maximum of five years from the date of their 
report (Article 38). Some crucial provisions introduced in this category are 
summarized in Table 6-6. 
Table ‎6-6: New provisions in the Inter-ministry Team draft of PAL (June 2004) 
Article (penalty) Provision 
2.2 Attestation services are exclusive to public accountants 
3.2 Public accountant licences are valid for 5 years 
11.2 Minimum 2/3 (two-thirds) of total partners of a KAP partnership have 
to be public accountants 
11.4 Minimum 2/3 (two-thirds) of total partners of a KAP partnership have 
to be Indonesian 
12 Non-public accountant partners have to register with the Minister  
13 At every hierarchal level, minimum 2/3 (two-thirds) of a KAP‟s 
professional workers have to be Indonesian 
21-22 KAP can cooperate with and use the name of foreign accounting firms 
only with Minister‟s permission 
27.3 KAPs have to submit annual financial statements 
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Article (penalty) Provision 
23.1 Professional associations must be endorsed by the Finance Minister  
23.2 The Minister would only recognize 1 professional association 
25 “The Minister delegates to the profession the authority of compiling 
the accounting and public accountant professional standards, and 
organizing public accountant professional examinations and CPE 
(continuing professional education)” 
29 Public accountants are entitled to receive fees for their services 
31. Public accountants are prohibited from concurrently assuming other 
works/positions as:  
 a state official and/or  
 a director, manager, or employee at any governmental agencies, 
state-owned enterprises, political parties, educational institutions or 
any other legal entities.  
However, they are allowed to assume the positions of:  
 a lecturer in a higher education institution without any managerial 
role; or  
 a commissioner or member of a committee that is responsible to 
the commissioner (of an institution / a corporation) 
32 In rendering attestation services, public accountants and KAPs have to 
maintain independence and be free from any form of conflict of 
interests. The article set out some conditions in which conflict of 
interests is assumed to exist 
38 Public accountants are only liable for their service for a maximum of 5 
years from the date of the report 
40 No other parties other than public accountants are allowed to offer such 
services 
Art. 39: 
Max. 6 years and 
or max. Rp300 
millions 
Public accountants who 
a. Fail to comply with professional standards and or any relevant 
statutory legislation in performing their services which caused third 
party losses (Article 26.6) 
b. Issue an audit opinion without basing it on valid, relevant and 
adequate audit evidence (Article 31) 
c. Commit an action which causes working papers or any other 
documents related to his/her work unusable (Article 32.1.h)  
d. Manipulate or help to manipulate data that is relevant to his/her 
work in performing services (Article 32.1.h) 
e. Give a false statement or false and/ or forged documents to obtain 
or renew public accountant licence, KAP operating licence and or 
licence to pen KAP branch 
Art. 40 (1)  
 Max. 6 years 
and or max. 
Rp300 million 
for person/ 
individual 
 Max. Rp 
3billion fine for 
Any party whether a person or an entity that offers the services of a 
public accountant or works or acts like a public accountant when 
actually he/she/it is not 
 
Note: Exception is given to governmental or state agencies in 
performing their duties according to the relevant statutory legislations 
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Article (penalty) Provision 
non-person 
entities. 
Art. 40 (2)  
 Max. 4 years and 
or max. Rp200 
mil. for a person/ 
individual  
 Max. Rp 3 billion 
fine for non-person 
entities. 
Any party (a person or entity) who/that sets up and or runs an entity, 
organization or their equivalence which uses the term “Accountant”, 
“Accountancy”, “Audit”, or “Auditor” which gives image that the 
entity/ organization is a KAP 
Art. 41 
Max. 6 years and 
or max. Rp300 
millions 
KAP partners other than the signing partners and KAP employees who 
are involved in an engagement of a service who: 
a. Conduct or help conducting data manipulation in performing the 
attestation service. 
b. Commit an act that causes working papers or any other documents 
related to the attestation service missing.  
Source: Draft of PAL as submitted by the Finance Minister to the President (Letter from the 
Finance Minister to the President dated 2 July 2004). 
Similar to the first draft of PAL, the Inter-ministry Team also included penal codes in 
the second draft, summarized and presented in Table 6-6. As the table shows, there 
are important differences between the first draft and the second draft of PAL. Firstly, 
the imprisonment and fine penalties for public accountants/KAPs violations were 
lower than the first draft. Secondly, similar to the 2002/2003 ministerial decrees, the 
Inter-ministry Team‟s draft linked some penalties with professional misconduct 
whereas many of the penalties in the first draft were linked to administrative 
violations. Finally, there were also penalties for parties other than public accountants 
and/or KAPs, especially for acting illegally or operating as if they were public 
accountants. This provision was a clear and strong provision that would grant public 
accountants state-backed professional status. Despite the differences, the two drafts 
retained one important similarity: these penal codes were in congruence with the 
ADB‟s demand for enhancement of Indonesian auditors‟ liability for negligence. 
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The ADB‟s involvement was beyond merely requiring the enactment of the new law 
in the policy matrix as it was also involved in the drafting process, reviewing and 
proposing amendments to the Government‟s draft. In December 2002, the ADB sent a 
14-page document containing “proposed provisions for auditors‟ liability” (Letter 
from the ADB to the MoF dated 11 December 2002). The document commented on 
no fewer than nine articles of the then working draft of PAL and suggesting 
amendments in the forms of rewording of articles, adding provisions and, in some 
cases, complete omission and replacement of an article. Unsurprisingly, most of the 
comments were regarding auditors‟ liability, including some crucial 
recommendations that (1) public accountants must act without fraud, dishonesty, or 
negligence, and (2) public accountants who perform an attestation service are liable to 
pay compensation to anyone who suffers a loss because his/her opinion is misleading 
or inaccurate. Furthermore, the document also recommended some measures that 
would enable the Minister to enhance professional discipline such as suspending and / 
or revoking public accountant or KAP licences without having to wait for the 
profession‟s disciplinary procedures. Finally, ADB also recommended that the 
Minister should be able to (1) impose an administrative sanction in the form of 
forcing public accountants to “pay compensation to a specified person” and “to do or 
not to do a specified thing” in order “to ensure that the violation is not repeated or to 
rectify a situation that arises because of the violation concerned”; and (2) revoke a 
public accountant practice licence if she/he is criminally convicted.  
 
Obviously, ADB‟s recommendations were not to be ignored. Based on the document, 
the Inter-ministry Team compiled a matrix comparing the recommendations of the 
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latest version of the draft as well as the comments from the AusAID consultant
82
 on 
those recommendations. While the Inter-ministry Team believed that their current 
draft had in one way or another addressed ADB concerns, there were additional 
Articles added in accordance to the ADB‟s recommendations. More specifically, the 
Inter-ministry Team inserted new articles that clearly stated that public accountants 
and KAPs were financially responsible for the losses and damages occurred as a 
result of their professional negligence.   
 
Changes in ministerial decrees governing the Indonesian accountancy profession 
continued with the drafting of PAL. In fact, the PAL initiative was more 
revolutionary because it was an attempt to introduce tougher provisions in a 
higher/stronger legislative hierarchy. The PAL initiative and MoF‟s insistence on 
escalating most provisions in the 2002 decree into the new act turned the uneasiness 
between the MoF and the profession into a full-blown power struggle.  
6. 5. Power struggle between the IAI and the MoF  
The crisis that hit the profession, nevertheless, was not caused merely by the 
Government‟s initiatives. In fact, the MoF‟s initiatives had gained momentum 
because the profession had already received public criticism for their perceived lack 
of professionalism. In early 2001, a high profile case involving public accountants 
erupted when BPKP
83
 released the results of its peer review investigations into 17 
                                                 
82
 In addition to the ADB, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) assigned an 
Australian consultant, Brian Waldron, to assist the MoF in the drafting of PAL between November 
2001 and December 2003. Being a former practising accountant in Australia, the consultant‟s main 
responsibility was to give views on various issues related to the draft based on his experience and 
expertise in the Australian accountancy profession. 
83
 Although the review was conducted by BPKP, the investigations itself was initiated by the Ministry 
of Finance (Bisnis Indonesia, 2001a). 
   
273  
 
auditors who audited the financial statements of 36 banks for the years 1995 to 1997. 
The investigation was triggered by the fact that most of these banks experienced 
liquidity problems and were suspended from operating during the krismon. The 
agency concluded that many of the auditors did not comply with the professional 
standards in performing the audit.
84
 The IAI itself had to defend its position against 
the accusation of contributing to the Indonesian financial crisis (e.g. Koran Tempo, 
2001, Bisnis Indonesia, 2001a). The fact that the MoF‟s sanctions came prior to any 
actions taken by BP2AP (short for Badan Peradilan dan Pemeriksaan Akuntan 
Publik, the IAI‟s disciplinary body) had incited strong reactions from the public85 as 
well as the regulators.  
 
In addition to the ADB pressure, these cases had given the MoF both the momentum 
and excuse to impose the regulatory reforms agenda, citing the need for better public 
protection. An important MoF officer highlighted the need for the IAI to allow greater 
public participation in the governance of the profession in order to restore public 
confidence (Kompas, 2002). As admitted by two other high profile MoF officers, the 
case was also one of the reasons the MoF decided to establish a compliance review 
programme as opposed to the IAI‟s voluntary quality review programme established 
in early 2002 (Media Akuntansi, 2002a). In a sense, the 2002 decree was perhaps the 
pinnacle of the MoF‟s efforts in “shifting the balance of the MoF‟s roles from mainly 
supporting the development of the profession to guarding the public interests” (Media 
                                                 
84
 In total, BPKP reported 129 instances of noncompliance (Bisnis Indonesia, 2001c; Republika, 2001). 
Violations were found in the area of documentation of audit evidence (62 findings); noncompliance 
with the reporting standards (42 findings); audit opinion not in compliance with audit standards (one 
finding), and other types of violations (11 findings). Based on those findings, the MoF reprimanded 
all the auditors/KAPs (Warta Ekonomi, 2001). 
85
 The case also prompted the Indonesian Corruption Watch, a prominent non-governmental 
organization, to file a class action to the IAI‟s Honorary Councils for the slowness of the profession 
in taking disciplinary action against the auditors (Bisnis Indonesia, 2001b; Hakim, 2001). 
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Akuntansi, 2002a p.7). It was intended as “an effort to answer the problems of the 
declining public trust in the profession by repositioning the role of the MoF as well as 
the association” (Media Akuntansi, 2002b p.5 ). As the next sections will describe, 
these efforts had invited the profession to challenge openly the new provisions in the 
revised ministerial decrees and later the PAL draft. It will also show that fiercer 
efforts of overturning these provisions also occurred more discreetly. 
6. 5. 1. The IAI’s attempts to challenge regulatory changes 
The enactment of the 2002 decree was immediately followed by the IAI‟s challenge. 
On 14 January 2003, the IAI sent a letter to the Finance Minister challenging the 
imposition of audit firm rotation. Among the complaints put forward was the 
contention that the IAI were not involved in the process leading to the issuance of the 
decree (Letter from Chair of IAI-KAP to the Finance Minister dated 14 January 
2003). It was also argued that KAP audit rotation would create a “conflict of laws 
between the 2002 Decree which limits KAPs from accepting audit engagement and 
the 1995 Companies Act which rules that auditor appointment is the right of the 
shareholders” (p. 1). Finally, the letter also questioned the effectiveness of KAP audit 
rotation in achieving its intended aim of protecting public interest. Such 
ineffectiveness, according to the IAI letter, was because KAP rotation “is against the 
free market concept … whereas the global trend, with the existence of WTO and 
AFTA, is heading towards free market mechanism” and it “would also hinder market 
competition between KAPs, thus reducing audit quality; and create moral hazard 
amongst public accountants”. Furthermore, the IAI also argued that KAP audit 
rotation would undermine financial control mechanisms in the country, both in the 
public and private sectors as it “does not solve the problem of audit failures in 
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detecting fraud and reduces audit effectiveness in sectors/companies which require 
specific industry expertise”. Finally, the IAI also quoted that KAP audit rotation 
would increase audit costs, especially for “multinational corporations whose auditors 
may have been appointed by their headquarter offices” (p.2). Similar arguments were 
publicly echoed by some members of the profession (e.g. Bisnis Indonesia, 2001d).  
 
Besides formal complaints, KAPs also tried to get around firm rotation by changing 
their names and partner compositions, hoping that they would be treated as a new 
entity and thus could avoid audit rotation (e.g. Bisnis Indonesia, 2002; Wulandari, 
2007). Despite the objection from the IAI, the MoF insisted on enacting the provision. 
The MoF issued the 2003 decree as a response to KAPs‟ attempts at avoiding audit 
rotation and, more importantly, included the provision in the publicized Inter-ministry 
Team‟s PAL Substance86. As a reaction to this, the IAI sent another letter to the 
Finance Minister as a reaction to the substance of the PAL‟s draft document on 10 
November 2003. The IAI reiterated its concern about the lack of involvement of its 
members in the process of PAL drafting. The reaction was rather strongly expressed:  
“In this reformasi era, we should hold high the principles of democracy 
and people sovereignty …. in accordance with the above principles 
[democracy and people sovereignty] and the principles of good practice of 
enacting legislation, transparency and public participation are key 
foundation ….…  IAI as the organization of all public accountants who are 
part of Indonesian public and in accordance with the people sovereignty 
should have been actively involved in the drafting of the law.“ (Letter from 
Chair of IAI-KAP to the Finance Minister dated 10 November 2002 p.1-2)  
 
The IAI went on criticizing the PAL substances, arguing that it had among other 
shifted many of the IAI‟s existing roles and functions to the MoF, and that it unjustly 
                                                 
86
 The Inter-Ministry Team‟s “Substances of PAL Draft” was officially published and disseminated 
through public hearings in several major cities throughout Indonesia between September and 
October 2003. The public hearings were the first occasions on which the proposed PAL draft went 
public, albeit in the form of concepts and not detailed provisions. 
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put too much emphasis on detailing public accountants‟/KAPs‟ obligations and not 
enough emphasis on their rights. The IAI demanded that Minister include the IAI in 
the process of PAL drafting, and re-evaluating the substance of PAL “thoroughly in a 
correct and scientific way” (p. 5-6). The IAI also suggested the MoF reformulate the 
law in such a way that “the Government only regulates necessary and significant 
matters such as licensing” and “gives rooms to the association to develop into an 
independent, impartial, and exemplary self-regulatory organization” (p. 5-6).  
 
As a response to the letter, the Inter-ministry Team held a limited hearing with the 
IAI-KAP on 12 November 2003. In the hearing, the team insisted that the drafting of 
PAL had been in accordance with Presidential Decree number 188/1998 and the 
existing regulations on the procedures for Government‟s initiative of proposing a new 
law (Minutes of meeting between the Inter-ministry Team with IAI-KAP on 17 
December 2003 p.1). It was further explained that the Team “welcomes any 
comments and/or opinions from the association but they could not be part of the 
Team according to Decree number 188/1998” (p. 1 & 5). However, the team stated 
that “the comments may or may not be incorporated in the law and any disagreement 
will be brought to the higher structural level in the Team (i.e. the Steering Committee 
of the Inter-ministry Team - Author)” (p. 5). Finally, the team also explained that 
although the PAL draft assigned the ultimate regulatory authority to the MoF, some 
of its functions would be delegated to the association. The hearing on the 12 
November was followed by another meeting on 17 December 2003 in which both 
parties agreed to discuss PAL draft in detail (Minutes of meeting between the Inter-
ministry Team with IAI-KAP on 17 December 2003). A series of meetings thus took 
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place in early January and March in which each and every article of the PAL draft 
was discussed.  
 
These meetings, however, did not fully assuage the disagreement between the IAI-
KAP and the Inter-ministry Team. One of the IAI-KAP‟s remaining discontents was 
their inability to access the draft (Letter from Chair of IAI-KAP to the Inter-Ministry 
Team dated 8 March 2004); to which the team responded that the draft was still 
ongoing and there needed to be consultation with the team‟s steering committee 
(Minutes of meeting between the Inter-ministry Team with IAI-KAP on 17 December 
2003). More importantly, the meeting did not reconcile the differences between the 
MoF and the IAI-KAP on some crucial provisions. On 7 May 2004, the IAI-KAP sent 
yet another letter to the Finance Minister, raising stronger objections to the draft. In 
the letter, the IAI-KAP again complained that “they have never been given the 
complete draft” and “the draft which was discussed with the Inter-ministry Team is 
significantly different from the substance disseminated in the public hearing” (Letter 
from Chair of IAI-KAP to the Inter-Ministry Team dated 8 March 2004). Mandatory 
KAP rotation remained the IAI-KAP‟s foremost objection and their most fundamental 
difference with the Inter-ministry Team. Objections were also raised to periodic 
renewal of the public accountant licence and the introduction of penal codes against 
public accountants/KAPs. They also challenged the proposed rule that the Minister 
was to endorse the professional association, arguing that “… the professional 
association is an independent organization recognized by the public and the state…. 
the relationship between the Government and the association should be equal as it has 
been so far” (p. 1). Finally, the IAI-KAP also raised objections to the provision that 
the authority of professional standard-setting was proposed to belong to the MoF', 
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citing the reason that “the practice of setting up professional standards has been in 
accordance with international standards and has been running independently under 
the authority of the association” (p. 2). Based on those objections, the association 
submitted an alternative concept of PAL to the Team.   
 
Despite the IAI‟s objections and alternative draft, the Inter-ministry Team went on 
submitting and presenting the draft to the Finance Minister. The team argued that the 
submission of  the PAL draft to Parliament by June 2004 was a required condition for 
the release of the second tranche of the ADB FGSSR loan totalling US$100 million 
(Memo from Chair of the Inter-ministry Team to the Finance Minister dated 29 June 
2004). Shortly afterwards, the Finance Minister submitted the draft to the President. 
In the letter, the Minister emphasized that the PAL draft submission to Parliament 
was mandated by Inpres number 5 year 2003, the Government‟s “Exit Strategy” for 
terminating cooperation with the IMF (Letter from the Finance Minister to the 
President dated 2 July 2004). It is necessary to note that the submitted PAL draft did 
not incorporate many of the IAI-KAP‟s objections as it included provisions on 
regulating licence renewal, audit firm rotation, penal codes for public 
accountants/KAPs, the requirement for a professional association to be endorsed by 
the Minister, and the Minister‟s holding of ultimate regulatory authority over the 
profession (see Section 6.4.4). 
 
The submission of the PAL draft to the President did not end the struggle. Following 
the MoF‟s submission, IAI-KAP sent another letter to the Finance Minister requesting 
a copy of the submitted PAL draft (Letter from Chair of IAI-KAP to the Indonesian 
Finance Minister dated 14 September 2004). Within the space of just two weeks, the 
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association also sent a letter directly to the State Secretary requesting access to the 
draft. In this letter, they reiterated some of their concerns, particularly the fact that 
they were not fully involved in the drafting process and thus wanted total 
involvement in the further processes of enacting the law which they believed were 
under the control of the State Secretary Office (Letter from Chair of IAI-KAP to the 
State Secretary dated 27 September 2004). The MoF finally sent the draft to IAI-KAP 
on 26 October 2004 (Letter from the MOF's Director General of Financial Institutions 
to Chairman of IAI-KAP dated 26 October 2004).  
6. 5. 2. The IAI attempts to infiltrate the regulatory process  
The MoF‟s decision to finally send the draft to IAI-KAP was also due to some 
political developments that boosted IAI-KAP‟s position, giving them the opportunity 
to launch an extraordinary attempt at infiltrating the drafting process. First, Indonesia 
went through yet another political transformation in 2004 as a result of the second 
post-crisis general election and the first direct presidential election ever. In October 
2004, the new directly elected president was inaugurated and, shortly afterwards, he 
introduced his cabinet, including the new Finance Minister. The figure of the new 
Finance Minister was important to the struggle between the MoF and IAI-KAP: he 
had a collegial connection as lecturer at Padjadjaran University in the city of Bandung 
with one of the profession‟s leading figures. This had provided access for the 
profession to the highest position in the decision-making hierarchy in terms of the 
PAL drafting process.  
 
The installation of the new cabinet and Finance Minister had seemingly influenced 
the PAL drafting process to the advantage of the profession. On 8 November 2004, 
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the State Secretary returned the submitted PAL draft to the Finance Minister and 
stated that “… with the formation of Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu (United Indonesia 
Cabinet, the name of the new cabinet - author), hereby we would like to ask your re-
confirmation regarding the submission of the draft” (Letter from the Indonesian State 
Secretary to the Finance Minister dated 8 November 2004 p.1). Referring to the IAI-
KAP‟s letter sent to him on 27 September 2004, the State Secretary also reminded the 
Finance Minister of the IAI-KAP‟s requests to be involved in the drafting process. 
The second event was the enactment of a new act regarding the legislative procedures 
(Act Number 10/2004) on 1 November 2001.  
 
Following those events, the Inter-ministry Team asked IAI-KAP to submit any 
additional comments and/or suggestions relating to the draft. Referring to Act 
No10/2004, IAI-KAP dismissed the request and stated that “…we believe that there 
are more important things other than merely submitting comments on the existing 
draft. We would like to propose for the setting-up of a new team that includes all 
parties related to the profession which would then thoroughly review the existing 
draft ...” (Letter from Chair of IAI-KAP to the Inter-ministry Team dated 29 
December 2004 p.2). The Inter-ministry Team did not change their stance and 
responded by describing all the steps it had taken in the drafting process until then 
(including the limited hearing/meetings with IAI-KAP between December 2003 and  
March 2004) and insisted that the procedures had not been contravened by any 
governing regulations, including the new Act number 10/2004 (Letter from the Inter-
Ministry Team to IAI-KAP 5 January 2005).  
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On 12 January 2005, IAI-KAP finally replied and asked for more time before 
submitting any comments, to which the Team responded by setting a deadline of 28 
February 2005. The IAI-KAP sent their “temporary response to the PAL draft” on 16 
March 2005 in a fifty-page letter. Accompanying the letter was the association‟s 
version of the PAL draft. As with the previous letters, the comments revolved around 
the issues of audit firm rotation, drafting procedures, and authority of standard-setting 
and governing the profession. Perhaps a new suggestion in the letter was the proposal 
of setting-up an “independent regulatory body” to replace the MoF as the regulator of 
the profession, and thus “all the provisions and/or authority previously related to the 
MoF would be taken over by the independent regulatory body” (Letter from Chair of 
IAI-KAP to the Inter-ministry Team dated 16 March 2005, Appendix II p. 2). Under 
this version of PAL, the authority of licensing, developing and supervising the 
profession was split between IAI-KAP and the new independent regulatory body. 
More specifically, the independent body mainly handled the licensing of public 
accountants and KAPs; registering foreign accountants/foreign accounting firms; and 
supervising the profession (which included monitoring administrative compliance and 
conducting reviews). On the other hand, the authority to set up accounting and 
auditing standards; compilation of codes of ethical conducts; administration of 
professional examinations, CPE, and quality reviews, it was proposed, would be 
under IAI-KAP. Obviously, KAP audit rotation, licence renewals, and penal codes for 
public accountants/KAPs were omitted from the proposed law whereas public 
accountant audit rotation was extended from three to seven years and only made 
mandatory for auditors of public companies.  
 
   
282  
 
The IAI-KAP‟s reaction had forced the Inter-ministry Team to defend their position 
on the topics raised by IAI-KAP to the new Finance Minister. Regarding IAI-KAP‟s 
proposal of setting up an independent regulatory body, the Inter-ministry Team 
argued that such body was not necessary because “there has not been any complaint 
from the public regarding the current regulatory arrangements under the MoF”; this 
body “should only be set up based on the demand by the profession‟s wider 
stakeholders”; and the proposal “does not offer any significant advantage over the 
proposal in the current PAL draft” (Memo from Chair of the Inter-ministry Team to 
the Finance Minister dated 21 December 2005). Citing the reason of protecting public 
interests, the Team also insisted on keeping the provisions on KAP audit rotation and 
detailing the conditions where conflicts of interests would be deemed to have 
occurred (p.2). On the issues of penal code provisions, the Team argued that their 
inclusion did not contravene any existing law and was a common practice in other 
countries (p.2-3). Finally, licence renewal was also deemed necessary as “a 
mechanism of periodical check over public accountants‟ competence” (p.3).  
 
By then, the struggle between the two institutions had already reached an 
unprecedented magnitude but was yet to reach its highest point. During the second 
half of 2005, the association launched a new and perhaps the most extraordinary 
attempt at exerting its influence on the drafting of PAL. On 15 September 2005, the 
Finance Minister formed Tim Review Rancangan Undang-undang tentang Akuntan 
Publik  or „the MoF's Team for Review on the drafting of the Public Accountant 
Law‟ (hereafter the Review Team) whose tasks were “to review the PAL draft; to 
recommend improvements on the draft based on the review and to conduct any other 
tasks related to the public accountant profession as and when required by the 
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Minister” (KMK number 445/KMK.01/2005). The influence of the profession in the 
Review Team was evident: the appointed Chair was the former Indonesian Finance 
Minister for the period of 1998–1999 (who at the time of appointment had joined 
Ernst & Young Indonesia as a consultant), the Team‟s secretary was assigned to the 
aforementioned colleague of the Finance Minister at Padjajaran University, and, 
finally, four of 11 members of the team were public accountants.
87
 
 
Based on its described tasks and position, the Review Team clearly had the power of 
exerting enormous pressure upon the Inter-ministry Team. In October 2005, the 
Review Team met with the Inter-ministry Team for the first time and asked that they 
attend the consultative meetings with the Review Team. On 22 December 2005, The 
Review Team sent a memo to the Inter-ministry Team in which the Team submitted a 
version of the PAL draft (Memo from Secretary of the Review Team to the Inter-
Ministry Team dated 22 December 2005). As in the IAI-KAP‟s draft, the Review 
Team‟s version also omitted licence renewal, KAP rotation, and MoF‟s endorsement 
of professional association. However, there were also major differences. First, the 
proposal of an independent regulatory body was abandoned. Secondly, auditor 
rotation was omitted altogether. In short, the Review Team‟s version of PAL draft 
was in many respects similar to the IAI-KAP version submitted to MoF on 16 March 
2005. Once again, the Inter-ministry Team had to defend its position, this time against 
the Review Team. Based on the meetings with the Review Team in October, the 
Inter-ministry Team addressed the Review Team‟s version by quoting the entire 
previous defence to its position over KAP rotation. The Inter-ministry also quoted the 
                                                 
87
 There were six members from the MoF but most of them were economists, one member represented 
publicly listed companies and another member represented “entrepreneurs”. 
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result of their survey conducted during the 2003 public hearing that “77% of all 
respondents and 64% of public accountant respondents agreed to the imposition of 
KAP rotation” (Memo from Chair of the Inter-ministry Team to the Finance Minister 
dated 21 December 2005 p.2-3). It also mentioned other industry-specific regulations 
that had already applied audit firm rotation which included regulations regarding 
audit on banks, public companies, SOEs and pension funds (p. 3). Other than those 
points, the differences over other matters remained the same.  
 
It is important to note that the Review Team‟s memo on 22 December 2005 was 
signed only by the Secretary of the Team and that the submitted PAL draft was not 
completely finished. In other words, the Review Team seemed to be in a rush to get it 
sent to the Inter-ministry Team which may have been influenced by another political 
event at that time. On 5 December 2005, the President announced a new Finance 
Minister in his first cabinet reshuffle. The change effectively terminated the 
profession‟s access to the MoF‟s decision-making structure. While the installation of 
the new Finance Minister had undermined the position of the Review Team, it was 
not a clear boost to the position of the Inter-ministry Team either. As in the previous 
change, the figure of the new Finance Minister was one decisive factor in determining 
the direction of the new PAL. The new Finance Minister was a US-educated 
economist, who had acted as the IMF‟s executive director for Southeast Asia and a 
consultant on the Indonesian economy for USAid. At the same time, she was also an 
academic at the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia who on several 
occasions had submitted opposition towards some of the Inter-ministry Team‟s 
concepts, particularly the KAP audit rotation (e.g. Letter from Head of Accounting 
Department of University of Indonesia to the Inter-Ministry Team dated 5 November 
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2003 and Letter from Head of Master of Accounting Programme - University of 
Indonesia to the Inter-Ministry Team 29 December 2003). Following an audience 
with the new Finance Minister at the end of 2005, IAI-KAP itself revived its efforts at 
overturning the KAP rotation provision stipulated in the 2002/2003 ministerial 
decrees. In addition to all the reasons stated in their previous letter dated 14 January 
2003, IAI-KAP argued that the regulation had been proven ineffective and:  
“… had instead caused problems, indicated by various KAPs‟ attempts of 
avoiding audit rotation. Recent wave of KAP mergers are merely formality 
masks on their attempts of swapping clients. On the other hand, the going 
concerns of KAPs that do not have the option of merging another KAP are 
seriously threaten” (Letter from Chair of IAI-KAP to the Finance Minister 
dated 16 January 2006). 
As an answer to the letter, the Inter-ministry Team submitted an equally powerful 
justification in defence of KAP audit rotation. The Team started its defence by 
arguing that the services of public accountants are used “not only by the management 
of the audited company but also a wide array of parties outside the company”; that 
public accountants and KAPs are the only independent parties that are allowed to 
access company records; and that they are the parties that various regulators relied on 
in performing their supervisory functions (Memo from Chair of the Inter-ministry 
Team to the Finance Minister dated 7 March 2006). The Team also argued that 
rotation is required because it would minimize auditor-client cosy relationships built 
through long audit tenure, and increase the degree of prudence of the existing auditor 
as their work will be reviewed by a new auditor. Another argument put forward by 
the Team was that it was also needed because “it is KAPs that are bidding in any 
tender for audit service, hence the independence of an auditor to his/her own KAP is 
not guaranteed”. Finally, the Team also insisted that the provision does not violate the 
WTO agreement; that it has been applied in other countries; and that it is not against 
market mechanisms because “in Indonesia there are 885 KAPs and 429 public 
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accountants. In fact, without audit rotation, the market for audit service is controlled 
by a group of KAPs commonly known as the Big Four” (Memo from Chair of the 
Inter-ministry Team to the Finance Minister dated 7 March 2006 p.2). On 28 March 
2006, the MoF sent a letter specifically quoting the above reasons to the IAI-KAP to 
officially respond to IAI-KAP‟s letter sent on 16 January 2006. Following this row, 
the Inter-ministry Team had the boost it needed when, in an internal meeting with her 
staff on 28 July 2006, the Finance Minister agreed to keep audit rotation, albeit with 
some modifications. The modification was that the rotation for public accountants 
was extended from three to five years. In effect, audit rotation was made applicable to 
both public accountants and KAPs every five years. Another modification was that a 
cooling-off period of two years was also made mandatory.  
6. 5. 3. The mobilization of pressures from peer institutions 
As on previous occasions, the modification did not put an end to the disagreement as 
IAI-KAP‟s efforts at challenging the provision and the PAL draft in general 
continued. In fact, during the second half of 2006, such efforts came not only from 
IAI-KAP but also from other institutions. One of the results was that the Inter-
ministry Team was forced to hold another round of public hearings in several cities 
across Indonesia and carry out another audience with IAI-KAP, both at the end of 
2006. Between December 2006 and January 2007, three institutions requested the 
MoF to review the audit rotation requirements. On 22 December 2006, the European 
Business Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia submitted their view on mandatory 
audit rotation directly to the Finance Minister. Somewhat echoing the concerns of 
IAI-KAP, the institution argued that mandatory audit rotation “is in conflict with the 
Indonesian Companies Act”; undermines shareholders‟ right of appointing auditors; 
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“restricts the proper functioning of a free market in audit services”; and increases 
audit costs (Letter from Chair of European Business Chamber of Commerce in 
Indonesia to the Finance Minister dated 22 December 2006). The letter was shortly 
followed by a similar request from the Foreign Bank Association of Indonesia, which 
stated that:  
“... according to the [Indonesian] Companies Act, the shareholders reserve 
the right of appointing the auditor. The requirement of mandatory audit 
rotation does not correspond with this right…. All foreign banks that we 
represent generally appoint their auditor globally. It is important for these 
foreign banks that they can execute their rights as guaranteed by the 
Companies Act. 
In our opinion, mandatory audit rotation can burden our members. Having 
the same auditor globally will abridge the process of group reporting in 
accordance with international standards and in a more cost-efficient way.  
On behalf of our members, we hope that exception is granted for foreign 
companies operating in Indonesia. Such exception is also applied in other 
countries … and also in Indonesian Banking Sector. Bank Indonesia, in 
particular, excluded foreign banks from mandatory audit rotation. 
We believe that every step taken to facilitate foreign investment and to 
protect the existing foreign corporations in Indonesia is very important for 
Indonesia‟s economic wellbeing within the global market” (Letter from 
Chair of Foreign Banks Association of Indonesia to the MoF dated 5 
January 2007) 
Responding to these requests, the Inter-ministry Team was adamant on their position. 
Its recommendation on these requests to the Finance Minister was to compile all the 
differences and continue with the next process of enacting the law. Referring to all 
the steps it had taken as well as the revisions made to the draft, the Team believed 
that:  
“... the draft has gone through a series of consultations and reviews within 
the Team. Revisions have also been made to accommodate 
comments/reactions obtained during public hearings… In our opinion, the 
draft is ready for submission to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights … 
Any unresolved differences arising from public comments and/or proposals 
could be included as notes for further discussion in the next stage.” (Memo 
from Chair of the Inter-ministry Team to the Finance Minister dated 12 
January 2007) 
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The Finance Minister nevertheless turned down the Team request, and stated that she 
wanted to meet with the Inter-ministry Team (Memo from Head of the Inter-ministry 
Team's Task Force to the MoF Secretary General dated 23 January 2007).  
 
Another group that voiced concerns over the PAL draft was the University of 
Indonesia. Concurrent with the Inter-ministry‟s attempt to continue with the process 
of enacting the law, the faculty at the Accountancy Department of University of 
Indonesia (FEUI) submitted its view on the PAL draft in the form of an “academic 
paper” on 22 January 2007. In essence, the letter was a request to the Minister that 
“the submission of PAL draft should be delayed and the draft should be further 
consulted” (Letter from Head of Accounting Department - University of Indonesia to 
the Finance Minister dated 22 January 2007). The submitted academic paper 
explained the reasons and justifications for this request. While the justification in the 
paper was quite lengthy, many of its core points were in resonance with those of the 
profession. Unsurprisingly, the recommendations given included, inter alia, power 
sharing between the MoF and the professional association as well as abandoning both 
KAP rotation and penal codes for public accountants/KAPs.  
 
Following this letter, the Inter-ministry Team and FEUI held a meeting on 2 May 
2007 to discuss the draft. Some degree of consensus achieved in the meeting included 
the need for: (1) extending the regulations for cooperation with foreign audit firms to 
„foreign audit organizations‟88, (2) reducing the proportion of foreign 
                                                 
88
 While “foreign audit firms” refer to any audit firms formed and located in a country outside 
Indonesia, a “foreign audit organization” refers to a form of cross-country affiliation of audit firms 
in which member firms have “equal rights and obligations” and “although its head office is located 
in a particular country, it does not mean that the organization/affiliation belongs to that country” 
(e.g. Kartikahadi, 2007 p. 57).  
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partners/professional workers in KAP (from one third to one tenth), and (3) lowering 
the requirement for becoming a non-public accountant partner (from passing the 
public accountants‟ code of ethical conduct examinations to just participating in a 
course on the same topic). However, disagreement also revolved around the same 
issues: audit rotation and the regulator of the profession. FEUI recommended the 
abolition of audit firm rotation and the reduction of the time requirement for public 
accountant rotation from five to three years. On the issue of the regulator of the 
profession, FEUI recommended the establishment of an independent committee 
whose responsibilities were to give advice to the Finance Minister on the violations of 
professional and ethical standards; and to actively supervise the profession including 
imposing sanctions. On this last matter, the Inter-ministry Team insisted on assigning 
all supervisory functions under the MoF.  
6. 5. 4. The impacts of the struggle and the ADB’s pressure 
An obvious impact of the MoF–IAI-KAP power struggle was the delay in the 
submission of the PAL draft. At the beginning of the ADB Loan 1618 programme, 
the date for submission of the PAL draft to the Parliament was set “towards the end of 
March 2000” (The Asian Development Bank, 2000 p.5). A year later, the PAL 
drafting was still not completed and was highlighted as a “condition with problems” 
under Loan 1618 progress review (Letter from the ADB - Indonesia Residence 
Mission to the MoF dated 16 February 2001 and Facsimile from the ADB to the MoF 
dated 25 April 2001). As described in the previous section, the MoF had completed a 
draft in 2000 but apparently, it did not meet the ADB‟s requirement. On 22 May 
2002, the ADB solemnly reminded the MoF that:  
“One of the outstanding conditions for the third tranche was the enactment 
of legislation making auditors liable for negligence in performing audits. A 
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partial waiver of this condition will be requested for release of the third 
tranche at this stage, however ADB‟s Board of Directors will need 
demonstration of the progress and commitment for this action” ( Letter 
from the ADB to the MoF dated 13 May 2002).  
In particular, the ADB requested that the MoF provide a “written confirmation” of 
“the status of amending the draft… the date of establishment of the inter-ministry 
team… and the planned date of submission to the Parliament” (Letter from the ADB 
to the MoF dated 13 May 2002). The ADB also required the MoF to submit “a copy 
of the most recent draft bill and a list of the review team”. As a response to the letter, 
the MoF promised that submission to parliament would be at the end of September 
2002 (Letter from the MoF to the ADB dated 16 May 2002).   
 
The promised deadline was not met as the Inter-ministry Team was not even 
established by the end of 2002 whereas, as stated earlier, the MoF Team‟s PAL draft 
of 2001/2002 was not accepted because it did not include the provisions for holding 
public accountants liable for audit negligence (The Asian Development Bank, 2002a). 
In November 2002, the ADB was promised a new deadline (September 2003) for the 
submission of PAL draft to the State Secretary (not the Parliament). Faced with this 
delay, the ADB requested a temporary solution in the form of a new ministerial 
decree which was fulfilled by the enactment of the Finance Minister Decree number 
423/KMK.06/2002 or the 2002 decree:  
“A  draft  public accountants  law  will  be  expanded  to  include  adequate  
provisions  for  liability  for  auditors for negligence,  to  be  submitted  to  
the  State  Secretary  Office  in  2003. As  an  interim  measure,  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  issued  a  decree  for  Public  Accountants  in  
September  2002  including provisions establishing liability of auditors for 
negligence and expanding the scope of coverage to include financial 
audits, performance audits, and special audits.” (The Asian Development 
Bank, 2002c p.16) 
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Realizing that Indonesia would not continue its cooperation with the IMF after 
December 2003, the ADB attempted to push the agenda throughout 2003. On 3 April 
2003, the ADB requested the PAL draft in progress that included all the changes 
made from the previous drafts (Letter from the ADB to the MoF dated 3 April 2003). 
In June 2003, the ADB sent a special envoy whose task was “to review provisions 
and status of the draft law” (Letter from the ADB to the MoF dated 18 June 2003). 
Shortly afterwards, the ADB set a weekly timetable of what needed to be done 
between August and October 2003 and issued the reminder that “it is critical for the 
MoF to meet the schedule in order to disburse the Second Tranche of US$100 
million” (Letter from the ADB to the MoF dated 8 August 2003). The weekly 
schedule detailed both the steps and the corresponding time frame to be met which in 
effect required the MoF to submit the PAL draft to State Secretary Office by “Week 
of 23 October (2003)”.  The ADB went on to mention that “this schedule requires a 
priority effort from your directorate that these dates are met …. as non-compliance to 
this condition would prevent the release of the second tranche…” and asked the MoF 
to confirm the schedule in writing. In its response, the MoF refused to give such 
confirmation and only stated that “the Government of Indonesia has mentioned in its 
exit strategy, which is the replacement of the Indonesia–IMF Letter of Intent, to 
submit the draft law to the parliament by June 2004” (Letter from the MoF to the 
ADB dated 28 August 2003). This proved unacceptable to the ADB which in a matter 
of hours responded by insisting that:  
“the exit strategy alone is not sufficient to meet conditionality of Second 
Tranche release. The draft Public Accounting Law, containing relevant 
provisions imposing liability on auditors, must be submitted to the State 
Secretary Office. …. submission of the draft law is required, not only a 
plan indicating future submission date.” (Letter from the ADB to the MoF 
dated 28 August 2003) 
The MoF finally and reluctantly confirmed that  
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“We will do our best effort to meet the condition and we expect to submit 
the draft to the State Secretary Office by the first week of November, in 
line with your previous letter” (Letter from the MoF to the ADB dated 4 
September 2003) 
 
Despite the commitment, the schedule was still falling behind. By early October 
2003, the MoF stated in its internal memo to the Executing Agency of the ADB‟s 
loans that submission in November was “impossible” and provided the reasons and 
the remaining steps needed in the drafting process. The MoF thus requested the help 
of the Government to negotiate and ask the ADB to alter the submission date to June 
2004, in accordance with the exit strategy (Memo from the MoF to the Coordinating 
Ministry of Economic Affairs dated 2 October 2003). When the ADB checked the 
progress of the draft on 28 October 2003 (Letter from the ADB to the MoF dated 28 
October 2003), unsurprisingly, the MoF replied that the draft would be submitted by 
the end of March 2004 (Letter from the MoF to the ADB dated 2 December 2003).  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the first attempt at submission was made in 
June 2004.  However, the reactions from the profession had partly caused the State 
Secretary to send the draft back to the MoF and thus significantly prolonged the 
process. The second attempt could only be made three years later. On 18 June 2007, 
the Inter-ministry Team submitted a request to the Finance Minister to submit the 
PAL draft for the next stage (Memo from Head of the Inter-ministry Team's Task 
Force to the MoF Secretary General dated 23 January 2007). By the end of 2007, it 
was submitted to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights for harmonization and 
synchronization with the existing legislations (Detik Finance, 2007). Currently the 
draft is back with the MoF with a minor problem arising from the harmonization 
process i.e. an objection from Bank Indonesia to the provisions that allow the MoF to 
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access a bank‟s customer data included in the working papers of and/or obtained by 
the bank‟s auditor. 
6. 6. Summary and conclusion  
In many respects, the 1997 Asian financial crisis was a crucial factor in explaining the 
dynamics of the accountancy profession during the last decade. Unlike the previous 
periods, the crisis has caused the free-market capitalism agenda to prevail in post-
1997 Indonesia. As explained by the stage theory, the last three decades have been a 
period of global financial era in the phases of free-market capitalist expansion in 
which countries are integrated into a single economic order through the 
institutionalization of cross-border capital markets. In this era, pressure on peripheral 
countries such as Indonesia to construct a fully compatible capital market came from 
multinational governmental institutions, viz. the IMF, the World Bank, and the ADB 
although other institutions such as the WTO, ASEAN, and APEC were also 
influential. Debts, grants, or “financial aid” were used as the means by which the 
necessary adjustment and update agendas were imposed. However, the liberalization 
agenda was only partially successful in shaping the Indonesian economy until mid-
1997, largely due to the New Order‟s version of capitalist economic management 
supported by the material forces of the New Order‟s crony capitalists.  
 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a turning point in the efforts to globalize the 
Indonesian economy as it fundamentally changed the power balance between 
domestic and global politico-economic forces in Indonesia. It had considerably 
undermined the structure of crony capitalism built by the New Order and given global 
capital interests a significant boost. The destruction of the New Order was perhaps the 
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biggest reason why global material and institutional forces of capitalism were able to 
exert their ideas of economic development in Indonesia. The cause of krismon itself 
has been a source of debate between the camps that blamed the domestic economic 
mismanagement and those who argued that Indonesia was a victim of the inherent 
volatility of the global financial system (see Hill, 1999; Khor, 1999 for a review of 
these arguments). Despite the debates, one should remember that global forces had 
also contributed to Indonesia‟s domestic conditions as the New Order built 
Indonesia‟s economy with the help of the global material (debts) and ideas (technical 
aid and programme) from the global institutions (the ADB and the World Bank) and 
Western creditors for 30 years before the crisis (e.g. Pilger, 2003). Regardless of the 
cause, the fall of the New Order signified the destruction of a social structure that 
rivalled and hindered global capitalism from prevailing in Indonesia. With the 
crumbling of the New Order as a rivalling material and ideal force, liberalization 
efforts significantly accelerated from 1997 as Indonesia had to tie herself to a series 
of policy commitments in order to receive urgent financial aid from the IMF. 
 
The narrative in this chapter further supports the contention that the source of change 
in the Indonesian accountancy profession was the need of the global capitalists to 
integrate Indonesia into the global economy. Adjustments and updates in the area of 
supporting structures such as the accountancy profession were an inseparable part of 
the IMF‟s agenda. Under the New Order‟s crony capitalism built upon family 
businesses, there was no urgent need of an “independent” accountancy profession. 
Had this model of capitalism been able to survive the crisis, there would be every 
reason to doubt that considerable changes in the profession would have occurred, let 
alone at the rate and magnitude of changes in the last ten years. With the country 
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marching towards liberal capitalism, the ADB and World Bank‟s efforts towards 
improving the country‟s accountancy professional infrastructure encountered virtually 
no major obstacles.  
 
As a result, the post-krismon period has been by far the most vibrant period in the 
history of the Indonesian accountancy profession. New professional standards were 
introduced and constantly revised; new routes to professional certification were 
introduced; and professional associations underwent significant transformations. The 
most intense dynamic, however, was in the area of regulation of the profession where 
the Government introduced several new regulations and attempted to promote the 
acceptance of these regulations into the new Public Accountant Law (PAL). These 
actions had initiated disharmony between the Government and the profession that led 
to power struggles between the two institutions over the last decade. All these major 
and unprecedented changes took place during a period of just over 10 years.  
 
Despite the enormous progress of the last decade, the history of the profession over 
the last five decades tells us that future changes are far from certain. The next chapter 
will attempt to integrate the story in this chapter with those of the previous periods. 
Perhaps the whole story may enable us to speculate on how the transformation may 
unfold in the future.   
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Chapter 7 : Summary, conclusion and reflections 
Chapter 7 
Summary, conclusion and reflections 
 
7. 1. Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to provide a summary and to conclude and reflect 
on this study. Section 7.2 summarizes the main themes emerging from the narratives 
of the development of the Indonesian accountancy profession covered in previous 
chapters. Section 7.3 presents some conclusions that can be drawn from the story 
from its early emergence until the latest developments following the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. Based on the two sections, some propositions regarding the future of 
the profession are offered in Section 7.4. Finally, Section 7.5 discusses some 
reflective points from the study in which the limitations of the study are evaluated and 
areas for further research are explored.  
7. 2. Summary  
This study has described and explained the historical development of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession from Indonesia‟s formal independence in 1949 until the 
present time. The study uses the world-system theory of globalization and Robert 
Cox‟s historical structure to identify the factors responsible for changes and 
transformations during the three major periods in the history of the Indonesian 
accountancy profession. In the first period, as in many other ex-colonized societies, 
the emergence and early development of the Indonesian accountancy profession was 
inseparable from the fact that as a newly independent country, Indonesia was a hotbed 
of various ideological, material and institutional forces trying to dominate the 
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country‟s rich natural resources. Combined with the diversity of nationalist 
aspirations of nation building, these forces created the most intense ideological 
battlefields in virtually every aspect of the new nation. Between 1949 and 1966, both 
capitalist and anti-capitalist ideological, material or institutional forces were present 
in Indonesia. It is undeniable that
 
many other ex-colonies, the newly independent Indonesia had neither clear proximity 
to nor close support from any of the then superpower blocs in terms of strategies of 
economic development. 
Despite the exciting start in the early years of the New Order under Soeharto, the 
profession failed to develop as might be expected during the 32 years of the New 
Order political regime. As in the previous period, the obstacle to full development of 
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the profession was the emergence of the New Order as an alternative structure to the 
Western capitalist system. With the help of the oil profit bonanza and societal 
sentiment against Westerners, the New Order developed its own developmental 
ideology based on economic growth and social justice. The two conditions also 
contributed to the New Order‟s success in nurturing domestic business groups to 
become powerful forces in the country. Many of these business groups were cronies 
and families of the key political figures in the country, thus rendering the New Order 
a politico-business regime. As a crony capitalism regime, the New Order did not see 
the need of building a strong and sophisticated accountancy profession as 
unnecessary and within this context, the development of the profession was once 
again compromised. On the other hand, most initiatives towards progress in the 
profession were due to external demand and stimulated by external parties, most 
notably the ADB and the World Bank. Such progress was notable in the first and last 
decades of the New Order era when foreign money was needed. However, the 
increasing power of the politico-business coalitions during the height of the New 
Order‟s power in the 1980s rendered the progress towards building a Western-like 
professional infrastructure of limited effects and intermittent at best. Some indicators 
show that the profession progressed relatively slowly despite the remarkable 
economic growth during the New Order regime. The size of the profession after 50 
years, for instance, is relatively small compared with other countries. The 
membership of the association only increased from 30 accountants in 1960 to just 
below 6,900 in 2005 (IAI, 2007a). The number of public accountants only increased 
from 13 new public accountants per year during the 30 years of the New Order (11 in 
1966 to 567 in 1998) to 77 new public accountants per year during the last 10 years 
(from 567 in 1998 to 1013 in 2009) (IAPI, 2009a; the MoF, 2004). The country‟s 
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profession is also smaller than those of countries with similar GDP per capita such as 
Pakistan and the Philippines and significantly smaller than those of Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore. With a population of around 225 million in 2008, there is 
only one registered accountant for almost every 6,000 citizens, one public accountant 
for 247,000 citizens and one public accounting firm to serve more than half a million 
of the population, (see e.g. The Asian Development Bank, 2003; IAPI, 2009a; the 
MoF, 2004; Tuanakotta, 2007).  
 
In other words, failure to implant the more fundamental Western-like capitalist 
structure in Indonesia‟s economy prior to 1997 hampered the progress towards a 
modern accountancy profession. One of the most critical changes brought about by 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis was the destruction of the material power of the 
domestic conglomerates and the fall of the New Order in 1998. In effect, the crisis 
has considerably undermined the New Order‟s crony capitalism as the prevailing 
system of political economy in Indonesia. The Government‟s submission to the IMF‟s 
financial aid symbolized the invasion of liberal, outward-looking economic 
management. Predictably, reforms and restructuring in accounting and the 
accountancy profession were a priority to enhance the countries‟ governance and 
accountability system. As a result, the transformations of the profession in order to 
meet international standards significantly accelerated during the last decade. Both the 
government and the profession rapidly adopted steps towards the internationalization 
of the professional infrastructure: new professional standards were introduced and 
constantly revised; new routes to professional certification were introduced; and 
professional associations have undergone significant transformations. The 
strengthening of the profession was also propagated by the Government through the 
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introduction of tougher regulation of the profession, especially those related to 
external auditors. Such sudden and dramatic changes have sparked intense tension 
between the Government and the accountancy profession in general and public 
accountants in particular over the last few years. 
7. 3. Conclusion  
From the narratives of the historical development of the Indonesian accountancy 
profession for approximately the last five decades, several conclusions can be drawn.  
First, the development of the accountancy profession in Indonesia is located in the 
wider and more fundamental dynamic of the country‟s system of political economy. 
In other words, the dynamics of the profession are best explained by paying attention 
to the changes in the country‟s wider socio-political and economic structure. The 
narrative of the historical development of the profession during the last five decades 
shows that changes and transformations of the profession follow the political changes 
in the country, as evident in the changes from the Old Order to the New Order in 
1966-67 or the fall of the New Order in 1998.  
 
Secondly, the development of the profession is inseparable from Indonesia‟s 
historical and contemporary position within the global capitalist economic order. In 
the context of ex-colony countries such as Indonesia, progress and changes in the 
profession are mainly driven by external pressures, more specifically the demand for 
the country to keep up and serve the needs of the global expansion of global capital. 
According to the world-system theory of globalization, the method and agent of these 
changes are part of and depend on the “modernization” or “development” of the 
wider socio-political and economic context as required by the pertaining capitalist 
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order in each period in question. In the first period of analysis, for example, the 
emergence and consolidation of the profession was achieved by nurturing the 
profession‟s elites through educational cooperation established by the US through the 
Ford Foundation project from 1951. In the second and third periods, the 
transformation was parallel with the debt and aid programmes under the 
administration of the World Bank (in 1973 and 1988) and the ADB (in 1993, 1998 
and 2002). As argued by the world-system theory, the change of the globalization 
agent was consistent with the restructuring of the capitalist relationship between 
states. The birth of the profession was framed within the neo-colonial period in which 
the US was dragging the world into her hegemony. On the contrary, changes in the 
second and third periods were no longer associated with the power of any particular 
nation but instead driven by the cross-border global capitalist class. 
 
Finally, by utilizing the concept of historical structure, the study has shown that the 
development of the Indonesian accountancy profession was affected by the 
interactions between rivalling structures influencing the direction of Indonesia‟s 
political economy. Efforts to directly modernize the profession in the first two periods 
proved futile because of the limited success of capitalism in capturing the country‟s 
system of political economy. This failure was due to the existence of alternative sets 
of ideological, material and institutional forces in each of those periods. In the first 
period, Soekarno‟s Old Order was the ultimate alternative structure, amalgamating 
the rising ideological and material forces of the Soviet Union as an alternative global 
power, and local socio-political factors such as nationalist ideology, religion and 
language barriers. In the second period, despite not being confrontational towards 
capitalism, the New Order became the obstructive structure through its developmental 
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ideology, backed by the material forces of its crony capitalists and domestic 
conglomerates. The transformation into a global-oriented profession gained a 
significant boost when the New Order crumbled in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, giving way to the liberal capitalism agenda. Given such 
developments, the next section discusses the possible trajectory of the development of 
the profession in the future. 
7. 4. Envisaging the future of the profession 
Structural and institutional change towards global capitalism could reach its full 
potential only recently as the 1997 krismon has profoundly altered the power balance 
in Indonesia. With fundamental changes in the political system, it can be reasonably 
assumed that Indonesia‟s march to capitalistic economy will continue in the near 
future. Among the most crucial changes are the right of freedom to establish political 
parties, the right to direct presidential elections and the limitation of the presidential 
term (two consecutive five-year terms). The most recent presidential election in 2009 
has shown that the technocrats have a greater political position in the Government as 
shown by the vice president figure (Boediono, an alumnus of the University of 
Pennsylvania‟s Wharton Business School - see e.g. Fitzpatrick, 2009; The Jakarta 
Post, 2009) and the President‟s choice of technocratic economists, most of whom are 
Western (US)-educated, in strategic ministerial posts (e.g. Purnomo, 2009; 
Qomariyah, 2009). These measures make it incredibly difficult for the New Order‟s 
crony capitalism to return since, as described in Chapter 5, the dominance of the 
President in such a political structure was central for this model of capitalism to 
persist. Despite having terminated cooperation with the IMF, Indonesia‟s level of 
foreign debts continues to rise from US$135.4 billion in 2003 to US$161.7 billion in 
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the third quarter of 2009, 60% of which are the Government‟s foreign debts (Bank 
Indonesia, 2009; BPS, 2009). Although the proportion of the debts to GDP has 
declined after the krismon from 96% in 1999 to 32% in 2009 (Bank Indonesia, 2009; 
INFID, 2009), the installments of the debts are still a heavy burden for the economy 
(e.g. inilah.com news portal, 2009; Palupi, 2009; Suara Karya, 2009). Such 
significant dependence on foreign debts certainly puts considerable pressure on the 
Government over its choice of economic management strategy and policies.  
 
In the absence of a consolidated rival politico-economic structure, the IMF, the World 
Bank and the ADB had been able to push a far-reaching economic liberalization 
agenda in Indonesia. However, there are also elements of uncertainty that may cast 
doubt as to whether the economic liberalization will continue at a full rate in the 
future. First, capitalism has never been a popular ideology in Indonesian society, 
which means that there is essentially no political basis for pursuing such a policy 
agenda (Rosser, 2002). Anti-foreign-interest sentiment, for example, was still a vote-
gathering issue in the recent 2009 presidential election. Secondly, the influence of the 
domestic conglomerate groups and the politico-business culture from the New Order 
cannot be dismissed fully as krismon did not destroy their economic power 
completely (see e.g. Aditjondro, 2002; Robison and Hadiz, 2004). Furthermore, while 
they have adapted to the post-krismon economic liberalization, their commitment to 
this agenda is not taken for granted (Chua, 2008). They support the democratization 
and liberalization of the economy as they see it as the most appropriate position to 
take, and there is no guarantee that the politico-business coalitions will not return in 
the future. The persistence of politico-business coalition culture is evident, for 
example, in the recent Bank Century bail-out scandal where large, politically 
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connected depositors in the bank allegedly influenced the Government‟s decision to 
save the bank, costing the country Rp 6.7 trillion, far beyond the amount agreed by 
parliament of Rp 1.3 trillion (e.g. Aswadi and Azhari, 2009; Duta Masyarakat, 2009; 
Maulia and Suharmoko, 2009; Witular et al., 2009). 
  
In effect, despite enormous progress and major changes during the last decade, there 
are also reasons to argue that the internationalization of the profession in the future is 
far from certain. Progress will depend on the transformation of the Indonesian society 
and state towards a capitalist socio-economic arrangement, which will provide 
fundamental demand for the profession. Without this fundamental change, the 
development of the profession in Indonesia will be intermittent at best, as evident 
during the last five decades of its history. Current conditions still show that demand 
for accountancy services has been created by statutory legislations, most of which are 
served by big international accountancy firms. On the other hand, users of the 
services of accountancy firms are largely institutions and corporations whereas 
individual users are virtually nonexistent. The profession‟s call for the Government‟s 
help to create a market for accountancy services still persist five decades after the 
formation of the profession (Media Akuntansi, 2007). Another source of uncertainty 
has been the termination of cooperation with the IMF as it means that pressure for 
change will be weakened. This is true, for example, in the case of the proposed Public 
Accountant Law which is still ongoing almost ten years after its initiation (e.g. 
Republika, 2009). In the meantime, the MoF issued another revision of the 2002/2003 
decrees in early 2008. The revision was nevertheless both limited and minor in scope. 
Perhaps the most crucial factor is the extension of the time limit for KAP audit 
rotation from a maximum of five to six consecutive years (KMK number 
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17/PMK.01/2008 Article 3.1). The new decree also reintroduced cooperatives (in the 
form of Koperasi Jasa Audit, literally means “audit service cooperative”) as a 
permissible form of business entity by which public accountants offer their services 
(Article 45). Finally, the decree also changed the Government-endorsed professional 
association of public accountants from the IAI to the IAPI (Article 58). Consequently, 
all regulatory authority functions such as the administration of the CPA exams and 
quality reviews were also transferred to the IAPI.  
7. 5. Reflections 
One of the aims of this study is to try to make sense of the history of the accountancy 
profession in its social, political and historical context. The history was told in the 
context of how the interaction between the structural forces of globalization and the 
rivalling structures that existed in different periods in its history shaped the 
Indonesian accountancy profession. In this section, some reflections on the limitations 
of this approach as well as possible areas for further research are offered. 
7. 5. 1. Limitations of the study 
It is now accepted that accounting history comprises myriad perspectives in 
establishing what constitutes fact and truth (e.g. Fleischman et al., 2003). There is no 
benchmark to tell which interpretation of history is considered as the truth and/or 
which approach or method is the best. Each method and interpretation is always 
subject to criticism and limitations. This study is no exception.  
 
Mainstream accounting research may find that the use of a particular set of theories 
(globalization theory and historical structure) in interpreting the history of the 
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Indonesian accountancy profession is problematic. Such an approach may be deemed 
subjective and not value-free. However, in reality there is no value-free explanation 
of social life. Any theory or methodology trying to explain the history of the 
accountancy profession, especially in the context of ex-colonized nations, is based on 
a particular assumption about the social relations between people and/or societies and 
the changes thereof. While mainstream accounting research assumes that the 
accountancy profession (and the economy/business in general) developed within a 
plurality and equality of power between people and nations, the critical perspective 
contests this assumption. Moreover, an explanation of social phenomena is always 
influenced by the theorist. A social theory “is always for someone and for some 
purpose” and is bounded by the perspectives of the theorist, derived from his/her 
social and political particularity of space and time (Cox, 1996 p.87). It is always 
commendable for a theory to recognize and reflect on its own perspective. 
 
Secondly, the explanation offered in this study, which locates the development of the 
Indonesian accountancy profession in the juxtaposition of global capitalism and 
rivalling structural forces, may not address all aspects or questions concerning the 
history of the accountancy profession in Indonesia. As implied in the analysis, the 
approach may be deemed state-centric and concentrates on the politics and economic 
aspects of the development of the profession. While accepting this limitation, it is 
equally important to note that the offered explanation is the most appropriate 
considering the objective of the study and the socio-political history of Indonesia. 
Globalization theory has enabled the study to capture and make sense of the major 
social forces that have driven changes in the profession. Understanding the 
development of the profession in a country such as Indonesia without incorporating 
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power configurations between states would be incomplete, to say the least. Historical 
structure, on the other hand, incorporates the dynamics of the profession within the 
more fundamental structural changes (the “framework of action”) over a long period.  
7. 5. 2. Areas for further research 
While this study puts emphasis on the influence of politics and economics on the 
accountancy profession at the state level, future studies may wish to explore the 
societal forces that may become the important sources of change in the profession. 
One of the most important impacts of krismon is the end of the New Order‟s 
ideological repression, which gives the opportunity to almost any kind of political and 
ideological aspirations to flourish. During Sukarno‟s Old Order period, Islamic 
movements were heavily involved in the political scene while Suharto‟s authoritarian 
political regime prevented the development of any Islamic identities (see Footnote 
25). As a result, the resurrection of Islam in Indonesian socio-economic and political 
life has only emerged strongly in the last decade despite the fact that Muslims make 
up the majority of the population in the country. One of the areas that received 
attention following the resurgence of Islam is the economy, which was marked by the 
rise of Islamic financial institutions and the sharia capital market (see e.g. Akuntan 
Indonesia, 2007). In this regard, further research may take an interest in investigating 
the impact of Islam as a powerful force in Indonesian society on the development of 
the profession. Over the last decade, there has been significant development of 
Islamic accounting infrastructure in the profession. Today, the IAI has set up the 
Sharia Accounting Committee, which has issued Standard Akuntansi Keuangan 
Syariah (Sharia Financial Accounting Standards), a codification of a conceptual 
framework and six sharia financial accounting standards (IAI, 2009a), including the 
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conduct of the Certified Syariah Accountant Examination (IAI, 2009b). It would be 
interesting to speculate how Islamic-based accounting will influence the development 
of the profession in the future in relation to its conventional counterpart.  
 
Shifting the attention from structural analysis to social agents involved in the 
profession may also form the basis for further research. Regarding the global actor, 
for example, it would be interesting to see whether there is a change/evolution in the 
inter-governmental regulatory institutions‟ (such as the World Bank and the ADB in 
the case of Indonesia) views on the benchmark model of accountancy and the 
accountancy profession in developing countries across different periods. The role and 
influence of big international firms is also an area for further exploration. In the case 
of Indonesia, at least until the last decade, the direct role of these firms in influencing 
the statutory legislation seemed to be undermined by the strong position of the 
government, a political culture inherited from the New Order. This may not be the 
case in future and in other areas such as the intra-professional regulatory functions. 
Finally, future research may want to look more closely into the reasons or motives as 
to why the policy makers in peripheral/ex-colony countries willingly adopt regulatory 
measures that are stricter than the model. In the context of this study, for example, 
this phenomenon is evident in the MoF‟s insistence on imposing audit firm rotation 
(see Chapter 6, in particular Section 6.4.4), a provision that even most model 
countries (including the US) are reluctant to impose. 
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Appendix 1: Act number 34 year 1954 
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Appendix 2: The World Bank Loan Agreement INO-1618 
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Appendix 3: Samples of the ADB letters to the Government of Indonesia 
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Appendix 4: The IAI letter to the State Secretary Office 
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Appendix 5: A sample of the IAI letter to the Finance Minister  
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Appendix 6: Suharto’s family wealth  
A6-1: The wealth of Soeharto’s children 
Name of Son / Daughter  Wealth*  Business corporations 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana ("Tutut") 700  Citra Lamtoro Gung Group 
Bambang Trihatmojo 3,000 Bimantara Citra 
Hutomo Mandala Putra ("Tommy") 800 Humpuss Group 
Sigit Harjoyudanto 800 Humpuss Group 
Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih ("Mamiek") 30 Manggala Krida Yudha 
Siti Hediati Hariyadi ("Titiek") 75 Various 
Adapted from Colmey and Liebhold, 1999. Note: * Wealth is US$ million as of 1998. 
A6-2: Charities related to President Soeharto 
Controller Foundation names Business activities (selections) 
Soeharto 1. Yayasan Supersemar; 
2. Yayasan Dharma Bhakti 
Sosial (Dharmais); 
3. Yayasan Dana Abadi Karya 
Bakti (Dakab); 
4. Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim 
Pancasila; 
5. Yayasan Serangan Umum 1 
Maret; 
6. Yayasan Bantuan Beasiswa 
Jatim Piatu Tri Komando 
Rakyat, (Yayasan Trikora);  
7. Yayasan Dwikora;  
8. Yayasan Seroja; 
9. Yayasan Nusantara Indah;  
10. Yayasan Dharma Kusuma;  
11. Yayasan Purna Bhakti 
Pertiwi;  
12. Yayasan Dana Sejahtera 
Mandiri 
Solely or jointly invest in: 
1. Mass media (Gatra magazine) 
2. Banking (Bank Duta; Bank Windu 
Kentjana; Bank Umum Nasional; 
Bank Bukopin; Bank Umum Tugu; 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia)  
3. Manufaturing (PT Multi Nitroma 
Kimia; PT Indocement Tunggal 
Prakarsa; PT Nusantara Ampera 
Bakti; PT Wahana Wirawan Wisma 
Wirawan; PT Fendi Indah PT 
Kabelindo Murni; PT Kalhold 
Utama; PT Kertas Kraft Aceh; PT 
Kiani Lestari; PT Kiani Murni; PT 
Sagatrade Murni) 
4. Agriculture & food supply (PT Teh 
Nusamba; PT Gunung Madu 
Plantations; PT Gula Putih Mataram; 
PT Werkudara Sakti)  
5. Civil aviation (Sempati Airlines, 
Mandala Airlines) 
6. Foresty and timber:  
7. Some of the above firms are holding 
companies which have investment in 
mining (including Freeeport), 
insurance, automotive, and hotel 
industry 
Tien 
Soeharto 
(wife) 
13. Yayasan Harapan Kita; 
14. Yayasan Kartika Chandra;  
15. Yayasan Kartika Djaja;  
16. Yayasan Dana Gotong 
Royong Kemanusiaan 
Have shares in companies such as PT 
Bogasari Flour Mills; PT Bank Windu 
Kencana; PT Kalhold Utama; PT Fatex 
Tory; PT Gula Putih Mataram; PT 
Gunung Madu Plantation; PT Hanurata; 
PT Harapan Insani; PT Kartika Chandra; 
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Controller Foundation names Business activities (selections) 
PT Kartika Tama; PT Marga Bima Sakti; 
PT Rimba Segara Lines; PT Santi Murni 
Plywood; RS Harapan Kita. 
The biggest is PT Bogasari mills, a flour 
mill which became a conglomerate in the 
instant food industry. The company was 
founded by Liem Sioe Liong and 
Sudwikatmono (Soeharto‟s nephew) to 
monopolize the trading of wheat 
originating from the US food aid 
programme under Public Law 480 in 
1971.  
Soeharto‟s 
Trusted 
Persons  
17. Toyota Astra Foundation, 
18. Yayasan Astra Dharma 
Bhakti,  
19. Yayasan Dana Bantuan Astra, 
20. Yayasan Dharma Satya 
Nusantara 
21. Yayasan Abdi Bangsa, 
22. Yayasan Amal Abadi 
Beasiswa Orangtua Bimbing 
Terpadu (ORBIT) 
 
Sons/ 
daughters 
and their 
husbands/ 
wives 
23. Yayasan Tiara Indonesia, 
24. Yayasan Dharma Setia, 
25. Yayasan Bhakti Nusantara 
Indah, alias Yayasan Tiara 
Putra, 
26. Yayasan Bimantara  
27. Yayasan Bhakti Putra Bangsa; 
28. Yayasan IMI (Ikatan Motoris 
Indonesia) Lampung;  
29. Yayasan Badan Intelejen 
ABRI (BIA), 
30. Yayasan Veteran Integrasi 
Timor Timur; 
31. Yayasan Hati, 
32. Yayasan Taman Buah 
Mekarsari (TMB) 
33. Yayasan Bunga Nusantara 
Owner of PT Abdi Bangsa, publisher of 
Republika national newspaper and 
Ummat magazine 
In laws and 
their 
families 
34. Yayasan Tri Guna Bhakti, 
35. Yayasan Pembangunan Jawa 
Barat,  
36. Yayasan 17 Agustus 1945,  
37. Yayasan Pendidikan Triguna; 
38. Yayasan Balai Indah 
Yayasan Balai Indah co-ordinates trade 
and export activities in some Asian & 
European countries. This business is 
conducted with the help of some 
conglomerate groups such as Texmaco 
Bakrie Group, and Nugra Santana. 
Distant 
relatives  
39. Yayasan Mangadeg, operated 
by distant relatives of Tien 
Soeharto in Solo; 
40. Yayasan Kemusuk 
Somenggalan, operated by 
Mangadeg was set up to handle royal 
cemetery but has stakes in various 
business such as  
1. PT Gunung Ngadeg Jaya which owns 
stakes in PT Semen Nusantara 
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Controller Foundation names Business activities (selections) 
relatives of Soeharto in 
Kemusuk Yogyakarta. 
cement factory; Gajah Tunggal cable 
factory, PT Kabelmetal Indonesia,  
2. 3 joint venture companies with 
Korean Miwon groups;  
3. PT Pasopati, operated by Bob Hasan, 
owns shares in PT Karana Lines dan 
PT Garsa Line (timber transport 
companies)  
4. Hotels (Sahid, Kartika Chandra,  
5. Forestry consession (PT Sahid 
Timber).  
6. Livestock Farm (PT Rejo Sari Bumi)  
which also has shares in PT Gunung 
Madu Plantations and PT Gula Putih 
Mataram (sugar refinery),  
 
Yayasan Kemusuk Somenggalan has 
forestry concession in Suriname, Brazil 
and Guyana through MUSA (Mitra 
Usaha Sejati Abadi) Group.  
Adapted from Aditjondro (2004). Note: Yayasan is Indonesian for foundation. PT, short for 
Perseroan Terbatas, is Indonesian for limited company (Ltd.) 
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